INTRODUCTION

The Doctrine of Bhakti was not Imported

In his preface to his Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Dr. S. Radhakrishnan writes: `Ignorance of the subject of Indian thought is profound. To the modern mind Indian Philosophy means two or three `silly” notions about mā yā, or the delusiveness of the world, karma, or belief in fate, and tyā ga, or the ascetic desire to be rid of the flesh. Even these simple notions, it is said, are wrapped up in barbarous nomenclature and chaotic clouds of vapour and verbiage, looked upon by the "natives" as wonders of intellect. After a six months’ tour from Calcutta to Cape Comorin, our modern aesthete dismisses the whole of Indian culture and philosophy as "pantheism,” "worthless scholasticism,” "a mere play upon words," "at all events nothing similar to Plato or Aristotle, or even Plotinus or Bacon.”'

No wonder that such Western scholars have traced the origin of the doctrine of bhakti (or devotion to God) to Christian ideas and influences. Even E. B. Cowell who has done yeomen service to the cause of Indian philosophy by his pioneering works through his translations of Sarvadarśanaśaṅgraha, Nyāyakusumāṇjali and Śāṅḍilyaśatasūtras is constrained to write in his preface to the last-mentioned work (p. viii) thus: `Dr. Lorinser, Prof. Lassen, and Prof. Weber have maintained that the doctrine of bhakti arose in India as a more or less direct reflection of Christian ideas.

`I cannot pretend to speak positively on the controversy; I would only confess to a somewhat hesitating inclination towards Prof. Weber’s moderate opinion on the question.’ Of course, these views have been contradicted by other scholars who have made a more dispassionate study of Indian thought. Garbe says in his Philosophy of Ancient India (p. 84): ‘For one who is intimate with the intellectual life of ancient India, the doctrine of bhakti is entirely conceivable as a genuine product of India. No shadow of evidence has up to now been brought forward to support the theory that the conception of bhakti is derived from Christianity. The religious significance contained in the word bhakti has nothing exclusively about it that is specially Christian. Not only have devotion to God and faith in Him developed themselves gradually in other monotheistic religions, but even beyond the circle of monotheistic ideas the two conceptions are to be found. And particularly in India we possess all the essentials on the strength of which we have to regard bhakti as ‘indigenous’ fact, as Barth says, since monotheistic ideas are to be found prevalent from the time of the Rgveda onward through almost all the periods of the religious history of India, and the powerful longings after the divine, peculiar to the Indian soul from yore, must have developed such sentiments as divine love and divine faith in a popularly conceived monotheism.’

Its Vedic Origin

Actually the doctrine of bhakti is as old as the Rgveda itself. While commenting on the aphorism ‘bhaktih prameyā śrutibhyah’ (Śāṅḍilya Sūtras 1.2.9) Śrī Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha has accumulated quite a mass of unassailable evidence to prove its Vedic origin. Take for instance the ṛk where the Lord as been praised and there is also a reference to the recitation of His names: ‘You praise that Ancient Cause, the Origin of ṛta (the
Divine Law), according to your knowledge. You will be freed from birth. If you cannot praise Him, recite His name. However, we, O Lord Viṣṇu, devote ourselves to your light and attributeless form!’ (R. V. 1.156.3) And again, this rāk where there is a clear allusion to the hearing and reciting of His names as also surrender to Him: 'He who offers (his all) to Lord Viṣṇu, the husband of Śrī (or Lakṣmī), the Ancient Cause, the Creator, the Ever-new, he who recites the glorious birth and works of this glorious Being, that giver, that reciter, obtains fame (or material enjoyments) and reaches the Highest Abode’ (R.V.1.156.2). Another rāk considers Indra the great God as father and mother: 'O Vasu! O Śatākratu! You have become our father! You are Mother! So now we bow down to you!' (R. V. 8.98.11)

Coming to the Upaniṣads we see that though they are mainly devoted to knowledge, the doctrine of grace which is an important aspect of the philosophy of devotion, is evident, as for instance, in this statement of the Kaṭha Upaniṣad: ‘Whom the Ātman chooses, by him is He obtained; to him He reveals Himself’ (2.23). So also in another: ‘When he who is devoid of desire-motivated actions, through the grace of God the supporter, sees the Paramātman’s glory, then does he become freed from sorrow’ (ibid 2.20) The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad actually uses the word bhakti and clearly states prapatti (self-surrender) also: ‘He who has supreme devotion (bhakti) towards God, and as towards God so towards the teacher, to him verily, the great soul, all these things declared (thus far) will reveal themselves’ (6.23) ‘To Him who at the beginning created Brahmā, and who gave the Vedas to him, to Him the God who reveals the knowledge of Himself, desirous of liberation, do I fly for refuge’ (6.18).

The Bhāgavata Religion

Gradually the doctrine of bhakti was systematised into a regular philosophy and religion. It came to be known as the Bhāgavata-religion and has also been variously designated as the Nārāyaṇīya section of the Mahābhārata, the Viṣṇu Purāṇa, the Bhagavad Gītā, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, the Pāñcarātra Āgamas and the Bhakti Sūtras of Śāṅkilya and Nārada.

Not being satisfied with the impersonal Brahman of the Upaniṣads, the Bhāgavata religion has converted Brahman into the Personal God. Īśvara, Nārāyaṇa and Kṛṣṇa-Vāsudeva are the names most commonly used with respect to Him. He cannot be apprehended by the senses nor by logic and arguments. Śrutis or the scriptures at best point towards Him. His grace is the supreme factor in realising Him. Single-minded devotion (ekāntīkabhakti) is the only thing by which His grace can be obtained and He can be captured. Actually He is not independent as others made Him out to be, because, He is subject to the will of his devotees (bhaktaparādhīna). He is always fond of those devoted to Him and reveals Himself to them. Complete resignation (prapatti or śaraṇagati) is another means of attaining Him. These are its chief tenets in brief.

The Sūtras of Nārada and Śāṅkilya

In Sanskrit literature it is commonly seen that the propounder of any doctrine or philosophy or for that matter, any branch of knowledge puts it down in the form of sūtras or aphoristic statements which are supposed to be brief but pregnant with deep meaning. Either his disciples or those coming in that tradition generally compose more detailed explanations of those sūtras called variously as bhāṣya, vṛtti, vārttika or ēkāntikā, depending upon their length, form etc. It is impossible to understand these sūtras accurately without the help of such traditional
commentaries. Since this sūtra literature along with the respective commentaries forms the basic work in any branch of knowledge it is usual for the students of that branch to make a deep study of them. Looking from this standpoint, it is imperative that serious students of the doctrine of devotion must make a careful study of both the Nārada Bhakti Sūtras and the Śāṅkilya Bhakti Sūtras. Before we delve deeper into the latter which is the subject of this work, it is worthwhile making a brief comparative study of these two.

Though both the works are associated with the names of two great sages who adorned the spiritual horizon of our country, though there are no doctrinal differences between them, and though they deal with the subject in a more or less systematic way, their mode of approach to the subject is so different that we are compelled to say that each is complementary to the other and that our study of devotion will not be complete without studying both of them. Śāṅkilya's approach is more intellectual while Nārada's is more emotional and practical. Hence we can safely say that Śāṅkilya is very particular in mentioning the pramāṇas (the means of knowledge) as also the nature and mutual relationship among the various constituents of the prameya (what is to be known) likeĪśvara, jīva and prakṛti. He discusses about the reality of creation, controverts the theory that knowledge alone can give liberation, propounds and defends devotion as the sole means of liberation and also delineates the various forms of devotion. Nārada however does not seem to be interested at all in these intellectual gymnastics, but goes straight to the practical aspects. Apart from defining devotion and describing its various forms, he gives several invaluable practical hints, warns against the pitfalls, eulogises the importance of devotion, gives its special characteristics to enable the aspirants to imitate them and finally paints a vivid picture of the ideal devotees.

When we look at the sūtras of Jaimini, Patañjali or Bādarāṇa, we would perhaps be more right in putting the sūtras of Śāṅkilya in that class. May be for the same reason, several commentators have chosen to comment upon these sūtras and leave Nārada's untouched. Neither do the latter need any commentary since they are so simple and direct.

It would however be extremely interesting, and even fascinating, if an attempt could be made to intelligently synthesise the two into a single treatise on devotion.

Śāṅkilya, the Sūtra

The ancient Indian mind seems to be sweetly indifferent to ‘history’. If an oriental scholar of the West is prepared to devote his whole life-time to collect the exact historical date regarding a Śaṅkara’s date of birth, just to know whether he was born in 680 A. D. or 788 A.D., the Indian paṇḍita would begin to trace ‘his story’ to the promised descent of Lord Śiva (who is also known as Śaṅkara) in Kailāsa! That is why Dr. S. Radhakrishnan says that the problem of determining the exact dates of early Indian systems is as fascinating as it is insoluble and it has furnished a field for the wildest hypotheses, wonderful reconstruction and bold romance.’ The problem of our Śāṅkilya is no exception to this.

If we can just manage to forget the well-known Vedic dictum śā tā yurvai puruṣaḥ (‘man lives but hundred years’), we will be amazed to find our Śāṅkilya almost in every age! In the Tretā yuga we find him as the spiritual guide of king Dilīpa. In the Dvāpara age, he is the priest to the king Nanda of the cowherds. In the beginning of this Kaliyuga, he is very busy performing the Putreṣṭi sacrifice of Śatānīka, the son of Janamejaya.
At one time he is the priest of king Triś aṅ ku. At another time he is seen chatting with Bhīṣma, the grand old man of the Mahā bhārata sitting on his bed of arrows! He is also the father of Śāṅkha and Likhita, the two well-known authors of a smṛti.

Neither can we fall back on the Upaniṣads which contain his name, since there are three Śāṅśālīyas mentioned in the Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad alone, and since the dates of these Upaniṣads themselves have not been determined with any accuracy so far. There is a well-known passage in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad which goes by the name Śāṅśālīya-vidyā which is also referred to in the Śāṅśālīya Sūtras. But the commentator says that it refers to an earlier Śāṅśālīya. Nor is there any definite internal evidence in the sūtra-work itself.

However there is some evidence available, though very fragile, with the help of which we may just limit the period of his existence. Śāṅśālīya has been quoted as an author in the Vañcarātra literature. The author of these Bhaktisūtras also belongs to the Vañcarātra school since that is the philosophy propounded here. He draws upon the Bhagavad Gītā freely and even directly mentions it once. Therefore he comes definitely after the age of the Mahā bhārata (500 B.C.).

Although the Bhāgavata Purāṇa occupies almost a central place in this Bhāgavata cult there is no direct reference to it anywhere in the sūtras. Even Svapneśvara, the earliest commentator on these sūtras, has not quoted from it, except once (sūtra, 72) and that too not having any direct bearing on the sūtra itself, though he quotes profusely from the Viṣṇu Purāṇa. It is only Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha that finds a reference to the Bhāgavata in the sūtra, while interpreting the words tathā hyā ha. Since Svapneśvara supplies a more apt quotation from the Gītā to this very sūtra, we need not take Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha’s reference very seriously. Hence we would not be wrong if we say that Śāṅśālīya existed before the composition of the Bhāgavata which is normally assigned to 900 A.D. This limits his existence to the period between 500 B.C. and 900 A.D.

Two sages, Kaśyapa and Bādarāyaṇa, are mentioned in the sūtras 29 and 30. Bādarāyaṇa is mentioned again in sūtra, 91. It is well-known that he is the author of the Vedānta sūtras, though nothing definite can be said about Kaśyapa. Indian scholars put the lower limit of the date of these sūtras to 200 B.C.

Then, there is a definite and clear reference to the Yoga system of Patañjali in the sūtra, 19. The words samādhi (sūtra, 20) and kliṣṭa (sūtra, 33) belong to yogic terminology. Hence the Yoga of Patañjali must have been a well-known system by the time of Śāṅśālīya. According to scholars the Yogasūtras must have been composed anywhere between 200 B.C. and A.D. 300. Since there are clear indications that our author believed in the satkāryavāda (the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause), and also a few other doctrines of the Sāṅkhya school, and since the earliest work of this system viz., Saṅkhya Kārīka of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is assigned to the 3rd century A.D., Śāṅśālīya’s date is now restricted to the period between A.D. 200 and A.D. 900.

There are two other works Śāṅśālīyaṁhitā and Śāṅśālīya Upaniṣad associated with the name of Śāṅśālīya. But nothing can be said definitely whether our sūtra-kāra was their author.

Svapneśvara, the Bhāṣya

The earliest extant commentary on the sūtras of Śāṅśālīya is that by Svapneśvara. It has been traditionally known as the Bhāṣya. In fact, Svapneśvara himself has christened it so.
In trying to determine his date, we meet with almost similar difficulties since there is scant evidence on which to base our conclusions. He has quoted the Bhāgavata only once in his commentary (sūtras 72) by which we can guess that he comes after the age of the Bhāgavata. But, since he has not quoted profusely though there was plenty of scope for that, we are constrained to say that this purāṇa had not as yet attained the fame and status as it did in later years. Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, a later commentator refers to a commentary on the sūtras by Śrī Rāmānuja. Granting that this is the famous ācārya of Viśiṣṭādvaita and since Svapneśvara does not seem to be aware of this commentary we may say that Svapneśvara existed between 900 A.D. and 1000 A.D.

But then, there is another difficulty. It is definitely known that Svapneśvara wrote a work called Kaumudī-prabhā. Wherein he refers to the Sāṅkhya pravacana-sūtras and assigns it to Paścaikha instead of Kapila as the tradition goes. Scholars are almost unanimous in assigning this latter work to the 14th century A.D. Again, Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (17th century A.D.) often refers to the views of Svapneśvara especially when he is differing from him. Hence we will have to conclude that Svapneśvara must have existed between the 14th and the 17th centuries, much nearer the 14th than the 17th.

Svapneśvara belongs to Bengal. He himself says in the closing verse to his commentary that he is the son of Jaleśvara who was the commander-in-chief of kings and that Jaleśvara was the son of Viśāra, the sovereign monarch of the Gauḍa-adesh (i.e. Bengal). While quoting from the Abhijñāna Śākuntala (See sūtras, 6) he has given the Gauḍa-recension. This also confirms that he was a native of Bengal.

His commentary on the sūtras is simple and gives a natural explanation. It occupies the same place in antiquity and importance with respect to the Śāṅkilya Sūtras as the Bhāṣya of Vyāsā on the Yoga Sūtras of Patañjali.

He himself mentions two of his works wherein he says, he has discussed the subject of the pramāṇa as in greater detail. They are: Nyāyatattvanikāṣa and Vedāntatattvanikāṣa. Unfortunately neither of the works is available now.

Other Commentators

Two other commentaries have so far been discovered and published: The Bhakticandrikā of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha and another by Bhavadeva.

Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha was an advaitic monk and lived in the latter half of the seventeenth century at Vārāṇasī. He was a disciple of Śrī Rāma Tīrtha and had his education under one Vāsudeva. He was a very great scholar and has ten other works to his credit which include two commentaries on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Siddhāntabindhu, two on the Sāṅkhya treatises, Tattvā-kamudī and Sāṅkhya-rākṣa, one commentary each on the Yoga Sūtras and Nyāya-yakṣumāṇī of Udayana and another work on devotion, Bhaktyadhikaranamālā.

His Bhakticandrikā is very exhaustive and replete with quotations, especially from the Bhāgavata. His
interpretations are elaborate and often independent of Svapneś vara's views though at times he elucidates his Bhāṣya also. It is evident that he has drawn largely upon Madhusūdana's Bhagavad-bhaktirasāyaṇa. It is interesting to note that Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha while commenting on the sūtras 32 and 33, refers to the interpretation of Śrī Rāmaṇujacārya. Since Śrī Rāmaṇuja's life and works are well-preserved in the annals of his Maṭhas and since nothing has been heard of his having ever written a commentary on the Śāṉḍilya Sūtras, this statement of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha is intriguing. It is perhaps worthwhile making some research in this direction.

Another factor to be noted in Bhakticandrikā is that it gives three additional sūtras which are not in Svapneśvara's version, but omits one from the latter.

Other Bhaktisūtras

Śrī Baladeva Upādhyāya in his Sanskrit introduction to the excellent edition of Bhakticandrikā refers to two other sūtra-works on bhakti which he has appended at the end: Bhaktimāṁsā and Parabhaktisūtrāṇi. The former is a work of the thirteenth century and consists of 102 sūtras, divided into four chapters, each chapter being subdivided again into two pādās. Śrī Upādhyāya thinks that this work belongs to the Bhāgavata cult and follows very closely the doctrines of the Mukṭaphala of Bopadeva. The latter is the work of Svāmī Hariharāraṇya, a well-known scholar on Yoga. It is a short work of only 26 sūtras and is divided into four āhnikas.

The Philosophy of Śāṉḍilya Sūtras

Let us now turn to the philosophy of Śāṉḍilya as depicted in his sūtras, depending mainly on the Bhāṣya of Svapneśāvaraseva. For the sake of convenience in understanding the philosophy of the sūtras, the same can be discussed under four main headings: (a) the Pramāṇas or means of knowledge; (b) the Prameyas or the objects to be known through these means; (c) The Sādhanas or the practical means to be adopted to gain liberation; and (d) Mukti or absolute liberation from mundane existence.

(a) The Pramāṇas:

Though the philosophy of the sutras seems to have a close affinity with the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, only three means of knowledge like the three eyes of Rudra are accepted, as against the six of the Śaṅkara school. They are pratyakṣa or sense-perception, anumāna or inference, and śabda or verbal testimony of the scriptures, the last one being the chief. In sense-perception an important point to be noted is that knowledge through it comes in two stages: When the senses come into contact with their objects, the ignorance covering them is first destroyed, and then only, knowledge will arise in the mind due to its being illumined by the soul.

(b) The Prameyas:

Īśvara or God, jīva or the individual soul and jagat or the created world are the three prameyas we come across in the work as in other theistic treatises.
Ī ś vara, Paracit and Bhajanī ya are the words used in the sūtras to denote God. Devotion to him gives liberation, and not knowledge of him. His śakti or power is called mā yā or prakṛti. He creates the world through this mā yaśakti, putting it up as a screen as it were. Hence it is the prakṛti that undergoes modifications and not he himself. Since he and his power are identical, this creation also is identical with him. His power is unobstructed. He is ever the Lord and ever free. He is of the nature of consciousness. He out of pity for the created beings takes on a divine body through his power and is born in the world out of his own free will in order to destroy the demons or propagate the Vedas. In fact after creating the world consisting of the high and the low, he also, like a father, creates the Vedas.

There are several well-known incarnations of his, devotion to whom also will give liberation. Though there are several modes of devotion, even one is enough to please him if practised intensely. When devotees give up their bodies in this world before attaining supreme devotion to him, they are reborn in his world where they will continue their practice and ultimately attain him. He is the dispenser of the fruits of our actions, of our merit and demerit.

The individual soul or jīva is of the nature of consciousness and is essentially identical with God, also called Brahman by the commentator. His individuality, his separation from God, has been caused by his association with buddhi or antah karaṇa (intellect or internal organ) which consists of the three guṇas and is an upādhi (limiting adjunct). Again this association and the consequent bondage of saṁsāra have been caused by lack of devotion to God and not by lack of knowledge of him. Being an evolute of the prakṛti of God, which is real, this upādhi is also real and not an illusion caused by ignorance. Hence it cannot be removed by knowledge. When a red china rose is kept near a crystal and the crystal appears red, it cannot be got rid off however intently or cleverly one may gaze at it! It can be removed only by the removal of either of the two things or the contact between them. Similarly here also. Since the soul is eternal and all-pervading, the only other alternative left is to dissolve this upādhi viz., the buddhi back into its original cause, the prakṛti of God. This can be done only by supreme devotion to God. Once this is done, liberation is attained.

Though the individual soul is actually identical with God, because of the multiplicity of the buddhis, it also appears as many. It is like the sun appearing as many being reflected in several mirrors. When the mirrors are removed, the several reflections are merged back in the sun. It is for this very reason, when one soul is liberated, others are not, like the reflections continuing in other mirrors even though one is removed.

Apart from the conscious entity which exists in a two-fold form (God and individual soul), the only other reality that exists is the insentient prakṛti. There is no third reality apart from these two.

This prakṛti is actually the power (śakti) of God and is also called māyā and pradhāna. It functions also as the material cause for creation. Being the power of God, it is real and not unreal as some others think. Hence this world, the whole creation, which is its product or effect, is also real. Arguing backwards, prakṛti is the generality or totality of insentient creation. Hence it pervades every one of its products. But being insentient, it cannot by itself evolve into this wonderful universe. Neither can the intellect of an ordinary being do it. It is possible only for God. The order in which creation takes place from God is practically the same as in the Sāṅkhya and Vedānta. Dissolution takes place in the reverse order.

The sūtras uphold the sat-kārya-vāda or the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause and the consequent pervasion of the former by the latter. Hence creation (sṛṣṭi) and destruction (pralaya) are actually
manifestation (ā virbhā va) and disappearance (tirobhā va). The doctrine of production (utpatti) which says that the effect is a new product, produced by the combination of the causes, is criticised and disapproved.

(c) The Sādhanās

Bhakti or devotion is the sole means to liberation. It is defined as supreme attachment to the love for God. All, down to despised souls, are entitled to tread the path of devotion.

This devotion is not of the nature of knowledge (jñāna) for these reasons: (i) It is lacking in the knowledge of one who hates. One who hates another may have knowledge about him, but he cannot be said to be devoted to him! (ii) Knowledge gradually gets eclipsed as devotion arises. (iii) It is the opposite of hatred. Hatred being an emotion, devotion also must be likewise.

It is well-known that the opposite of hatred is love and not knowledge. (iv) Devotion is spoken of as a rasa which is the same as rāga or attachment, and as anurāga which clearly means attachment to God. (v) Lastly, there is the famous example of the milkmaids of Vṛndāvana who attained liberation through devotion even though they had no knowledge.

Though devotion is of the nature of rāga (attachment), it cannot for that reason be condemned, because the object of that attachment is God and not human beings or the things of the world. It is only in the latter case that it becomes condemnable.

Neither can it be identified with work (kriyā) will or wish (icchā), nor even with faith (śraddhā).

Then, what is the place of knowledge in the scheme of liberation? It is a secondary sādhanā which helps to destroy the impurities of mind and thus pave the way for the rise of devotion.

It is interesting to note that Śāṅkilya calls the Prasthānatraya (the Upaniṣads, the Gītā and the Vedāntasūtras) as Brahmakāṇḍa and not as Jñānakāṇḍa as it is usually termed. He argues that jñāna or knowledge is common to both the Pūrvamāṇa (called Karma-kāṇḍa) and the Uttaramāṇa (called Brahman-kāṇḍa). In both cases the object is to give us the knowledge about things which are previously unknown: of karma (ceremonial rites) in the former case and of Brahman in the latter case. After giving this knowledge the former urges us to perform these rites and the latter, to attain liberation through devotion to Brahman, termed as saṁstha.

The path of Yoga as taught by Patañjali is also useful as a secondary discipline since it helps in the purification and concentration of mind. However the samādhi (perfect concentration) spoken of there, can also be attained by secondary devotional practices. Precisely for these reasons a devotee of God is superior to those who tread the path of concentration, ceremonial rites or knowledge.

Śāṅkilya has graded devotion into parā or supreme and gauṇī or secondary. Actually it is the former alone that deserves to be named as bhakti. Since the latter leads to the rise of the former, it is also called bhakti, but in a secondary (gauṇī) sense.
In sū., 44 Śāṇḍilya gives a long list of the signs by which the maturity of devotion can be inferred. They are: sammā na (respect), bahumā na (high esteem), prīti (delight), viraha (forlornness), itara-vicikitsā (doubting other objects), mahimakhyā ti (praising His greatness), tadartha-prāṇasthā na (holding the life for His sake), tadī yatā (considering everything as His), sarva-tadbhā va (regarding Him as existing in all beings) and apratikūlya (not resisting His will).

Though these are the signs by which supreme devotion expresses itself, they are also the means to attain supreme devotion when they are consciously practised. In the latter case they become gauṇī-bhakti.

Other types of secondary devotion are those mentioned in the Gītā (9th chapter) such as kīrtana (praising Him) namaskāra (obeisance), ananyacintana (thinking of none else but Him), yajana (worshipping Him), patrādi-dāna (offering of leaves, flowers etc.), arpaṇa (offering everything one does or enjoys) etc.

All these purify the heart and facilitate the rise of supreme devotion. There is no rule that they should be practised all together or only some of them or in any particular order. Anyone when practised sincerely and intensely can please God and thus give rise to supreme devotion.

Most of these forms of secondary devotion are of the nature of action; for instance, worshipping Him with all the accessories, singing His glories, repeating His names and so on. Among all forms of action these are the best, since they are actually the result of the meritorious acts of previous births and will now lead directly to supreme devotion. Another beauty of these is that they can produce either supreme devotion or fulfill any other desire of the aspirant depending upon his attitude and motive.

The scriptures contain elaborate and difficult expiations for various kinds of sins. They consume a lot of time and money as also cause a lot of physical pain. The doctrine of bhakti assures that remembrance of God, glorifying Him, hearing about His life and deeds etc., are also equally capable of destroying even great sins and can take the place of those difficult expiations. However a sincere repentance is a precondition and these practices must be continued till death. And for a sinner, the real practice of devotion will begin only after the destruction of his sins through remembrance etc.

Supreme devotion (parā-bhakti or parā nurakti) which rises in the final stages as a result of the practice of secondary devotion leads to infinite beatitude. A very important characteristic of this devotion is ekāntabhāva or absolute one-pointedness. This devotion can be directed not only towards God but also towards any of His manifestation like Varāha, Nṛsiṁha, Vāmana, Rāma or Śiva.

Since all, irrespective of their birth or capacity, are entitled to the practice of devotion, it is likely that many of them will not have attained supreme devotion before they die. Such devotees are reborn in the world of God like the Śvetadvīpa where they will continue their devotional practices and finally attain it, and through it, liberation.

(d) Mukti:

It is the lack of this supreme devotion that is the real cause of bondage, of suffering and transmigration, and
not lack of knowledge as some argue. The commentator does not subscribe to the Advaitic view of anirvacanīya-kyāti (logical indefinability of a particular type of knowledge) with the help of which the illusoriness of the world is sought to be proved. When a snake is seen in a rope it is a simple case of mistake technically called anyathā-kyāti (mistaking one for another).

Hence it is lack of devotion alone, and not knowledge, that is the cause of boundage. Consequently devotion destroys this bondage and gives liberation. That this liberation is of the nature of immorality and is obtained through devotion to God is confirmed by the śrutis also (vide Ch. U. 2.23.2).

Supreme devotion destroys the upādhi of the individual soul viz., the buddhi (understanding) or antakaraṇa (the internal organ) thereby liberating it. The liberated soul lives as a jīvanmukta as long as the body lasts due to the momentum of his past karmas which have fructified giving him this body. Once the body falls, he is merged in God.

It has already been pointed out that this is like the merging of the reflected image of the sun in the real sun once the mirror is removed, and other non-liberated souls will continue to exist separately due to the upādhis being infinite in number.

Liberation can also take place in a gradual way. Those who are purified by the practice of lower forms of devotion but die before getting supreme devotion, will go by the arcirādī-mārga (the path of light leading to the world of conditioned Brahman) and reach final beatitude from there, later on. Thus, lower devotion gives gradual liberation whereas supreme devotion gives it immediately. However, it should not be forgotten that even lower devotion leads to liberation only through the production of supreme devotion whether in this world or in the higher region.

Published Literature on Śāṇḍilya Sūtras

We have so far come across the following printed works:


(2) The sūtras in nāgarī script, with English translation and more detailed notes by Sri Jadunath Mazoomdar, published by the Hindu Patrika Office, Jessore, Bengal, in 1898 A. D.

(3) The sūtras with Svapneśvara's Bhāṣya, original only in nāgarī script, originally edited by J. R. Ballantyne, subsequently by Sri Nandalal Sinha and published in the 'Shyamacharana Sanskrit Series' (No. IV), in 1925 A. D. By Major B. D. Basu at the Pāṇini Office, Allahabad.

(4) Svapneśvara-bhāṣyaṣya, original only in nāgarī script, published by the Oriental Research Institute of Mysore.

(5) E. B. Cowell's English translation of the sūtras and Svapneśvara-bhāṣyaṣya without the original, under the title 'The aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya with the commentary of Svapneśvara OR the Hindu
Doctrine of Faith' published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1878 A. D., in the Bibliotheca Indica series.

(6) Manmathanath Pal's English translation of the Svapneś vara-bhāṣya published by the Pāṇini Office of Allahabad in 'The Sacred Books of the Hindus' series, in 1911 A. D., along with the Sūtras of Nārada and Garuḍa Purāṇa. In this edition, the original Śāṇḍilya Sūtras are given in nāgarī script. This has been recently reprinted.

(7) The sūtras with Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha's Bhakticandrikā, original only in nāgarī script, edited by Sri Baladeva Upādhyāya and published in the 'Sarasvatī Bhavana Granthamālā' series (No. 9), second edition 1967 A. D. In this edition, Svapneś vara's Bhāṣya also is given as an appendix.

Out of these, except (6 and 7) the rest are not inprint.

Among these, the first work is too brief to be of any use to a serious student. The second one contains many mistakes, both in the sūtras and in the translation. Cowell's translation is very good and useful. We have derived a lot of help from it.

The seventh work is excellently got up and contains much additional information as appendices.

The Present Work

Both the English translations of Svapneś vara's Bhāṣya have long been out of print. Hence the present work. It is a fresh translation with plenty of critical notes wherever necessary.

The original sūtras and bhāṣya are also given in the nāgarī script to help students who have a working knowledge of Sanskrit. Sūtrapāṭha as also an index of the sūtras is appended at the end. The contents are cast in the form of a brief synopsis so as to be of greater use. This detailed introduction also, it is hoped, will enable the serious students of this work to understand it better. If such students and scholars welcome this work as a useful addition to the Bhakti-sūtra literature, we are satisfied.

Swami Harshananda

Notes
1. For further defence of this view see Indian Philosophy by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Vol. I. pp. 499-502.
2. This aphorism is not found in Svapneś vara's version of the original.
3. The first and last names have been derived from the names of their source-books. Sātvata means a devotee of Kṛṣṇa. Ekāntika means single-minded devotion.
5. See 4.6.1; 4.6.3; 6.5.4.
6. 3.14. The same passage is also found with slight variations in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 10.63.
7. Sū. 83.
8. Sū. s. 37, 40, 42, 86, 87, 92 and 100.
9. Bhāṣya yate'dhunā (from his introductory verse).
10. See Bhakticandrikā on 2.1.7.
11. See Dr. S. Radhakrishnan’s Indian Philosophy Vol. II, p.255, footnotes 3.
12. ibid.
13. See his commentary. on sū . 99.
14. Ś rī mad-rā mā nujā cā ryā stu ‘pibanti nā maviṣ ayam...’ (Mā ntrikopaniṣ at 6) iti ś ruter jivā nā m
bahutvarī bhokṭr -tvam ī ś varasyaikatvarīn prayojakatvarīn ca vā stavamicchantaḥ sū tradvayamidam anyathā
yoyayanti, tathā hi.
15. The sū tra ‘prā guktānca’ (16) is omitted. The three extra sū tras appear continuously between sū . 18 and sū .
16. na hi nipuṇ ataradarś anenapyupā dhiyoge sphaṭ ikalauhitya- bhrama-nivṛ ttirasti (Svapneś vara’s
introduction)
17. sū ,. 2. sā parā ‘nuraktiriś vare.
18. The word saṁ sthā in the statement of Chā ndogya ‘brahmasaṁ tho’mṛ tatvameti’ (2.23.2) means, according
to Š ā ṇ ḍ ilya, devotion. See sū ,. 3
19. c. f. with Š aṅ kara’s words: sarvatra eva hi adhyā tmaś ā stre kṛ tā rthalakṣ anā ni yā ni tā ni sā dhanā ni
upadiś yante yatna-sā dhyatvā t; yā ni yatnasā dhyā ni sā dhanā ni lakaṇā ni ca bhavanti tā ni (Gī tā -bhā ṣ ya
2.55)
20. See sū ,. 66.

Ś Ā ṇ ḍ ILYA BHAKTI SŪ TRAS with Svapneś vara Bhā ṣ ya

FIRST CHAPTER
SECTION I

Victorious is the Supreme Lord!

Having taken refuge in the supreme God, the learned Ś rī Svapneś vara gives his commentary now on the
hundred Aphorisms of the (sage Ś rī ) Š ā ṇ ḍ ilya.

Great is the marvel of the nectar of the two feet of Govinda! Those who drink it, do not get deluded whereas
those who do not, do get deluded!

This being a treatise on bhakti (devotion) it is but proper that the commentator begins this work on a
devotional note.

Like the author Š ā ṇ ḍ ilya, very little is known of the commentator Svapneś vara also. Because he quotes
from the Bengali version of the drama Abhijñā na Š ā kuntalam in his commentary on the sixth Aphorism, E. B.
Cowell concludes that he must have been a native of Bengal (Gauḍ adeś a).

Delusion refers to being caught in the bondage of sā ṭ sā ra or the rounds of birth and death.
COMMENTATOR'S INTRODUCTION

It will be declared later on that liberation is the attainment by the jī vas or individual souls, of the state of Brahman. Since the individual souls are absolutely identical with Brahman, their bondage is not natural to them. Just as the red colour etc., of a (colourless) crystal is caused by the proximity of a china-rose etc., their bondage also has been caused by the antah karaṇ a or the internal organ (the mind) made up of the three guṇ as and acting as a limiting adjunct. Because this bondage has been caused by a limiting adjunct, for that very reason it cannot be removed by knowledge. On the other hand, it can be removed (only) by the removal of either the object (e.g., the crystal) or the limiting adjunct (e.g. the china-rose) or the connection between them. Not even by the most skillful gazing at the crystal can the erroneous perception of redness in it be removed as long as the contact with the limiting adjunct (viz, the china-rose) lasts! Now, by extending the same analogy here: It is not possible to destroy or remove the ātman (the soul) which is the very basis of all existence and manifestation. Nor can its connection (with the internal organ) be destroyed because it is not possible to transcend the nature of either of them. Hence we are obliged to accept the last alternative only, viz, by the destruction of the limiting adjunct alone can the erroneous perception be destroyed and not by the knowledge of the ātman.

1 The ātman is all-pervading by nature. It is bound to pervade the internal organ (which by nature is limited and finite) wherever it is. Hence the connection between them will also be there as long as the latter has an existence of its own.

And for the removal of this limiting adjunct, another cause is to be sought; and this is none other than devotion to God. Being supra-mundane it is established by the Vedas and smṛtis (authoritative traditions or secondary scriptures). For instance, in the Bhagavad Gītā, the Lord himself declares that devotion to Him destroys the internal organ consisting of the three guṇ as and becomes the cause of the liberation which is characterised by the attainment of the bliss of Brahman, in the following words: ‘Of these, sattva, luminous and free from evil, from its stainlessness, binds O sinless one, by attachment to happiness and knowledge. Know rajas to be of the nature of passion, giving rise to thirst and attachment; it binds fast O son of Kunti, the embodied one, by attachment to action. And know that tamas is born of ignorance and that it deludes all embodied beings. O descendant of Bharata, it binds fast through carelessness, indolence and sleep’ (14.6-8). He concludes: ‘And he who serves Me with an unswerving devotion transcends the three guṇ as and is fit to become Brahman’ (ibid. 26).

2 Other than the knowledge of the ātman.

3 And not by direct perception or inference.

It should not (be thought) that the knowledge of the ātman is useless because it assists devotion by washing out impurities like lack of faith. However, knowledge of the ātman is incapable of removing the superimposition of the characteristics of the limiting adjunct-the internal organ-(on the ātman, since it is) directly connected with it. That is why this has been clearly declared in such passages as, ‘When he knows that which is higher than the guṇ as, he attains to My being’ (Gītā 14.19) and ‘whose doubts are rent asunder by knowledge’ (ibid. 4.41).
The knowledge that he has jaundice cannot and does not prevent the jaundice patient from seeing a white object as yellow!

And the bondage of the soul has not been caused (as the Advaitins say) by ignorance in which case it could be said that it could be removed by knowledge because there is no proof there of. When an oyster shell is mistaken for silver, silver cannot certainly be produced out of the ignorance of the real nature of that shell; because, silver particles—the real cause—do not exist. Moreover, the Vedic text, ‘O gentle youth! How could it be thus, that being be produced from non-being?’ (Ch. U. 6.2.2) establishes the very reality of this world by declaring that a real effect can be produced only by a real cause. The reality of the Supreme Lord's creation has been well-established in such other texts like ‘whose will is true’ (Ch. U. 3.14.2) also. Nor has the venerable Bādarāyaṇa said anywhere in his sūtras that this world has been conjured up by ignorance. On the other hand, by rejecting the doctrine of a dream-creation, he has asserted the reality of the waking world. Nor was it meant to be employed only as an illustration, for there is no proof for such an assumption.

To prove the unreality of this created world, the Advaitins give the example of the oyster shell being mistaken for silver due to the ignorance of the real nature of the shell. Similarly they argue that due to the ignorance of the real nature of Brahman, this world is being seen in It. Svapneśvara's contention is that this world—which is being directly experienced—is real; and as such cannot be produced by ignorance which itself is unreal. A real effect must have a real cause.

Since silver particles did not exist in the oyster shell no silver was really produced. Similarly if a real cause did not exist prior to creation, this real world could not have been produced.

Vide Brahman Sūtras 2.2.28 and 29. While refuting the Baudhāyaṇa who hold that this world is unreal like a dream,

Bādarāyaṇa comes to the conclusion that the external world is real.

But the theory (of the Advaitins) that bliss etc., (sat-cid-ānanda) are the natural characteristics of (or, in fact, constitute the) soul is not tenable; because, they are not direct modifications of the soul. Like whiteness etc., they are perceived (as reflected in) the soul. Perception being an action which implies an instrument, it is simpler to suppose that the perception (or experience) of bliss, etc., takes place through an instrument (i.e., the internal organ). Therefore bliss etc., are produced through the instrument (i.e., the internal organ) in which they are inherent, just as sound is produced by the internal ear. Others (like the Naiyāyikas) hold that bliss, etc., are inherent in the instrument (i.e., the mind) because they are qualities apprehensible by the uncreated organ (as they hold the mind to be) just as sound (is apprehensible by the uncreated internal ear). According to both the views the qualities (of bliss or sound) are apprehended by an intangible organ (the mind or the internal ear). But the proof of the reality of the ātman is that it reveals all existence. All this will be made clear in the second section of the third chapter. Therefore, like the desire to know more about dharma (as in the Pūrvamīmbāṁsā), with a view to having a fuller discussion of bhakti or devotion—which is the cause of the attainment of the highest good of man—the following aphorism is being propounded.

The idea is that bliss etc., are qualities which inhere in the internal organ and so are not themselves the ātman.

What is meant here by the word śrotra is the ākāśa in the internal ear.
\textsuperscript{9} And so, are not themselves the organs.

\textsuperscript{10} For, if there were no seer or knower, nothing could be seen or known.

\textsuperscript{11} The first sūtra of Jaimini's Pūrva māṇḍūkya is:

Here a few words are required by way of explanation and a brief discussion on this introduction as a whole. Though Svapneśvara accepts the Advaitic position that the individual souls are identical with Brahman he differs from the Advaitins on two counts: the cause of bondage and the means of attaining liberation from that bondage. He considers that bondage has been caused by the contact of the ātman with the antah kāraṇa which is disguising its true nature. After considering the various alternatives he concludes that this bondage can be removed only by the removal of the antah kāraṇa itself, through devotion to the Supreme Lord. This devotion helps the aspirant to transcend the three guṇa of which antah kāraṇa is also made, thereby transcending it also and attaining the state of Brahman. Since this is a treatise on devotion it is quite understandable that it has been given the primary place and that knowledge has been relegated to a secondary position.

However, when he begins to tackle the other doctrines of Advaita, he does not seem to be on very safe grounds. Let us first summarize his arguments: (1) Liberation can be got only by the removal of the antah kāraṇa through devotion to God and not by the knowledge of the ātman; (2) But knowledge of the ātman is not useless in as much as it cleanses the antah kāraṇa of impurities like lack of faith and assists devotion; (3) Bondage has not been caused by ignorance and hence it cannot be got rid of by knowledge; (4) This created world is not unreal but real; (5) Existence, knowledge and bliss do not themselves constitute the ātman but are qualities inherent in the antah kāraṇa. After reading these arguments one wonders how Svapneśvara can yet stick to his `Advaitic' position, viz., the absolute identity of the ātman with Brahman!

If this creation is real both the antah kāraṇa and the ātman as also their connection have also to be real. Since what is real can never be destroyed, neither the antah kāraṇa nor its connection with the ātman can ever be destroyed. Consequently the ātman will have to be in eternal bondage! That is why Advaita takes up the position that this world including the body, the senses and the mind is only a myth, unreal appearance.

It is always possible to get rid of the unreal phenomena by knowing the truth behind them. Seeing a snake in a rope or silver in oyster shells is certainly due to the ignorance of the real nature of the substratum. The former produces fear and the latter, a desire to possess, ending up in disappointment. It is this mental reaction leading to further actions and reactions, that is termed bondage, in Advaita philosophy. Hence, once the truth regarding the substratum is clearly known, these reactions come to an end even though the false appearances themselves may persist. This is freedom. Similarly, once the truth behind the limited individual personality (viz., the ātman) and that behind the phenomenal world (viz., Brahman) as also their identity are directly known there is no reason why the bondage caused by the false appearance should not disappear even though the world-appearances may continue to linger. Once this is understood and appreciated, the arguments of our commentator just fade away.

Svapneśvara has taken great pains to prove the reality of this world. So have Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara! In fact, the very
definition of Brahman that Bādarāyaṇa gives, is centred round the authorship of this creation. In consonance with
the principle that we can conceive of the unseen and the unknown only in terms of the seen and the known,
Śaṅkara also admits of the reality of this world and accepts the definition of Brahman as the one and only cause
from which creation, sustenance and destruction are proceeding. It is thus that they have countered the Buddhist
Nihilism. But Śaṅkara does not stop with this. He goes a step further and posits a higher Brahman (based on the
Vedas) which is beyond all names, forms, qualities etc., which can at best be defined only as 'Not this', 'Not this', neti
neti, and whose essential characteristic is sat-cit-ānanda. From the standpoint of this Highest Brahman even the
creation is only a myth, like the pictures projected on a screen, the screen alone being real.

But in the normal plane of consciousness, for all practical purposes, reality is never denied to this world.
Though according to the latest theories of science everything that exists in the world is a bundle of electrical charges,
things are taken at their face value for all practical purposes, including of course the atomic scientist himself! So also
with Śaṅkara's Brahman and the world.

As regards the nature of ātman and Brahman it has been very clearly established by such statement of the
scriptures as:

1. Now, therefore, the desire to know about devotion (must be cultivated).

The word atha (translated as 'now') indicates commencement (of a new treatise) and should not be taken in
the sense of 'afterwards'.¹² There is no necessary subsequence to any preliminary study of the Vedas¹³ here since it
will be declared later on that even beings of degraded births¹⁴ are competent (to practise devotion). Nor does the
word imply a subsequence to a previous acquisition of tranquillity etc.,¹⁵ because the desire to get liberation alone is
enough to qualify one to take to the path of devotion. This is (corroborated by the) following Vedic passage; 'To Him
who at the beginning created Brahmā and who gave the Vedas to him-to Him the God who reveals the knowledge of
Himself, do I, desirous of liberation, fly for refuge' (Śv. U. 6.8).

¹² The word atha is used in four senses: (1) afterwards;
(2) commencement of a new treatise; (3) connection with a previous passage; (4) benediction. Though the first
meaning is more common, the second one is more appropriate in this context.

¹³ The Pūrvamīmāṃsā sutras begin with the words where the word atha indicates 'after studying the Vedas'.

¹⁴ Even sub-human species are entitled to tread the path of devotion as instanced by the elephant king (Gajendra).

¹⁵ The Vedāntasūtras begin with the words where atha is interpreted by the Advaitins as 'after the acquisition of
the four requisites, viz., discrimination, dispassion, the six spiritual treasures of tranquillity etc., and the desire for
liberation'.

Nor does the word indicate benediction because benediction is conferred by its very utterance.¹⁶ Therefore
(the correct interpretation of the word atha) is that one who is desirous of liberation must take to the inquiry into the
nature of devotion. The word jijñā sā ('a wish to know') in the aphorism implies 'inquiry'.

¹⁶ In the Yoga Sūtras which begins as
The word atha is taken to indicate benediction also along with the commencement of a new treatise. An ancient śloka gives the reason as to why atha indicates benediction:

No doubt this devotion which is of the nature of love of God cannot be the result of works like dharma (duties, as in the Pūrva-mīṃsā). Nor is it something to be known like Brahmā (as in the Vedānta). And yet, even when it has been perfected by its proper antecedents like good works, mundane and inferior devotion etc., it is still liable to be destroyed by the weight of false objections such as 'This is not devotion,' 'This does not lead to the Highest Good,' 'Its aim is not the Highest,' etc., just as a wife's faith in her husband (is likely to be destroyed by unfounded calumnies). Hence the word athā ('therefore') indicates the utility of such an inquiry in devotion in as much as it dispels such false objections. Because it is necessary to dispel false objections, therefore, an inquiry into devotion (must be undertaken)—this is the meaning of the aphorism. That is why it is said thus in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa (1.20.16): 'O Lord, even though I may have to pass through thousands of wombs, let there be in me for ever, O Acyuta, unshakable devotion to thee, in each of those births!' This prayer (of Prahlāda) that his devotion may remain unshaken shows the necessity of (counteracting the attempts to topple it). Therefore, this inquiry into devotion, though ancillary to devotion itself which bearsthe fruit (in the form of the Highest Good), is also fruitful.

Now, it may be objected that devotion without a practical form cannot be grasped by our intellect and as such, cannot be the subject of inquiry. To counter this, the definition of devotion is now given:

2. It is the highest love for God.

Here by the words, 'It is the highest,' the subject is indicated. The rest gives the characteristics. The word 'highest' is used to exclude the lower forms. The phrase 'of God' refers to the topic of the present work. Devotion is nothing but the love to be cultivated towards the being who is to be propitiated. In this treatise the particular modification of the internal organ towards God is itself devotion and its special character is easily grasped by examining worldly affections. For instance, Prahlāda who possessed the highest devotion said thus: 'The firm affection that the deluded feel towards the objects of the senses, such a firm affection (may I have towards thee and) may it never depart from my heart, remembering Thee!' (V. P. 1.20.17).

17 The previous aphorism set forth the necessity of inquiry into the nature of devotion. As a natural corollary the question arises: 'What is this devotion?' This aphorism is giving the answer. It seems more natural to interpret that only the word sā referring to the devotion of the previous aphorism indicates the subject and all the other words including the word parā give the characteristics. Compare this with Nārada's definition also (N. B. S. 2):

In this verse, by the word prīti an affection (towards an object) inseparably connected with happiness, is indicated. Otherwise, if the word prīti were taken to mean happiness—and because this happiness could be without an eternal object—the locative on the object would have been inappropriate. Same objection would hold good even if the word (prīti) were taken to mean 'perception of happiness' because 'happiness' would then be the object of this perception and not the external object as such. Therefore an affection along with the object is indicated here.

18 For instance, by remembering a previous experience of pleasure.

Nor does the word (prīti) mean the happiness produced by the object because it has not been ordained (by the grammarians) that the locative cause indicates the producer. And again, in the passage 'Let there be in me for ever, O Acyuta, unshakable devotion towards Thee,' since devotion to God is established, by the word prīti also the same is meant since the two form a single sentence. The distinction between the two passages is this: Whereas in
the former, devotion in every life has been prayed for, in the latter under the example of an affection for a worldly object, there is the prayer for its preservation for ever. Since it is not possible to derive happiness from an object without a feeling of affection towards it, the idea of 'affection' must necessarily be brought in here. The same idea has been reflected in the following aphorism of Patañjali also:

'Affection is what dwells on pleasure' (Yogasūtras 2.7). It is this affection that is to be taken as devotion because it is accompanied by all the characteristics mentioned later on (aphorisms 43, 44) and also because this is the simplest explanation.

To be engaged in remembering (God) sometimes and to sing (his glories) at other times-this also cannot (be described as devotion), because it is not necessarily associated with these always. Nor again, devotion is knowledge of God since this knowledge might exist even in those who hate Him. Nor can it be defined as the knowledge of God as an object of veneration, because it is not always found in such external acts of veneration as worship, obeisance, etc. And in that case we would be obliged to use the expressions, 'He is a devotee,' 'He has affection' even in the case of him who has the idea that God is to be bowed down, out of fear or compulsion! If it is said that devotion is the knowledge that God is to be propitiated, coupled with affection, then it is simpler to accept it as an affection (just as the aphorism declares)! That is why it is declared (in the Gītā): 'With their minds wholly in Me, with their senses absorbed in Me, mutually enlightening and always speaking of Me, they are satisfied and delighted. To them, ever steadfast and serving Me with affection, I give that Buddhiyoga by which they come unto Me' (10.9-10). In these verses, the service of those whose thoughts and spirits are fixed on God, has been described and not of those who merely know Him as fit to be propitiated.

That is why we read in the smṛti (V. P. 5.13) that even the milk-maids whose love was based on the attraction towards the lovely form of Kṛṣṇa, were liberated. The preposition anu (in the word anurakti) is not a mere affix whose meaning is merged in the definition but indicates subsequence: because it is produced after (anu = after) obtaining the knowledge of the greatness etc., of God, therefore is it called anurakti.

Objection: In that case even the affection towards father etc., must be designated as devotion of the present type.19

Reply: (No;) because it is only the world that is ensouled by God (and not any particular individual as such). In fact, such devotion (as described by the aphorism) is with respect to the unmodified Supreme Being only.

Objection: Then by this (definition of yours) the affection cherished by the milk-maids etc., towards God manifested (as a human being) is not included in (devotion)!

Reply: (No). Their affection was only towards the Being unconditioned by the limitation of the individual soul. Therefore the affection towards God both in His unmanifest and in His manifest forms, is included (under our definition of devotion).

19 Since mother, father, preceptor and other elders are to be venerated even according to the scriptures, why not call the affection cherished towards them also as devotion?-This is the contention of the objector.
3. Because immortality had been predicated to him who abides in God (therefore the inquiry into devotion is to be undertaken).

'To him who abides in God' means 'to him who had devotion to God.' To such an one immortality has been predicated (in the following statement): 'He who abides in Brahman, attains immortality' (Ch. U. 2.23.2). Therefore, not undertaking the inquiry into devotion due to the fear that it is useless or that it gives an inferior result, is hereby precluded.

Even after accepting the definition of devotion as given by the author in toto, the pragmatic mind will naturally ask, 'Well, what is the use of cultivating such a devotion?' This aphorism is answering such a question by quoting the Veda which is the highest authority in supermundane things.

4. If it is said that (the word saṁsthā, 'abiding') means knowledge, we deny it; because the knowledge of one who hates does not abide in him.

Objection: By the word brahmasaṁsthā ('abiding in Brahman') it is the knowledge of Brahman that is meant and not devotion. Hence you should say that the fruit of immortality accrues only to him.

Reply: There is nothing wrong in interpreting the word as devotion. In fact, the word saṁsthā means devotion only and not knowledge; because in practice, a person who hates another, even though he possesses a knowledge about the latter, is never said to 'abide' in him! Is it not true that it is only the ministers, friends etc., of a king who are devoted to him, that are described as abiding in him and not his rival kings? It should be remembered that the determination of the meaning of a word in the scriptures is similar to that in the every-day world. That is why in the legend of Cirakālikā (Mbh.S.266.45-46) in the lines, 'During that time, having reflected on that failure of saṁsthā in his wife, the sage thus distressed and shedding tears in sorrow, spoke thus.' By the phrase (patnī - saṁsthā vyatikrama) the failure of devotion on the part of the wife is meant. Therefore the word saṁsthā means devotion. And so too even in the aphorism of Bādarāyaṇa (Br. S. 1.1.7), 'Because liberation is declared to one who is abiding in that (sat)' this very same meaning (viz, devotion) is to be given (to the word niṣṭhā.)

20 The sage Gautama was one day offended with his wife and went away to the forest leaving instructions to his son Cirakālikā that he should kill her in his absence. The son however deliberated so long on the pros and cons of this command that the father had in the mean time second thoughts and returned in time to countermand it.

21 The word niṣṭhā in the phrase tanniṣṭṭha hasya and the word saṁsthā originate from the same root, viz., sthā. Hence the words mean the same thing.

5. And because (knowledge) is weaker than that (viz., devotion).

Because, with respect to the attainment of liberation, knowledge is weaker than devotion-(this is the purport of the aphorism). The particle ca (‘and’) signifies that this argument is in addition to those already given. For instance it is said in the Gītā (7.23): 'The worshippers of the gods go to the gods; my devotees too come to me.' Similar in purport are the Lord's words to Prahlāda: 'As thy mind endowed with devotion gets steady in Me. So shalt
thou through My grace, attain liberation also.’ (V.P.1.20.20).

22 That to him who is established in devotion liberation has been assured and that he who is endowed with the knowledge of God need not necessarily abide in Him.

**Objection:** In the Vedic verse, ‘Having known Him a man goes beyond death (atimṛtyumeti), there is no other path going thither’ (Ś v. U. 3.8) it has been declared that liberation is the result of knowledge; (therefore) when a smṛti (secondary scripture) goes against the Śruti (the Veda)23 it has to be interpreted in a different way.

**Reply:** No; because even there (i.e., in the passage quoted from the Veda) knowledge is weaker than (or inferior to) devotion. To explain: the word atimṛtyu is not conventionally used in the sense of ‘liberation’. It should then24 be etymologically derived as ‘that the existence of which enables one to go beyond death’. From this standpoint, by arguing that ‘because through devotion death is transcended, therefore,’ it is devotion alone that is meant by the word atimṛtyu. (This meaning also results from the fact) that the meaning produced by a case-affix (kāraka) is stronger than that resulting from a complementary construction.25

23 The Śrutis or Vedas are considered to be the highest authority in spiritual matters.

24 A word can have a conventional meaning established by usage and also another by etymological derivation. When the former is not definite there is every justification to accept the latter meaning. The commentator’s argument is that the word atimṛtyu does not conventionally mean liberation and hence he is free to derive its etymological meaning.

25 The bone of contention here is whether the word ati-mṛtyum should be taken as a single word or should it be split up into two words: ati and mṛtyum. The commentator prefers the former and bases the etymological derivation on that. Here the verb eti governs the accusative case of the word atimṛtyu (i.e., atimṛtyum). In the latter case, the pre-position ati governs the word mṛtyuṁ (in the accusative case) and therefore forms a complementary part of the sentence. So either way the word mṛtyuṁ assumes the accusative case. But according to Pāṇini the former accusative case (kāraka vibhakti) is more powerful than the latter accusative case (upapada-vibhakti). cf., (Pāṇini 2.3.19). Hence the former stand-point (of taking it as a single word) is preferable.

The way our commentator Svapneśvara has extracted the meaning of ‘devotion’ out of the word ‘atimṛtyum’ is indeed ingenious!

Let us examine that quotation from the Śvetāśvatara-niṣ at putting it back in its proper context. After describing the Lord of the universe as the great Magician in the first six verses of the third chapter, the seventh verse ends with the words

(‘Having known that Lord they become immortal’). Then begins our verse, the full text of which is:

(‘I have known that great Person of the hue of the sun and who is beyond darkness....’) Continuing, in the tenth verse, the Upaniṣad says again;
('Those who know that, they become immortal.') So it is very clear that the Upaniṣad says all through that immortality is attained by knowing God. Consequently, the simplest and most direct method would be to break the words atimṛtyum eti and reconstruct the sentence as: Mṛtyum atyeti, 'transcends death'.

(There is also another reason for interpreting the word atimṛtyu as devotion): From the verse (in the Gītā wherein it is said), 'For those whose mind is set on me, verily do I become ere long-O Påtha-the saviour out of the ocean of deadly saṁsāra' (12.7), it is seen that death is transcended through devotion (to the Lord). To the same effect there is a Vedic hymn: 'We worship the Three-eyed One, of graceful fragrance. The augmenter of prosperity; like the cucumber from its stalk, may I be delivered from the bondage of death, but not from immortality' (R. V. 5.7.59.12; also Tai. S. 8.6). Here the word 'worship' (yajana) means devotion, because it has been interpreted that way in the Kalpa.26 The non-occurrence of the word bhakti in this Vedic passage (should not raise any difficulty) because this applies equally to the word mukti (liberation) also (which is not found directly mentioned either). Therefore it is clearly seen that (even) from the eternal Veda itself, knowledge is inferior to devotion.

26 'Āpastamba's Kalpa directs that priests, as they recite these words, are to toss the baked flour cakes into the air, and to wish aloud to receive them from Bhaga, the deity who presides over good fortune. Svapneśvara seems to connect bhaga with bhakti.' (quoted from E. B. Cowell's translation, p. 12)

It may still be asked, 'Why should devotion be defined as a form of affection?' To meet this objection (the author replies):

6. (Devotion is a form of affection because it is opposed to hatred and also because (the Veda uses) The expression rasa ('taste') (with regard to it).

Devotion deserves to be defined as an affection alone. Why? Because it is opposed to hatred. It is a well-known fact in the world that the two expressions 'He hates,' 'He is devoted' are applied to persons of opposite temperaments. There, it is affection that is recognized as the opposite of hatred and not knowledge etc. That is why after describing Śiśupāla's uninterrupted hatred for Viṣṇu (i.e., Śrīkṛṣṇa) the Viṣṇupurāṇa goes on to say: 'This Divine Lord, even if named or remembered with uninterrupted hatred, will confer the boon that is hard to be obtained even by gods and demons. How much more will He reward those who possess perfect devotion?' (4.15.12). This has been corroborated in the Atrismṛti also: 'Thinking of Govinda even out of hatred, Śiśupāla, the son of Damarghoṣa, attained heaven. Then, what to say about him who is devoted to Him?' Even here it is devotion that is described as the opposite of hatred. Similarly we read in the Gītā (16.18-20) also: 'These malignant people who hate Me (the Self within), in their own bodies and those of others-these malicious and cruel evildoers, most degraded of men, I hurl perpetually into the wombs of the demons only, in these worlds. Obtaining the demoniac wombs, and deluded birth after birth, not attaining Me, they thus fall, O son of Kunti, into a still lower condition.'

27 A curious view is sometimes put forward that God is attained quicker through hating Him than through loving Him. Apparently such a view has been attributed to Nārada, himself, another great authority on bhakti:

('It is my firm conviction that the deep absorption that a man obtains through uninterrupted hatred cannot be obtained even through the yoga of love') [Bhāgavatam 7.1.26]. And Śiśupāla is the stock example that is often
quoted in support of this view. Actually the real motive behind Śiśupāla’s apparent hatred was love itself. The story
goes that he was the gate-keeper of Lord Viṣṇu at Vaikuṇṭha born as Śiśupāla due to a curse of some sages.
Between seven births where in he would love God and three births wherein he would hate Him and be killed by Him,
he chose the latter because it was too much for him to bear separation from His Lord for seven long births! All
statements such as those from the Viṣṇupurāṇa, Bhāgavata or Atrismṛti are only negative eulogies. If hatred
can do this much, how much more can be achieved through love! That is what they try to arrive at. God being the
inmost self of all, it is impossible to hate Him.

Another reason for these scriptures making hatred of God also a virtue is that if at all anger has to be shown
let it be towards God so that it is sublimated through that remembrance of God inevitably associated with such a
hatred. The whole question has been discussed in a masterly way by Śrī Madhvācārya in his commentary on the
Gītā 9.12. [See also Nārada Bhakti Sūtras, Tr. by Swami Tyāgīśānanda. pp. 36-39].

As opposed to this (hatred) it is but proper to describe devotion as an affection towards God. Again, from the
Vedic passage, ‘Having obtained rasa, he becomes full of bliss’ (Tai. U. 2.7.) it is clear that rasa is the cause for
obtaining liberation which is of the nature of the manifestation of the bliss of Brahman. Actually rasa means rāga or
affection. This is well-known in such verses as, ‘But his longing (rasa) also ceases, who sees the Supreme’ (Gītā
tā 2.59). Here rasa means the affection or longing for worldly objects. That is why we find (in the Viṣṇupurāṇa
or a) the word anurāga directly used in place of bhakti. After describing the ascent to heaven of Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa and
others it goes on to say: ‘The people also of that city of Kośala who had cherished a fervent affection (anurāga) for
those incarnate aspects of the Lord, having their minds fixed thereon, attained the same world as they had’ (4.4.4).
For this reason also it is not knowledge but devotion in the form of affection that results in supreme bliss.

Objection: Opposition to hatred alone cannot be the characteristic of affection, because indifference also satisfies this
condition; and consequently the argument becomes too general.

Reply: We shall explain (how it is not so). The effect of hatred is cessation from acts (of kindness etc.), whereas the
direct opposite of this is action itself. It is seen that devotees engage themselves in action in order to follow the object
of their devotion; and those who are opposed to it cease from such action. That is why, having this opposition as
manifested by their respective effects in view, it has been described (in the aphorism) as ‘the opposite of hatred’. Then the argument should be as follows: Devotion is of the form of affection towards its object, because it is a special
quality of the soul different from the selfish feeling that this object is the means of attaining one's own interest. And
yet it results in the following of that object. Whatever is not like this, it cannot (be called ‘affection’). For instance,
hatred.28 It is also seen that this following increases in proportion to the increase of affection (for that object).

28 These arguments can be clarified thus: Devotion is an emotion. It is of the form of love or affection towards its
object which may be a person or a principle or even an inanimate object. And this love or affection is actually a
special quality of the soul. It is possible that selfishness may often be the motive force behind this so-called affection,
goading him to use that object to further some personal interests. To preclude this possibility it is said that this
affection is different from such selfish feeling. Since action normally results from selfish motives, it may be doubted
how such an unselfish affection, (viz., devotion) will give rise to the following (anuvartana) of that object. But that is
exactly the nature of such an affection. It is dynamic even though there is no goading force of selfishness behind it.
Whatever does not conform to this description cannot be called devotion. That hatred is such, is very clear.
And also: Whoever is devoted to a particular object -the absence of his indifference towards that being clearly understood-in him will reside such devotion which must be the opposite of hatred and tend to produce a following of that object. This devotion is a special quality of the soul conducive to this following, just like the feeling that such and such an object will be a means of obtaining one's own interest. Thus we conclude that it is an affection but different from the feeling of promoting one's own interest. And again the argument a fortiori, 'How much more so, in the cause of the devoted?' can hold good only in the case of a quality opposed to hatred. So do we read (in the Gītā): 'For, taking refuge in me, they also OPārtha, who might be of inferior births... (even) they attain to the Supreme Goal. What need to mention holy Brāhmaṇ as...?' (9.32-33) etc. So also from the statement 'those who hate Me in their own bodies and those of others' (Gītā 16.18) etc., it is clear that hatred (of God) leads to transmigration; and love or devotion, which is its opposite quality, directed towards the Supreme Being effects the destruction of transmigration by eliminating the limiting adjunct (viz., the internal organ) of the individual soul. It is this that has been expressed, in the words 'never finding me' (Gītā 16.20) etc. The word ca ('and') in the aphorism (gives an additional reason): Even by such signs of earthly love like horripilation etc., (devotion is) an affection. In such passages like 'She reveals her affection for me through her cheek affected by horripilation' (Abhijñāna-śākuntalam, Act III), the association of horripilation with earthly affection is well-known. If devotion is to be considered as another quality (different from affection) then there would be a needless complication in having to assume a special set of characteristic signs for it. Some hold the opinion that affection is a kind of 'wish' born out of the knowledge that its object will produce a desired end, as in the case of a sacrifice etc. But according to us affection, like hatred, is a quality different from 'wish'. This we perceive from such statements as, 'I love,' 'I have an affection,' 'I do not wish' etc. Actually 'wish' refers only to what has not been attained whereas affection refers to both what is attained and what is not. On the other hand to conceive of (devotion) as a 'wish' etc., (which are already included in its interpretation as 'affection') is a round-about way. This summarises our arguments. Therefore our definition has not been disproved.

It may now be doubted that since devotion involves action it cannot lead to supreme bliss as instanced by such Vedic statements as: 'Not by action, not by progeny nor by wealth but by renunciation did some attain immortality' (Tai. Ā. 10.10.21). To refute such a doubt the author proceeds to say-

7. (Devotion) is not an action because like knowledge it does not depend upon effort.

This devotion cannot be an action because it does not follow an effort of will. Whatever does not follow an effort of the will that will not be of the nature of action; for instance, knowledge. Verily does knowledge depend upon the wealth of proper evidence. A man cannot at his pleasure produce it or not, nor can he alter it. Same is the case with devotion also. The affection felt by those in love with a beautiful woman, children etc., cannot be produced in its different manifestations by human exertions alone. But in the case of the devotion (which we are discussing) it depends upon the man's good deeds in his former births, inferior devotion etc.

29 In interpreting the word kṛiti as an 'effort of the will' Cowell (p. 16) quotes the following verse in support:

'From knowledge arises desire, from desire volition, from volition conscious exertion of the muscles, and from this,
action.'

30 See the aphorisms from 56 onwards.

8. Hence indeed, it is of inexhaustible result.

Because it (viz., devotion) is not of the nature of action, for that every reason its result, beatitude, is rightly held to be inexhaustible. Otherwise even immortality would have to come to an end as seen from the statement: `Just as here the world gained by work perishes, so too hereafter the world gained, by merit perishes' (Ch. U. 8.1.6).

Aphorism 3 referred to the statement in the Chandogya Upanishad where immortality has been promised to one who is devoted to Brahman. If it is conceded that devotion is also a kind of action, then this result of immortality would also have to perish according to the later statement made in the same Upanishad! This will however cut at the very root of our treatise. Hence devotion is not accepted as a kind of action.

9. And from the use of the word Prapatti ('devoted worship') in the case of one who possesses knowledge, (devotion) is not knowledge just as (it is not so) in other cases. (where the word) prapatti is used.

There is the Lord’s saying in support of this: `At the end of many births the man of knowledge becomes devoted to Me, realising that Vāsudeva is everything. Such a great soul is very rate to find' (Gītā 7.19). Here `devoted worship' (prapatti) has been attributed to a man of knowledge. This would not have been possible if devotion were the cause of knowledge (as opposed to our standpoint), just as (we also see) in other cases (where the same word) prapatti is similarly used. For example, immediately after this verse, by the statement, `Others again, deprived of discrimination by various desires devote themselves to other gods' (Gītā 7.20), devoted worship to the Supreme God is praised through blaming devotion to other gods. Here, it is devotion to gods that is meant by the word prapatti and not knowledge pertaining to them because it is only this sense that can be recognized in the word prapatti used in both the places. By the use of the word ca ('and') (in the aphorism), It is indicated that the statement in the Gītā mentioning the subsequence of devotion to knowledge should also be taken as another reason for devotion not being knowledge. Thus we read (in the Gītā): `He who, free from delusion, thus knows Me as the Supreme Puruṣa, he, knowing all, worships Me as the All-being, O descendant of Bharata' (15.19). And also `Knowing Me to be the origin of beings and immutable, worship Me with a single mind' (ibid. 13); and again: `Thus thinking, the wise worship Me filled with rapture' (ibid. 10.8). Therefore devotion is not of the nature of knowledge. Even though, from the very fact of its being an affection, its difference from knowledge is established, this discussion has been necessary to clear the doubt that the word `devotion' may mean, in a secondary sense, the knowledge of Brahman.
Here a little discussion is necessary. The statements in the Bhagavadgītā not being inspired (like the Vedas) cannot be taken as direct authority, but only as secondary authority since the Gītā is a part of the Mahābhārata which is a smṛti (a secondary scripture). This being the case, how can the aphorism declare śabdāt "by the word")? Here some explain it as 'by the inferred word'.\(^{32}\) (We however have) this to say: Whatever is uttered by a divine being with respect to things unseen, that itself constitutes the Veda. And this characteristic is not wanting in the Gītā also. That is why the colophon of the Gītā is seen to run thus: iti bhagavadgītā su upaniṣatstu ('in the Bhagavad Gītā which is Upaniṣad') Those very verses (uttered by the Lord) have been recorded by Vyāsa.\(^{33}\) And another Purāṇa declares thus: 'The Gītā which itself issued from the lotus-mouth of Padmanābha, is to be attentively recited. What need is there of other long compilations of śāstras?'

\(^{31}\) The word śabda usually indicates the Veda. The use of this word with respect to the Gītā shows that Śāṅkilya considers it as equal to the Veda. But it is not actually so. Hence the doubt.

\(^{32}\) It is to be inferred that whatever is in an inspired book of tradition like the Gītā must be found somewhere in the Veda. This is their argument.

\(^{33}\) Manusmṛti (8.255) uses the word `nibadhniyāt' to indicate recording in writing, what has been uttered by others.

The contingency of the śūdras not being allowed to hear it\(^ {34}\) also does not arise, because that had been settled by the general permission (given to all castes) to hear the Mahābhārata, similar to the one with respect to the passage praising Om etc.

**Objection:** We say that the permission excluded the Gītā portion.

**Reply:** Not so, because without the Gītā the well-known sum-total of one lakh verses would not be completed. That is why the teachers have declared: 'Those very mantras of the Vedas, inserted in the Bhārata etc., they use in a secular sense, omitting the rules of their private reading.'

Thus ends the first section (āhnikā) of the first chapter of the commentary on the Hundred Aphorisms of Śāṅkilya composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.

\(^{34}\) Titular brāhmaṇas, women and śūdras are prohibited from hearing the Vedas. If the Gītā is given the same status as the Vedas, then this prohibition would apply to it also. But it is an extremely important work on devotion; and the sage Śāṅkilya relies on it so much that its reading or hearing cannot be denied to the devotees. The sage himself says that in devotion there is no consideration of caste etc. Hence the discussion raised here is valid.

Having thus proved that devotion is the direct cause of immortality, this second section is now begun to show that devotion is the prime means to which knowledge (jñāna) and concentration (yoga) are subservient.
10. This (devotion) is the principal means, because the others depend upon it.

The word 'this' has been used to remind the reader once again, of what was mentioned at the close of the last section. This highest form of devotion is the principal means since others, viz., knowledge of the soul, concentration etc., need its assistance (in their fulfillment). After the statement 'That which is limitless, is felicity' (7.23) The Chāndogyanad proceeds thus: 'The ātman is all this. Seeing thus, thinking thus, knowing thus, he becomes devoted to the ātman, rejoicing in the ātman, mated to the ātman, having his happiness in the ātman, he becomes the lord of himself' (7.25.2). Here the ideal of 'sight' as expressed by the phrase 'seeing thus, becomes subsidiary to the 'highest devotion'-which itself is of the nature of finding happiness in the ātman-removing the delusion that the ātman is not lovable etc. For instance, in such sentences as: 'The staff-bearer (i.e. the ascetic) repeats the praiṣa mantra following his guru;' 'Wearing the sacred thread reversed, he causes the cow to be milked;' 'Knowing, he performs sacrifice;' 'Being wealthy he is happy' etc., the words 'staff' etc., are subsidiary. So too here, 'seeing' is subsidiary to devotion (to the ātman). Since it was relevant to the context 'thinking' and 'knowing' have also been added to strengthen the (main point) already described. Similarly the repetition of 'rejoicing in the ātman' etc. is quite to the point, because wherever there is devotedness (rāti), rejoicing (kṛiṇā) would also be there. Otherwise the sentence would have to be split up meaning either 'seeing for the sake of devotedness' or 'devotedness for the sake of seeing'. Therefore 'seeing' is subsidiary (to 'devotedness') according to the well-known rule: '(it is) subsidiary because it subserves another thing as its end' (Pū . M. 3.1.2). That is why the venerable Manu also declares the excellence of one devoted to the ātman, in the following words: 'If a person gives up worldly duties and becomes a sage ever devoted to the ātman, becoming himself the soul of all beings, attains the Highest state'. (Mah. Ś. 194.46).

1 According to the doctrine of this treatise, devotion is the main thing and other things are subsidiary to it. The commentator has tried to prove this with the support of the statement from the Chāndogya. Any interpretation other than what is given by him would necessitate the splitting up of the original sentence whereby the clauses would not be consecutive attributes of one and the same subject. Or it may even result in the opposite of what the treatise wants to prove, as in the case of the second alternative!

And the subject-matter is devotedness (or devotion) because it has been presented as the result (phala). Therefore 'seeing' which is included in this context has to be only subsidiary.
Objection: But then, immortality as being 'the lord of himself' is the result of 'seeing' only. Therefore that itself is the subject-matter; and consequently things are exactly the opposite of what you maintain!

Reply: Not so, because the pronoun tad ('he') is interposed in between. 'He becomes the lord of himself.' Here by the word 'he,' it is the person 'who is devoted to the ātman' that is represented because of proximity and not the one who is 'seeing' because he is remote. There is no reason why the remote one should be brought into close contiguity.

Objection: The context itself is the reason!

Reply: No, because in that case the logical fault of mutual dependence\(^2\) (i.e., reasoning in a circle) would result!

\(^2\) The objector tries at first to prove that the context belongs to 'seeing' as the subject matter because being 'the lord of himself' is only its result. When this argument is refuted by the theory of proximity, he now tries to wriggle out by stating that the reason for connecting the word saḥ with the distant word paś yan is that the subject-matter is 'seeing' which itself has not been proved but disputed! This would result in the well-known fallacy of 'mutual dependence' or 'reasoning in a circle', thus: (1) Since his becoming 'the lord of himself' (which is the same as attainment of immortality) is due to 'seeing,' the topic under discussion is 'seeing'. (2) Because the topic under discussion is 'seeing,' the word sat is to be connected with 'seeing'.

It is seen in the world also that the knowledge of a young man's beauty, causes love for him in a woman's mind.\(^3\) But love does not cause knowledge. Hence we conclude that knowledge is subsidiary (to affection) as it is seen to aid the latter. And again it is seen that the knowledge that 'nature' is merciless, of limited power, unpleasant etc., causes corruption in the minds of beings whereas the knowledge that the ātman is the repository of infinite mercy, unlimited power, beauty par excellence etc., destroys that corruption. And from that arises the highest devotion. That is why the Gītā says: 'Those who think of the Supreme, whose souls are bound up in Him, who abide in Him, who find their refuge in Him-they go thither from where there is no return, having all their sins removed by knowledge' (5.17).

Similarly the Āyurveda also says: 'Thought, courage and knowledge of the ātman etc.,-these are the best medicines for the mind's ailings' (Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayam 1.23).

\(^3\) It is well-known that Damayanti's love for Nala was produced this way.

14. For that very reason (the liberation) of the milk-maids, (even) without the help of knowledge, (has been declared).
Because knowledge is seen to be a subsidiary aim, for that very reason the smṛti rejecting all visible aids declares that the mink-maids attained liberation solely by devotion to the Supreme Lord which destroyed their impurities of the mind. We read: One milk-maid, having all her merits cancelled by the intense rapture of thinking about Him and all her sins expiated by the agony of not obtaining Him,-meditating on Him, the cause of the world, identical with the Supreme Brahman,-ceasing to breathe, obtained liberation' (V. P. 5.13. 14-15).

4 Like sins, merits also cause bondage by forcing the soul to take birth, to exhaust them. Hence anyone desirous of liberation must get rid of both.

Here (the presence) of devotion is to be inferred from the signs of pleasure and pain and through that devotion, liberation. This is the purport of the passage. Just as the fruit of the sacrifice is obtained by offering unhusked golden berries thus obviating all need for any intermediate operation, so in the case of the milk-maids also liberation is produced directly from devotion. Hence it is understood that knowledge is only a subsidiary means. If knowledge were the chief means, the result (of liberation) could not have been produced in its absence. Neither can it be said that the milk-maid’s intense thinking (cintā) about Him should be taken as the knowledge of the identity of ātman and Brahman because hearing (śravaṇa), pondering (manana) etc. the (well-known) causes of such knowledge were impossible in this case. Hence it (cintā) should be interpreted only as ‘remembrance bound up with affection’.

Nor can this be explained as a case of eulogy (arthavāda), since the subject is new and also since there is no direct ‘injunction’ (vidhi) nearby.

5 And not knowledge.

6 Knowledge removes impurities in the mind causing devotion which in turn gives liberation. But devotion cultivated directly—as happened in the case of the milk-maids—will also burn up these impurities and give the fruit of liberation directly. When the latter is there, there is no need for the former. To illustrate this there is an allusion to the statement in the work (Nyāyamālavistara 10.1.1). In a certain Vedic rite an oblation of boiled rice is made, for which dehusking is first necessary. But if an offering of golden berries is made instead, the result is obtained immediately without the intermediate trouble of dehusking.

7 Because these milk-maids did not have knowledge and yet attained liberation.

8 According to the śāstras on knowledge it can come only through the three steps of śravaṇa (hearing), manana (pondering) and nididhyāsana (meditation).

9 The contention of the objector is that even though knowledge is really intended, devotion has been brought in only to illustrate it. Statements of high praise, whose aim is persuasive enforcement of a previous injunction, are called technically arthavāda.
10. Arthavā da will follow only when that particular topic is already introduced or when there is a direct injunction near by whose enforcement is necessary. In this case neither the topic of knowledge nor an injunction enforcing it are near at hand. Hence the argument fails.

Now an objection is raised that the proofs so far adduced based on 'subject matter,' 'relative position' and 'sign' are nullified because they go against the śrutis, and then refuted (in the following aphorism)-

15. If it is said that he knows through devotion we deny it; because it is through 're-cognition' aided by (devotion that he knows).

**Objection:** It is declared (śrutam) (in the Gītā) thus: 'By devotion he really knows (abhijānāti) Me, how great and what I am. Then, having known Me in reality, he forthwith enters into Me' (18.55). Just as in the sentence 'He draws near to the gārhapatiya fire with an Andrī verse'11 (Tai. S. 1.5.8) here also by the rule that the meaning produced by a case-ending is more powerful, (whether in Vedas or in secular writings), it is to be decided that devotion causes knowledge. Of course, the aphorism 'since it is seen so in the world also' (13), (was adduced as a proof that knowledge leads to affection). Since it was a case of direct perception due to visible experience, there was no need to refer to the śrutis. But here perception fails to enlighten us how far devotion to Brahman is to be aided by knowledge. [Hence we have to depend upon the statement of the śrutis (i.e. the Gītā) and arrive at the above-mentioned conclusion.]12

**Counter Objection:** Since it has been seen so in the case of the young woman's love, why not infer similarly in the case of Brahman also?

**Objector's reply:** In that case all your arguments would end in the 'sign' (liṅga) leading to an inference (which would be nullified by a direct statement of the Gītā quoted above!)

**Reply:** There is nothing wrong in our arguments. Your objections would have been valid if the Gītā had simply declared 'cognises,' 'knows' (jānāti) But it is not so. On the other hand, it uses the term 're-cognises' (abhi-jānāti).
By the word abhijñā it is the knowledge of something already known that is implied. Therefore, the first knowledge which was conducive to devotion, resulted in the promotion of devotion. Then onwards devotion seeks to aid knowledge through repetition in the form of abhijñā (‘re-cognition’ or ‘revised knowledge’) until it becomes firmly rooted. This process is similar to the repeated acts of shelling to separate grains of rice. (The latter part of the) quotation (from the Gītā) elucidates this help (rendered by devotion to knowledge): ‘Then’ means ‘After devotion has been strengthened through the strengthening of knowledge’, ‘he enters.’ Therefore this cannot be called a śruti but only a confirmatory repetition (anuvāda) of what is got as a corollary.

The word aindryā is in the instrumental case thereby implying that its repetition is subservient to the action of moving near the fire.

To determine which is pradhāna (primary) and which is aṅga (subsidiary), Miṃśāṣa arranges the proofs in the following order wherein each is of superior force to the succeeding one: (1)Śruti—a definite statement of the text; (2) Liṅga—a ‘sign’ or the sense of the words leading to an inference; (3) Vākya—‘the being mentioned in the same sentence thereby establishing connection; (4) Prakaraṇa—context or subject-matter; (5) Sthāna—relative position or order and (6) Samākhyā—‘title.’ (vide Pū.M.3.3.1 to 14).

The objector’s contention is that the siddhāntin is trying to establish his position based only on prakaraṇa (aph. 11) sthāna (aph. 12) and liṅga (aph. 14) whereas from the direct statement of the śruti it is clear that devotion leads to knowledge and hence is subsidiary to it.

This is from the siddhāntin’s side.

Anuvāda literally means repetition. Technically, it is an explanatory repetition or reference to what has already been mentioned. It applies particularly to any portion of the Brāhmaṇas (of the Vedas) which comments on, illustrates or explains a vidhi (‘injunction’) previously laid down and which does not itself lay down any directions.

Moreover this has been declared before.

Before the words ‘through devotion he recognises me’ (Gītā 18.53), having declared that he becomes fit for becoming Brahman’ (ibid. 53), it is further said: ‘Having become Brahman, attaining peace of mind, he neither grieves nor desires. Feeling perfect equanimity towards all beings he obtains supreme devotion unto Me’ (ibid.54). For such an one, who has already known Brahman, there is no need of any assistance from knowledge. Hence our interpretation that it is only an illustrative repetition (anuvāda) (and not a fresh declaration of the śruti) is in order.
By thus settling that knowledge is subservient as a means (to devotion) the view that either of them can possibly be the end, is also refuted. With reference to a single goal the means and the end cannot become alternatives! By the word api (‘even’), the theory that both of them can be ends is also (refuted).

18. ‘Devotion to god’ applies to a god other than (the Supreme Being) because of its close association (with the devotion to the teacher).

Somewhere the śruti says: ‘He who has supreme devotion towards god, and as towards god, so towards a teacher, to such a great one, all these things so far declared, reveal themselves’ (Ś v. U. 6. 23). Here by the word ‘devotion to god’ (devabhaktiḥ), the devotion to a god other than the Supreme Lord is meant. Why? Because it is closely associated with the devotion to the teacher. Such close association would be improper in the case of the highest devotion which results in immortality. Gods like Indra when worshipped, will give the fruit of knowledge, just as they give good fortune. (With such an interpretation) the close association (mentioned above) can also become a deciding factor. This is what the close association proves just as the meaning of the word ulū ka¹⁵ (is proved by the connection of the context). This is just to strengthen the arguments already adduced.

So far it has been proved that parā bhakti (highest devotion) is with reference to the Supreme Lord only, that it gives immortality as its fruit and that knowledge is always ancillary to it. All arguments against this were also refuted effectively. But now here is a statement from the śruti (quoted above) which seems to contradict this position of the siddhāntin. It appears from this śruti that (1) the highest devotion need not necessarily be towards the Supreme Being but can exist towards a human being like the teacher also, in which case it gets degraded into an ordinary human affection; (2) such a devotion can give a comparatively insignificant result like the revelation of the meanings of certain scriptural passages; in other words devotion can lead to knowledge also! That is why it has become necessary to take this passage in particular and reinterpret it, to fit in with the philosophy of devotion. Here close association or co-existence (sā hacarya) with the devotion to the teacher (gurubhakti) has become the deciding factor in interpreting the word deva as a god like Indra etc., and not the Supreme God. Since gurubhakti is ordinary devotion towards a human teacher and since the parā bhakti in the text is equated with this, the object of that parā bhakti has necessarily to be a minor god like Indra and not the Supreme Being. In this case the predication of an ordinary result for such a devotion (viz., the revelation of the meanings of the scriptural passages) would also be not improper. This is the gist of the whole argument.

This verse occurs towards the end of the sixth chapter of the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad. Even a cursory glance at
the earlier verses will convince anybody that it is the Highest God that is the subject matter and that there is no hope of immortality without knowing Him (vide verses 7 to 20). It is strange that the commentator quotes verse 19 (aph. 1) in support of the doctrine of devotion earlier, wherein the deity is taken to be Supreme Being and interpret a succeeding verse in the same context in a different way! Reading verses 22 to 23 together it occurs that the verse 23 is a eulogy of gurubhakti. In that case all this discussion becomes meaningless. Even without this particular aphorism the original thought current will not be disturbed.

Ulū ka means an owl. It is also the nickname of Kaṇ ā da, the founder of Vaiś eṣ ika philosophy. Which one of the interpretations is to be given to this word depends upon the context. Similarly whether the word deva means the Supreme Ī ś vara or any of the minor gods, also depends upon the sā hacarya.

Bhakticandrikā gives another interpretation for ulū kavat: Even though the owl may be mentioned along with the crow in the group of birds, it represents a different species of birds. Similarly here also the two devotions are different.

19. However yoga (concentration) is for both: because, like the prayā ja ceremony it is needed by both.

Yoga on the other hand is useful to both knowledge and devotion; because concentration of mind is necessary in both.

Objection: There is a well-known dictum that `Subsidiary portions of a sacrifice stand as such on the same level and so cannot be connected with each other’ (Pū . M. 3.1.21). Therefore how can yoga which is subsidiary to the end (devotion) be a subsidiary to another means (knowledge)?

Reply: (It is possible) like the Prayā ja. The Prayā ja ceremony is subsidiary to the Vā japeya sacrifice as also to the Dī kṣ an ī yā which is its part. Similarly here also, because the proof which establishes yoga as subsidiary is common to both. Or we may even say that the practice of yoga which was originally undertaken as conducive to knowledge, incidentally aids devotion also. Renunciation of worldly objects must similarly be understood as helpful to both.

Prayā ja is a fore-offering made before the principal offering. Dī kṣ an ī yā is a preliminary sacrifice done before commencing the major sacrifice and the sacrificer obtains the competence to observe the vows (dī kṣ ā )
after this. Vā japeya is a major Somayā ga. It is supposed to give the sacrificer plenty of food (vā ja) and drink (peya).

**Objection:** Now, there is this traditional teaching of Patañjali which is hard to counteract: 'Or, by devotion to God (samā dhi is obtained)' (Y. S. 1.23). Here it is meant that devotion, termed as praṇ idhā na, is conducive to the attainment of samā dhi (i.e., perfect concentration). Hence how can devotion be the principal thing?

To answer such an objection, it is now stated:

20. However, it is by lower form of devotion that perfect concentration is attained.

**Reply:** There, praṇ idhā na means the lower form of devotion. That perfect concentration is produced by this does not at all go against the smṛ ti (i.e., the Yogasūtras of Patañjali). There itself we have these succeeding aphorisms (which support this interpretation): 'His manifesting word is Om' (Y. S. 1.27), 'The repetition of this(Oṁ ) and meditating on its meaning (is the way)' (ibid. 1.28).

Parā bhakti or the highest devotion is actually the devotion that arises after the realisation of God. Aparā bhakti or lower devotion, also known as gauṇī bhakti is the means thereof. This latter is of the form of chanting the Lord's name, singing His glories etc. It is clear that in the sūtras of Patañjali, it is this latter that is meant.

21. It may be said that (devotion) being an affection must be given up. Not so, because it has the Highest for its object. (The case is) similar to that of company.
Since the Yogaś āstra has been incidentally brought in, this aphorism is being introduced. It may be said that devotion also has to be given up by one seeking liberation since it is non-different from the affection mentioned in the Yogaś āstra. For instance, the particular aphorism runs thus: `..... attachment, aversion and clinging to life- these are afflictions' (Y. S. 2.3). This is countered thus: This is not a valid objection, because devotion has the highest as its abode. In other words, it has God as its object. It does not become fit to be given up only because it is an affection. Only when that affection becomes connected with mundane existence, does it become fit to be abandoned. A company need not be given up just because it is a company, but only when it is bad company. Similarly here also. Therefore in the statement, `Devotion to God must be given up since it is a form of affection,' we have to supply the limiting conditions (to make its implications less comprehensive) thus: (when it is connected with mundane existence or (when it is) not conducive to liberation. However this devotion is not devoid of the quality of goodness as seen from the statement of the Gītā : 'Those with the quality of goodness worship the gods' (17.4) etc.

22. This (devotion) is indeed (the highest) because of the declaration of the śruti (i.e. the Gītā ) that the (devotee) is superior to the performers of sacrificial acts, the followers of the path of knowledge as also those who practise concentration.

This devoted service is the highest: or this devotion is the highest. By all means this has been determined to be so, because it has been declared thus: 'The yogi is regarded as superior to the ascetics, also to those who follow the path of knowledge He is also superior to the performers of Vedic rites. Therefore O Arjuna, be thou a yogin! And of all the yogis, he who with his soul intent on Me, in full belief worships Me, he is considered by Me as the most devoted' (Gītā 6.46, 47). Here, it is to be understood that the successive superiority of the subjects is caused by the successive superiority of the characteristics like asceticism etc. But, of course, it is impossible that a subsidiary can be superior to the chief. Hence devotion is the principal.

In order to counteract the possibility of objections being raised, based even on the (supposed) purport of the śruti, he (now) quotes a passage:

23. Because, the superiority of devotion has been established by question and answer.
Here the whole of the twelfth chapter of the Gītā is an example in point. The question is: 'Those devotees, who, ever steadfast, thus worship Thee, and those also who worship the Imperishable, the Unmanifested—which of them are better versed in yoga?' (12.1).

The answer follows: Those who, fixing their mind on Me, worship Me, ever steadfast, and endowed with supreme faith, they in My view, are the best versed in yoga. But those also, who worship the Imperishable, the Indefinable, the Unmanifested, the Omnipresent, the Unthinkable, the Unchangeable, the Immovable, the Eternal—having subdued all the senses, even-minded everywhere, engaged in the welfare of all beings,—verily, they reach only Myself. Greater is their trouble whose minds are set on the Unmanifested; for the goal of the Unmanifested is very hard for the embodied to reach. But those who worship Me, resigning all actions in Me, regarding Me, as the supreme Goal, meditating on Me with single-minded yoga—for these whose mind is set on Me, verily I become ere long, O Partha, the Saviour out of the ocean of the mortal saṁsāra' (ibid. verses 12-7). Since the superiority of devotion to (knowledge) is thus established by this question and the answer thereof, the passage cannot be considered as a mere eulogy (arthavāda). It is well-known that a dialogue in the form of question and answer is aimed at setting a doubt aside and not for mere eulogy (of anything). The point to be noted here is that the practice of the subsidiary (knowledge) only (without the primary i.e., devotion) entails greater hardship.

Since, incidentally, faith (śraddhā) has been mentioned, the demon of doubt may now arise insisting that devotion is also a kind of faith. This is now slain thus:

24. But it can never be faith, because it is more universal.

Devotion should never be doubted to be of the form of faith, because faith is subsidiary only to ceremonial works. Devotion to God is not of this type.

25. And if devotion were the same as faith, then a regressus ad infinitum would result.
This passage of śruti (i.e., the Gītā) is well known: ‘He who with faith devotes himself to Me, is considered by Me as the most devoted’ (5.47). Here, if devotion were taken as a mode of faith, then since it is seen from this verse that faith is subsidiary to devotion, a regressus ad infinitum (an endless series of cause and effect) would result, though faith has no subsidiaries. Otherwise another faith has to be assumed as part of this faith and so on; thus an infinite regress alone will result. Therefore, just as an opening verse cannot have another opening verse or the preliminary ceremony of rinsing the mount (ācamana) cannot have another preliminary rinsing, so here also if devotion were the same as faith, it would not require another faith as its subsidiary. And also there is the common phrase, ‘endowed with faith and devotion’ which directly speaks of them as separate.

17 That which characterizes the agent is a subsidiary part of the ceremony performed. In the verse of the Gītā quoted above, faith being the characteristic of the agent, it is subsidiary to devoted worship (bhajate). If devotion also is a faith, then one faith has become subsidiary to another faith. The first faith being the same as devotion (according to this contention), should have another faith as its subsidiary and so on. This series will thus go on endlessly.

18 Because the devotion of Gītā requires a faith as a subsidiary and this would not be so if both were identical.

26. But the Brahma-kāṇḍa ends in devotion because with respect to the production of subsequent knowledge of (devotion) it is similar (to the pūrvakāṇḍa).

This is in reply to an objector who thinks that the Uttara-kāṇḍa (i.e., the Uttaramīṃśā or the Vedānta) would not have been famous as the Jñānakāṇḍa if jñāna or knowledge were not its principal subject matter.
(The reply is that) the Brahma-kāṇḍa (the portion of the Veda which treats of Brahman) is revealed for the sake of devotion and not for the sake of knowledge, since revealing what was not previously known is a trait common to both. Otherwise, the Pūrva-kāṇḍa (i.e. the Pūrva-mīmāṁsā) which declared the 'knowledge' of the Vedic rites should also have become a Jñāna-kāṇḍa! Moreover, there is no positive injunction with regard to knowledge by the strength of which it should have been possible to declare that 'this kāṇḍa is Jñāna-kāṇḍa because of the predominence of knowledge'. Therefore (to call it so) Jñāna-kāṇḍa is a mistake. That is why the aphorism has been composed thus: 'Now, therefore, the inquiry into Brahman' (Br. S. I.I.I). Since it is also for the sake of devotion to this Brahman, it is also a Bhakti-kāṇḍa.

The gist of the argument is that the object of the Pūrva-kāṇḍa is to reveal the 'knowledge' of the Vedic rites whereas that of the Uttarakāṇḍa is to reveal the 'knowledge' of Brahman. The argument hinges round the word jījñāsā which has been used by both the treatises in their very first aphorism. This word literally means 'the desire to know'. Knowledge being thus the common factor of both, it is really superfluous to designate only the Uttarakāṇḍa as Jñānakāṇḍa. The correct way is to call them as Dharma-kāṇḍa and Brahma-kāṇḍa respectively since they deal with Dharma and Brahman in that order.

Thus ends the second section of the first chapter of the commentary on the Hundred Aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya, composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.

THE FIRST CHAPTER ENDS HERE

SECOND CHAPTER

SECTION I

As this devotion cannot be produced by direct effort, there is need of other means to produce it. Among these, knowledge is the internal means. Lower devotion etc., are the external means. This second chapter is begun with a view to investigating them.
27. The practice of the means of knowledge must be continued until purity (of devotion) is attained, as shelling the rice (is continued until it is dehusked).

'Buddhi' means an accurate knowledge of Brahman. Though this is not something which can be produced by effort,1 yet, the practice of śravaṇa ('hearing'), manana ('cogitating') and nididhyāsana ('meditating') which are the means thereof, is necessary in order to attain it. Now the question arises whether it is to be practised only once2 since there is this dictum, 'The meaning of the śāstra is fulfilled when once it is performed;' or, should it be practised until devotion becomes well-established? (The aphorism is actually in) reply to this doubt. The practice of the means of knowledge is necessary until devotion becomes pure. When the śāstra says, 'He shells the rice' it actually means that the shelling is to be continued until the grains are dehusked. Similarly from the analogy of this visible example, (it is clear) that one has to strive to practise knowledge etc., until one's mind is cleansed of its dross.

1 Knowledge being a mental revelation cannot be produced by physical effort.

2 c. f. Brahma Sūtras 4.1.1.:

'The repetition of (hearing etc., is necessary), on account of the repeated instruction by the scriptures.' The Chandogya Upaniṣad repeats the sentence
It may now be suggested that the practice of the subordinate means of the aforesaid means (like 'hearing' etc.) has not been ordained! Here is the answer:

28. Their means also (must be practised).

It is but proper that their means also like approaching the teacher, reasoning in such way that it does not contradict the Vedas, tranquillity etc., must be practised. The primary means sans the subordinate ones, is unable to assist the principal end, just as a general is unable to achieve anything without his army.

3 The Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad says:

In order to know that, he has to reverentially approach a preceptor who is well-versed in the Vedas and established in Brahman’. (1.2.12)

4 c. f. Brahmasūtras (2.1.11):

`Also because reasoning has no sure basis (it cannot upset the conclusions of the Vedānta)’. And also Manusmṛti (12.106):
'He alone knows the dharma, who has scrutinized the dharmaś āstras of the ṛṣis through a reasoning which is not opposed to the spirit of the Vedas and other authoritative scriptures'.

5 The cultivation of the following group of virtues is indispensable in the path of knowledge: śama (tranquillity), dama (control of the senses), uparati (withdrawal of the senses from their objects and preventing them from going after them), titīkṣā (forbearance), śraddhā (ardent faith) and samādhi (concentration of mind).

c. f. Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (4.4.23):

‘Therefore he who knows thus, having become tranquil and self-controlled, withdrawing himself from desires, forbearing all pairs of opposites, gaining concentration of mind, sees the ātman in himself.’

The purification of understanding is now discussed:

29. Kāśyapa (holds) that the understanding must be intent on the omnipotence (of the supreme Lord); because He is the highest.6

The teacher Kāśyapa holds that this understanding gives supreme bliss when it has as its object, the omnipotence etc., of the Supreme Lord. Why so? Because He is far superior to the individual souls and the latter need knowledge
of Him in order to know themselves. According to this view there is absolute difference between the individual soul and Brahman.

6 Cowell translates the phrase

as `from its being other'. The word para has several senses, the chief ones being `the highest' and the `the other'. The former sense seems to be more apt because, the fact of the Supreme Lord merely being `the other' (viz., different from the individual souls) does not add weight to the statement that the understanding be engrossed in His omnipotence etc. His `greatness' is the real justification for doing so. This sense is obvious in such usages as parā bhakti, parā vidyā etc. The meaning that the two (the supreme Lord and the individual souls) are different, is of course implied even in this interpretation and hence does not contradict the last sentence of the commentary.

30. Bādarāyana (holds) that it must be intent on the ātman alone.

However the teacher Bādarāyana holds that the understanding must have purely the ātman (soul) as its object. So does the sūtra say: `But they recognize and declare it as the ātman (soul)' (Br. S. 4.1.3). According to this view even the conception that the jīva (individual soul) is Brahman, is false; realization of truth comes through the understanding being intent on the ātman as pure consciousness; this itself gives the fruit of liberation.

7 Since Brahman (= ātman) alone exists and nothing else, even to say that the jīva is Brahman, which presupposes some sort of difference between them, is ridiculous.

31. Śāṇḍilya (holds) that it should be intent on both; because (this is proved by) both the Veda and reasoning.
The teacher Śāṇḍilya however holds the view that the understanding must be intent upon both. Why? because śabda or Veda declares so. At first it begins thus: 'All this is varily Brahman, from thence doth it proceed, therein doth it merge and therein doth it live. So one should meditate upon It with a tranquil mind' (Ch. U. 3.14.1). Proceeding further it says: 'This is my soul within my heart, this is Brahman, this shall I obtain, having passed from here. He who is sure of this and had no doubt (he becomes Brahman). Thus saith the (teacher) Śāṇḍilya, thus doth Śāṇḍilya say' (ibid. 3.14.4). Having thus discussed the point it predicates the result of becoming Brahman to him, who knows both objects; and this result is brought about by love and devotion directed towards Brahman. No contradiction is involved here due to the mixing up of the eternal and the non-eternal; because, just as in the well-known passage 'Babara Prāvāhaṇi desired' (Tai. S. 7.1.10.2), here also it is an ancient Śāṇḍilya that is referred to. The authorship of the Vedas is in reality attributed to God. This is known from the Vedas also: 'From that universal sacrifice sprang the Rā and Sā man verses, the meters sprang from it, from it the Yajus arose' (R. V. 5.10.90; Tai. Ā. 3.12.4).

9 The word used in the original is

It is broken up as

and

The first refers to the production of the world from Brahman, the second to its dissolution in Brahman and the third to its living in Brahman.
10 The followers of the Mī mā ṇ ṁ sā hold that the Vedas are eternal in the sense that they have existed from eternity. They also consider that it is the Pūrvakāṇḍa that is the real Veda and that the Uttarakāṇḍa is authoritative only in so far as it supports the former. It is relegated to a secondary status. In this particular statement quoted from the Chāndogya Upaniṣad, the eternal words like etc., are juxtaposed with the noneternal words of an individual human being Śāṇḍilya. Hence the passage cannot be taken as very authoritative and it does not support the theory of the author of this treatise. This is the argument of the objector.

This objection is now met by the commentator on the following lines: First of all, the Vedas are not eternal in the sense of time, but only because of the eternal truths contained in them. They are in fact created by God at the beginning of every cycle of creation. In support of this a Vedic quotation taken from the Samhitā and Āraṇyaka portion (whose authority cannot be refuted even by the Mī mā ṇ sist!) is given.

As regards the Śāṇḍilya mentioned in the Upaniṣad, it refers to another ancient Śāṇḍilya, of a previous cycle of creation. After realizing the truth of etc., this Śāṇḍilya gave out his experiences out of joy and also to help future aspirants. Hence this statement of his was included in the Veda of the next cycle of creation. There is nothing wrong in this. In fact we have such a statement (Bābara etc.) even in the Pūrvakāṇḍa (considered by the Mī mā ṇ sist as supremely authoritative) wherein it is accepted that the name Prāvāhāṇi refers to another ancient individual.

The same view can be established by reasoning also. Indeed, Brahman has been described in the Vedas as possessing of the supreme power and also as being identical with the individual soul. For instance, the śrutis says: `From whom verily these beings are born, by whom when born they live, whom they approach, whom they enter,—him do thou seek to know' (Tai. U. 3.1). And so (in the Gītā): `An eternal portion of Myself, having become a living soul in the world of life....' (15.7).11 Between these two which can cancel which?12 Therefore, on the strength of such statement as 'That thou art!' (Ch. U. 6.8.7) it is reasonable to conclude that both should be known.

11 There are several statements in the śrutis describing the greatness of Brahman as also its becoming the individual soul:
'He is the Lord of all, the King of all beings, the Protector of beings; He is the supporting bridge preventing the mixing up of the worlds' (Br. U. 4.4.22);

'O Gārgi, it is by the order of this Akṣara (Brahman) that this earth and the sky are standing supported' (ibid. 3.8.9);

'Fearing Him the wind blows, fearing Him, the sun rises, fearing Him, Agni and Indra (perform their respective duties), fearing Him Death the fifth runs about!' (Tai. U. 2.8.1) See also: Mu. U. 1.2.1, Ka. U. 5.15 etc.

'He (the Lord) split this skull and entered through this hole (brahmarandhra), (Ai. U. 1.3.12);

'He has entered into this (body), right up to the end of the nails; (Br. U. 1.4.7);

'like little sparks from the fire, all these senses, all these worlds, all these gods, all these beings-have sprung up' (ibid. 2.1.20) etc.
In other words, both are equally important.

It be said that (the understanding being intent on both) cannot be proved because of incompatibility, we reply; `No, since, like recognition, this is also possible by neglecting the distinguishing characteristics.'

**Objection**: That the understanding can have both as its objects, cannot be proved because of incompatibility. To think of the Being endowed with the power to create the world etc., as (the being who is) without such creative powers etc., is indeed incompatible.

**Reply**: Not so; because just as in recognitions like 'This is that Devadatta,' 'That is I'-wherein one of the objects a general identity with the other is seen due to the substratum being the same, after overlooking its incidental characteristics-it is possible here also. The knowledge of the special characteristics of a given object can be overlooked (under certain circumstances).

**Objection**: So you hold that there can be the knowledge of the identity by means of the indirect (or secondary) mention only of an object!

**Reply**: Not exactly, since the knowledge obtained by means of indirect or secondary mention is of an inferior kind; and because in the knowledge of the object indicated thus, there is also the knowledge of the existence of the limiting factor which caused it. Otherwise we might sometimes have the recollection of the thing directly denoted by a word (śākya) without the limiting factor. Therefore you now stop arguing and sit quiet!

In the previous śūtra Śāṇḍilya has stated his view that the understanding can be intent on both the Supreme Being and the individual soul, because it is the same Supreme Being that has become the individual soul also. The objector's view-point is that the two are of opposite characteristics like omnipotence and the lack of it etc. Hence it is incompatible for the same understanding to be intent on such diametrically opposite things and yet hope to attain immortality.
The line of argument adopted by the author of the sūtras and elucidated by the commentator is very much reminiscent of the one resorted to by the pure Advaitins while interpreting what are called the Mahākāvyas of the Vedānta, like Tat tvam asi etc. That is because they are also Advaitins though not of the Śāṅkara type.

Before explaining the reply to the objection it is necessary to have a knowledge of the way a sentence is interpreted in Indian logic. The direct meaning of a word or a sentence is known as abhidhā or śakya and the indirect or secondary meaning is called lakṣanā. Normally it is the direct meaning that is preferred and accepted. However when that leads to absurdity, a search has to be made for the indirect meaning or meaning by lakṣanā. This lakṣanā is of three kinds: (1) Jahallakṣanā when the direct meaning is totally discarded (jahad = to give up) in favour of the indirect meaning. For example

which literally means `The village of the cowherds (is) in the Ganges'. Since a village cannot exist inside the waters of a river, the secondary meaning `on the banks of the Ganges' is to be adopted; (2) Ajahallakṣanā when the direct meaning is not given up (ajahad = without giving up) but the secondary meaning is added onto complete the sense. For example,

(`Red colour is running'). Here a `red horse' is added to complete the sense, without giving up the `red'; (3) Jahad-ajahallakṣanā or bhāgalakṣanā where a part of the direct meaning is discarded and another part is retained. For example

(`This is that Devadatta'). The Devadatta seen yesterday in the market place is recognized as `This is that Devadatta' when he comes to my house this morning. The two Devadattas are not absolutely identical because there is difference in time, place and dress etc. And yet the recognition is there. This recognition has been arrived at by overlooking the time, place, dress etc., associated with the `two' Devadattas and grasping only the person who is common to both the situations. The word abhijñā navad in the aphorism actually refers to this recognition.

Now, the identity between Brahman and the Jīva is also to be derived by adopting the last-mentioned method of Jahad-ajahallakṣanā. The special characteristics or Brahman like the ability to create this world etc., as also the
special limitations of the jīva as being bound in a body and suffering all its consequences etc., are to be overlooked in favour of the general characteristic, viz., pure Consciousness which is the essential nature of both and with regard to which there is absolutely no difference. Though a clay elephant and a clay mouse are not absolutely identical, they are identical from the point of view of `clayness,' similarly here also. Hence by adopting the same technique as in recognition, we conclude that there is no incompatibility in the original statement of Śāṅkīlya.

33. The Supreme Being is not subject to affliction,

because, of the special (ascertainment that comes) after (the realization of the identity).

Nor should it be said that, if such (an identity were accepted), there would arise the possibility of the Supreme Lord (also) being subject to the afflictions caused by the limiting adjunct (i.e., the internal organ) of the individual soul because after the realization of the aforesaid identity there will arise the special ascertainment that the afflictions etc., have no connection with the individual soul.

34. If it be said that the same (argument) holds good with respect to `power' also, we deny it, because it is natural (to Him).

Objection: It would then follow that like afflictions etc., power of the Supreme Lord also characterised by the ability to create this world etc., would have to be excluded! On the other hand, since the abstract quality of greatness is viewed as residing in the soul, it need not be excluded from it like affliction etc.!13

Reply: No, because the power to create etc., is natural to the Supreme Being. The natural capacity of fire to give heat cannot be altered. Is it not so? Therefore it is non-naturalness that constitutes the limiting adjunct. That is why, even though dirt etc., as found in the reflection in a mirror etc., can be excluded from the (real) sun, other natural (qualities like) roundness, brightness and so on, cannot be excluded.

13 The contention of the objector is that the `power' (aśvārya) of the Supreme Being depends upon an action like creating the world and hence, is incidental and not natural. Consequently there is every possibility of its being excluded, whereas the greatness (vaibhava) of the individual soul being natural to it, will not be excluded.
The question now arises: If the power of the Supreme Being is real, how then can you say that afflictions etc., are incidental to the individual souls only? The reason for this is now expounded:

35. The power of the Supreme Being is not disputed. Not so is the case with the others because they have His nature.

In no Vedic statement is the power of the Supreme Being disputed whereby even if it obtains elsewhere, it becomes nullified. Rather, it is known to be natural to Him, from such statements as, 'He whose will is truth' (Ch. U. 8.7.1). Contrary to the case of the individual soul, there is no reason in His case, for giving up the attributes once known to be His; because He is always the Lord and is eternally free. But, in the case of individual souls who are different from Him affictions etc., are never natural to them. Why? 'Because they have His nature.' This is proved from such Vedic statements as: 'He attains to the Supreme Light and appears in his own nature' (Ch. U. 8.3.4) etc. This would be impossible if (afflictions etc.) were natural. It would indeed be possible if afflictions etc., were natural to the Supreme Being. But it is not so. Therefore we have to conclude that transmigratory existence is only accidental from the additional reason that liberation, which is defined as attaining to the state of Brahman, would otherwise be impossible. Even though the power of the Lord is due to the limiting adjunct Māyā, this latter will never undergo absolute dissolution. Per contra, the internal organ—the limiting adjunct of the individual soul—will be absolutely dissolved on the rise of supreme devotion. The Māyā-power of the Lord never ceases because the souls are infinite in number, and its use by Him is ever necessary for their mundane existence as also manifold service. And therefore such statements as 'He as it were meditates, he as it were moves' (Br. U. 4.3.7) etc., and 'Hence there is this definition, "he is not this, he is not this"', (ibid. 2.3.6) refer to the individual soul only.

14 Suppose there is one Vedic statement ascribing omnipotence etc., to the Supreme Being and another statement denying this, then they cancel each other because both are equally authoritative. But such a negative statement is not found.

15 This difference is only in the state of bondage.

16 Even if afflictions were not natural to the soul, if they were natural to the Supreme Being, then, since the soul attains identity with it in the state of liberation, the latter's afflictions would accrue to the former also!

17 This automatically follows from note 16.

18 This statement also is made from the standpoint of mundane existence.
36. If it be said, 'What (becomes of God's power) without all the souls?' we reply that it will never be thus, since the internal organs are infinite in number.

**Objection:** But then, even if the liberation (of the individual souls) be only gradual, still, when all the internal organs get dissolved there being no purpose for the Mā yā -power of God, it will also necessarily be dissolved. What is the use of your telling that the power is natural (to God)?

**Reply:** This will never happen. Because the limiting adjuncts of the souls, viz., internal organs are infinite in number, such a time will never come; and therefore (our statement that) this power is natural to God, is but proper. Nor can it be proved that such a time will ever come, basing this argument on the maxim 'All antecedent non-existences produce their opposites from the very fact of their being so.'

**Objection:** We say that eventually all antecedent non-existences will have produced their opposites.

**Reply:** No; because no purpose would be served. To infer that a time will come when there would be no effects at all, is absolutely devoid of logic! Otherwise you might as well prove that there was a time when there was no substratum for destruction, based on the argument that there was a time when no antecedent non-existence has as yet produced its opposite.

**Objection:** Thinking that 'I alone will be the (unfortunate) soul who may never be liberated' one may never try for liberation!

**Reply:** Rather, why not accept that the means of liberation being definitely known, one will try to practise it even though there may be uncertainty regarding the fruit? On the other hand, if it is assured that all will get liberation, there is every possibility of no effort being ever made for that every reason!

19 Prā gabhā va is non-existence of an object before it is brought into being. It is destroyed the moment that thing is brought into being. One of the views is that it is this prā gabhā va that produces the pratiyogin (its opposite).

20 If you can accept that a time will come when all the prā gabhā vas will have produced their opposites, why not also accept that there was a time when none of the prā gabhā vas had as yet produced their opposites? At that time there was no substratum for destruction; i.e., no object had been produced which could be destroyed. Now, applying this argument to the particular case under discussion it would follow that there was a time when no internal organ had as yet been produced! That means there was already liberation and all this discussion would have been useless!

21 The argument of the objector is interesting: If the internal organs are infinite in number and liberation is an eternal
process then what guarantee is there that I would be liberated in the near future? In fact it may be eternally postponed! Hence what is the use of my trying for it?

22 In the uncertainty of the fruit there is every possibility of getting it. And the means is definitely known. Hence one will certainly try. Naturally no one needs to be in the `waiting list'!

If it is accepted that the power of the supreme Being—which is of the nature of the productive capacity of the material cause—is natural to Him, then it follows that like clay etc., He is also subject to modification. This doubt is now cleared:

37. (Brahman) is changeless because matter is interposed in between. (His power manifesting as the authorship of this world etc., really depends upon) the existence of thought and the consequent working (upon matter).

Actually matter (prakṛ ti) is the material cause for inanimate effects only. (Hence) it is subject to change. But Brahman is not so. His creative power etc., is due to the existence of thought and the consequent follow-up action on matter.23 And it is not possible to say that matter alone is existence, because this supposition will lead to the contingency of the non-existence of the individual souls who are superior to matter. Therefore the creative power etc., of the Supreme Being which accrues to Him through the intermediary Mā yā -ṣakti24, defined as matter, is natural to Him; and consequently He is changeless. The magician who creates through his power of illusion does not certainly become the subject of his own illusion! No doubt, being an effect means being changed because the cause and the effect are identical in substance. Yet, this change (with respect to the Supreme Being) is not a change in the form itself, as is the case with the milk becoming curds. Or again it may be said that (He) is not subject to change any more than the potter's stick is, in reference to the jar,25 since the stick does not effect any change in itself besides that produced in the jar. It is this which is described in the sūtra as `because matter is interposed in between'.

23 The idea is that at first He conceives of creation in the mind and then acts upon matter according to that. cf.

`He thought, "I shall create the worlds". He created these worlds' (Ai. U. 1.1.1-2);
The Lord of beings, desirous of progeny, thought over deeply. Having thus thought over deeply, He created the pair: matter and spirit (Pr. U. 1.4).

The Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad says:

It is to be known that prakṛti is Māyā and the Lord is the weilder of this Māyā (4.10).

Here the Supreme Being is considered as the 'efficient' or the instrumental cause, nimitta-kāraṇa.

If Māyā (the power of illusion) is the material cause of this world, then this world is established in Māyā only. How can then the śrutis advocate that it is established on Brahman through the statement 'In Him is everything established' (M.N.U. 30)? This question is now answered:

38. Establishment in Him (Brahman) is like (establishment) on a stool inside a house.

There is no contradiction involved in saying that the modifications (of illusory power) are also established in Him, (i.e.,) Brahman, 'as in the case of a stool inside a house.' For instance, even though one is established in a seat kept inside a house, he is said equally to be established in the seat as well as in the house. Same is the case here also.

But then, by the assumption of the primeval matter (prakṛti) does not the causality of Brahman stand disproved? This is now denied;

39. Both (are needed) because of their mutual dependence.

Both Brahman and prakṛti are the causes; since the conscious and the non-conscious entities depend upon each other, the conscious for attaining self-knowledge and the non-conscious for attaining an object for its potentiality. Hence, which of them can ignore the other?

Sāṁkhya-kārikā (21):

'This union of the pradhāna with the puruṣa is like the association of a blind man with a lame man and it serves a
In order to facilitate the usage of terms in his treatise, he now proceeds to enumerate the categories:

40. There is no third object beside the 'knowable' and the 'knower'.

The 'knowable' means matter (prakṛti) and the 'knower' means Brahman. Besides these two there is no third substance (in this treatise). This is the idea.

**Objection:** Since a 'third' one can neither be proved nor disproved, why raise the topic at all?

**Reply:** What the aphorism actually means is this,—that the capacity to know resides in none but Brahman and the capacity of being knowable resides in nothing but matter.

Now, if there is no connection between matter and soul, then all effects will be abolished. If there is connection, that itself will be the 'third'! This objection is now met.

41. And (these two) are joined, because they are beginningless.

The word 'mutually' must be supplied from the previous aphorism (39), before the word 'joined'. These two, matter and soul, which reside in the internal organ, themselves constitute the mutual connection; hence no extraneous (connection) need be assumed. Why? Because of the very fact that both are beginningless. And so does the Gītā declare: 'Know that both matter and soul are beginningless' (13.19).

**Objection:** Well then, let this 'beginningless' itself form the extraneous connection!

**Reply:** No; since the alternative lies between the conscious and the non-conscious only, there can be no (third thing)
Apart from them.

According such statements in the Vedas as ‘It is to be known that prakṛti is māyā (illusion) and that the Lord is the wielder of this māyā’ (Śv. U. 4.10), prakṛti (matter) is verily false, since it is of the form of illusion. And so, how can you say that it is a category (an object) which is ‘knowable’? The reply is now given:

42. The ‘knowable’ (i.e., matter) cannot be false because it is

The ‘knowable’ i.e., the pradhāna (also known as prakṛti or matter), cannot be false, cannot be an illusion. Why? From the very fact of its being a power. It is well-known that the magician will be unable to produce the required extraneous object without the power of illusion. Also, the Veda which declares the reality of the effects through the reality of the causes thus, ‘But how, O gentle youth, could the existent thing be produced out of the non-existent?’ (Ch. U. 6.2.2), is really advocating the reality of everything and not their falseness. The divine creation always depends upon a corresponding con-comitant cause because it is the product of an intelligent being, like the creation of a magician. Nor should a new object be posited through the assumption of adṛṣṭa (‘the unseen’ effect of a work) etc., because it is simpler to assume one power (like pradhāna, than two or more like adṛṣṭa etc.) Also, there is no proof that adṛṣṭa can cause anything except experience (the effect of past work) and its means. Again, since (the assumption) of several equally powerful causes leads to) their getting mixed up in all the effects the existence of one eternal power concomitant (to Brahman) is established. Even if several subordinate causes are assumed, since this aids in the attainment of the fruit (by the primary cause) it cannot be considered as a cumbersome assumption. This very discussion will be carried out at length in the third chapter.

The idea is that this world resembles the māyā power of God.

Hence we will not know which cause has produced which effect!

The incidental discussion being thus finished, he now resumes his original topic:

43. The purity of devotion is to be inferred from signs as in common life.
Just like the cognitions 'I know,' 'I wish' etc., devotion also is no doubt, directly experienced as instanced by such cognitions 'I love (him),' 'I am devoted (to him)' etc.

But still, its purity characterised by very strong special impressions, cannot be ascertained by direct perception as is the case with the authenticity of knowledge. Therefore it is to be ascertained through the manifested signs only just as we see in common life. Just as in the world the degree of love in a person is to be inferred from his reaction to the talk (about the beloved) manifesting as shedding tears, horripilation and other signs of emotion so here also (it is to be inferred from the external signs of reaction).

From the examples of cognition quoted above, it is clear that knowledge is an object of direct perception. But the development, maturity and purity of devotion are not so.

Not that there are only signs analogous to those found in common life; even by the authoritative traditions (smṛtis) of the great sages these signs have been abundantly defined. So he declares:

44. (And these are the signs) described in abundance in the smṛtis: respect, high esteem, delight, forlornness, doubting other objects, praising His greatness, holding the life for His sake, considering everything as His, regarding Him as existing in all beings and not resisting His will etc.

Respect as was shown by Arjuna: 'Arjuna, the righteous and the winner of wealth, in whatever posture he may be, never fails to get up to greet Krṣṇa, out of devotion and love for him.' (Mbh. D. 80.3)

High esteem as that shown by Ikṣvāku: 'Through fondness for him and for the deer and the lotus which resembled him, the king showed high esteem even towards the cloud which was of the same hue (as Krṣṇa).' (Nr. P. 25.22)

The eyes of Krṣṇa resembled the eyes of a deer as also a lotus. That is why he is often called

Delight as expressed by Vidura: 'O Lotus-eyed One! The delight (that has been welling up in my heart) due to your arrival here, how can that be described to you? You are verily the indwelling soul of all embodied beings!' (Mbh. U. 89.24)

Forlornness as exhibited by the milk-maids (of Vṛndāvan): 'It is not possible for us to speak before our parents,-what can I say? What can parents do for us, scorched as we are in the fire of separation?' (V. P. 5.18.22)
Doubting other objects, as for instance the feeling of hindrance that arose in the minds of the denizens of Śvetadvīpa. Or as that of Upamanyu: `At Śaṅkara's command I am prepared to become even a worm or a grasshopper. But O Indra, I desire not even the three worlds that you may give me!' (Mbh. Ā . 14.186)

Śvetadvīpa was a region inhabited by great devotees of Viṣṇu, Who never brooked any hindrance to their meditation on Him. When Nārada, another great devotee of Viṣṇu, went there, the Lord Himself appeared before him and bid him to depart for home so that their meditation was not disturbed!

Praising His greatness as done by Yama: `The guilty one, tormented in hell, was thus addressed by Yama, `Why did you not worship the Lord Keśava, who is the destroyer of affliction?' (Nṛ . P. 8.21), Or again, `Having seen his emissary with the noose in hand, Yama thus whispers in his ear: 'Spare those who take refuge in Thee, Madhusūdana! I am the lord of other men, but not of the devotees of Viṣṇu!' (V. P. 3.7.14)

Holding the life for His sake, as seen in the case of Hanumān. He himself has said it thus: `As long as Thy purifying story circulates through the world, so long will I reside there, obeying Thy command' (Rā . Uk. 107.31).

Or, there is the instance of Nārada and others who, though they had reached the goal, still continued to live solely for worshipping Him. That is why the Veda says: `He whom all the gods worship desiring liberation, as also the knowers of Brahman.' (Nṛ . U. 6)

Not resisting His will, as did Bhīṣma even when the Lord was advancing towards him to kill him! This has been told by Bhīṣma himself `Come! O Lord of gods! Come, O refuge of this world! Obeisance to Thee, armed with Your bow, mace and sword! Kill me in this vast wonderful and fierce battle by forcibly felling me from my chariot!' (Mbh. B. 59. 96, 97)
By the word ā dī (etc.), the actions of Uddhava, Akrūra, etc., must also be taken into account. Even though in the aphorism (6) ‘(Devotion is a form of affection) because it is opposed to hatred,’ this has been described, but still, there is a difference there it was described as a sign of affection, but here it is given as a sign of purity of devotion.

32 Not resisting His will (aprā takū lya) of this aphorism is practically the same as ‘it is opposed to hatred’ (dveṣ apratipakṣ abhā va) of the sixth aphorism.

Among those who are devoutly attached to their lord, it is seen that hatred, jealousy etc., exist due to the difference in the favours shown by him. Should they also be considered as `signs’? No. Therefore he says:

33 Those who have received lesser favours naturally cherish hatred and jealousy towards those who are favoured more.

Because of the very fact they are impossible, as has been said by the venerable Dvaipāyana: ‘Neither anger nor envy, neither greed nor impure thought can exist in the merited ones, who are devoted to Puruṣottama’ (Mbh.Ā . 139. 133)

In the case of Śiśupāla the following steps are to be traced: hatred led to continuous remembrance, from this arose supreme devotion and from that resulted liberation.

34 This point has been emphasised once again so that Śiśupāla’s case need not be taken as an exception to the general rule, but can be explained within its scope. See note 27 under aphorism 6.

Well, all these signs have been described in the smṛtis mostly with reference to the incarnations of God. However, since devotion according to you has sprung up as a result of the knowledge of Brahman, it must have reference to that Perfect Being! To meet this objection, he declares the true view:

That highest devotion can have as its subject even the manifested forms of the Lord (i.e., incarnations). How is this known? From the remainder of the sentence: ‘The worshippers of the gods go to gods and My devotees attain Me likewise’ (Gītā 7.23). In order to strengthen the declared doctrine (of devotion to Himself, the Supreme Being) this remainder of the sentence implies the censure of devotion to other gods. (And now the original passage): ‘Whatever form anyone devoted wishes to worship with faith to him I make that very faith unwavering’ (Gītā 7.21). Here, eventhough the intended sense would have, been complete by saying ‘Whatever anyone etc.’ The specific use of the word ‘form’ (tanu) leads us to the conclusion that that devotion has Him (the avatāra) as its object. And of course, the whole topic is of devotion only.
47. And through the revealed word (it is known that) the knower of the Lord's births and actions has no more births.<F14> 

(His) 'birth'-The Lord accepts a body in order to effect such deeds as producing the Veda, destroying the demons, appearing before (His) devotees etc., which are indispensably connected with the body. (His) 'work' is the production of the Veda etc. To him who knows these, (this knowledge) gives the fruit of freedom from future births. (the Lord Himself) has declared thus: 'My birth and My action are divine. Whosoever knows thus in truth, He, on giving up the body, is born no more, but attains to Me O Arjuna!' (Gītā 4.9). This does not prove that immortality is the direct fruit of the knowledge of His birth and actions. But through removing the impurities of his mind, it produces the highest devotion having that particular incarnation of the Lord as its object (and it is this devotion) that gives the result of freedom from future births. Therefore that the highest devotion can have the manifestation of the Lord also as its object, is thus known from the revealed word (i.e., the Gītā) itself.

48. And that birth (in a body) is divine, because it is produced solely from His own power.

'My birth and My action are divine' (Gītā 4.9): Here what (exactly) is this divinity? It cannot be due to previous merit because He has no contact with merit due to the absence of any 'unseen consequences of actions' (adṛṣṭa) in Him. Nor can it mean 'being produced in heaven' (divi = in dyuloka or heaven) since in that case it cannot apply to births in this world. Rather, it means that His body is not produced out of the (five) gross elements as the bodies of ordinary mortals, but out of his own māyā power. That is why we have this statement of the Lord Himself addressed to Nārada, in the Mokṣadharmaparva: 'All this is a māyā created by Me, that thou seest Me at all O Nārada!' (Mbh. Ś. 339.45,46). And so too in the Gītā (4.6): 'Though I am unborn, of changeless nature, and Lord of all beings, yet subjugating My prakṛti, I come into being in every age'.

It should not be thought that its quality of being body would disappear just because it is not composed of the gross elements; because this rule that it should consist of the gross elements holds good only when it is to be the seat of experience (of the previous deeds).

Objection: Why not then hold, that 'being the seat of experience' itself is 'being a body'?

Reply: No. Rather, it is simpler to hold that 'being the seat of
voluntary effort (ceṣṭā) is itself 'being a body'. Ceṣṭā is actually a special species of action. It should not be said that action itself is ceṣṭā; because in that case we should have to apply the term to the movements of a dead body also (under the influence of magic)! Nor should it be held that any action born out of direct effort is itself ceṣṭā, because (we will then have to) apply that word with respect to pot etc., also (when it is holding boiling water) since, (after all), all actions are born out of the effort of God! Therefore the same argument that enlightens us as to acceptance of a body by the Supreme Lord can also prove the efforts produced by that body. Hence let this discussion stop here.

Nor does it follow that by accepting such a body (for the Supreme Lord), the number of principles (tattva) will be raised (from 26 to 27), because this body is not the material cause of the world like pot etc., nor is it the cause of the senses.35

35 The Vedānta adopts the Sāṅkhya theory of principles with certain modifications. These principles are twenty-six in number, as follows: Īśvara, jīva, primordial matter, intellect, egoism, the five subtle elements (earth, water, fire, air and ether), the five gross elements, the five organs of cognition (eye, ear, nose, tongue, skin), the five organs of action (hands, feet, speech, organs of generation and excretion) and the mind. Out of these the subtle elements produce the gross elements, as also the sense-organs. The gross elements are the material cause of this gross world. The Lord's body is not the material cause of this world like the gross elements, nor is it the cause of the sense organs like the subtle elements. Like a pot (which is never considered as a primary principle) the Lord's body also is not a 'principle'.

Since He has nothing to gain for Himself, how does He engage in action? This question is now answered.

49. The chief reason (for His taking birth) is indeed His compassion.

In this world, the term 'compassionate' is applied to those who are disinterestedly engaged in the removal of others' sorrows. But this is not the highest sense of the word, when applied with respect to such people; because, ultimately, their effort is motivated by either the alleviation of their own sorrow born out of pity or the acquisition of merit, and hence their compassion cannot be unconditioned. Nor is this highest sense applicable with respect to him who merely acts to remove others' sorrows,36 because it cannot be applied to him who is conditioned by monetary gain etc. However the compassion of the Lord who destroys the afflictions of others unconditionally, is the highest. When we use the word 'compassionate' with respect to those who seek other benefits (when they work for the removal of others' sorrows), we use it only in a secondary sense because of His sake.37 Hence we say that men act from their feeling of compassion, having an eye at the same time, on the merit which will thus be produced.

36 If you take merely the working for the removal of others' sorrows without specifying any preconditions, as the guide
for the application of this word, the contingency of having to apply it to those who work with ulterior motives, will also arise!

37 Because it can have the highest sense only in His case.

By such statements as (‘I am) the king among human beings’ (Gītā 10.27), it is declared that even the preeminent manifestations of the Lord’s power are His own forms. Hence liberation can be got even through devotion to a king etc. This contention is now refuted:

50. (Devotion directed) towards the manifestations cannot (lead to liberation); because they are ordinary living beings.<F14>

Supreme devotion can have only that Being who is free from the limiting adjuncts of an individual soul, as its object. The affection shown towards kings etc., who are bound by the limiting adjuncts of an individual soul like the vital airs etc., cannot give the fruit of liberation.

51. And because gambling as well as the service to a king has been prohibited.

In the Dharmaśāstras we read that gambling and service to a king have been prohibited. If the king were God Himself, this would not have been so.

52. If it be said that this (prohibition) applied to Vāsudeva also, it is not so; because he is only the form of (Brahman).

Objection: When the śrutis mentions that Vāsudeva also is one of the manifestations, by the words ‘I am Vāsudeva among the Vṛṣṇis’ (Gītā 10.37), does he not also-like the king etc.-become unfit to be an object of meditation?
Reply: No; because though the form is of Kṛṣṇa, He is really the Highest Brahman (existing in that form). So does Parāśara say: 'By hearing of the race of the Yadus, where the Highest Brahman taking the form of a man, was born as Viṣṇu (or Kṛṣṇa) a man is freed from all sins.' (V. P. 4.11.2.) This would not have been so if (Kṛṣṇa) were only an individual soul.

53. And from His being recognized as such.<F14>

A recognition pertaining to Vāsudeva that He is the Highest Brahman, is found in the following śruti: 'The son of Devakī is related to Brahman. The destroyer of Madhu is related to Brahman. There is one form of Supreme Brahman belonging to Nārāyaṇa, pervading all beings, existing as the cause (of all), itself uncaused' (Nā. U. Atharvaṣiras 6.9) This recognition is also found in the smṛti. For instance, Mārkandeya who had had the experience of seeing a mundane dissolution (pralaya), tells Yudhiṣṭhira thus: 'The lotus-eyed God who was seen by me once upon a time, He verily is your relative Janārdana, a tiger among men' (Mbh. V. 189.52).

So also, Janamejaya says after hearing that the Lord cannot be seen even by austerity: 'The Lord adored by the world, who is invisible even to the power of austerity, has been directly seen as adorned with śrīvatsa mark by them' (Mbh. Ś. Mokṣadharma 343.22).

By the word 'and' an additional reason is implied, because the smṛtis speak of rewards to His devotees.

How then can He (Vāsudeva) be described among the pre-eminent manifestations? He answers this question:

54. That is due to His being the best among the Vṛṣṇis.<F14>

In such passages as 'I am Viṣṇu among the Ādityas (Gītā 10.21), the enumeration is only to inculcate the attitude that whatever is best among them, that really belongs to the Supreme Lord. Similarly the mention of Vāsudeva among the pre-eminent manifestations is to inculcate the attitude that He is the best among the Vṛṣṇis.

55. And similarly (devotion towards) the well-known (manifestations of Lord will give liberation).
In this way, it is to be known that devotion towards the other well-known manifestations like Varā ha, Nā rasirī ha, Vā mana, Ś rī Rā ma etc., who also like Vā sudeva, possess the characteristics of Brahman, will certainly give liberation. Or, it may mean that an attitude of mere superiority has to be cultivated towards the pre-eminent manifestations which are well-known to possess the characteristics of Brahman; As for instance (towards Ś aṅ kara because the Lord says): ‘I am Ś aṅ kara among the Rudras’ (Gī tā 10.23). The Skā ndapurāṇa says: ‘Whoever says there is any difference between Viṣ Ṽ u and Rudra or between Lakṣ mī and Gaurī , The statement of such a deluded fool is condemned by the scriptures’ (Kā ś ī khaṇḍa-I Part-27.181). Statements to the effect that Ś aṅ kara is well-known to possess the characteristics of Brahman, are found in abundance in the smṛtis etc.

Thus ends the first section of the second chapter of the commentary on the hundred aphorisms of Ś ā nḍ il ya composed by the most learned teacher Svapneś vara.

SECTION II

Knowledge and Concentration, the two manifest aids to (devotion) have been discussed. The inferior forms of devotion which lead to liberation through the destruction of sins hindering (such liberation) will now be described.

56. Because bhajana has been summed up by applying the word bhakti to it in a secondary sense, (the lower devotion exists) for the sake of the highest, since it is a means to its production.

After referring to the highest devotion which has been set forth in the seventh chapter (of the Gī tā ), by the line ‘Having known Me as imperishable and the origin of beings they worship (bhajanti) Me with a single mind’ (9.13), the Gī tā proceeds to say: ‘Glorifying Me always and striving with firm resolve, bowing down to Me in devotion (bhakti) always steadfast, they worship Me’ (9.14). After this again the topic has been summed up in the words ‘They who worship (bhajanti) Me with devotion (bhaktyā) are in Me and I in them’ (9.29). Therefore, just as in the case of the (Mī māṁ sā) text, ‘Let him sacrifice with citrā’ (Tai. S. 2.4.6) here also the meaning is ‘let him produce the desired fruit by worship (bhajana) which is expressed by the term devotion (bhakti)’; because then only there would be a common substratum1. An additional reason is that in such statements as ‘he who has devotion to the One (ekabhaktih) excels’ (Gī tā 7.17), the word bhakti has been used in the sense of devotion to God and as such, has acquired that significance; and also because the words bhakti and bhajana mean the same thing2.
The full text is ‘Let him who desires cattle, sacrifice with citrā,’ citrayā yajetā paś ukā mah. Here, what is the exact meaning of the word citrā? Does it mean a particular sacrifice of that name, so called because of the six varieties of things like ghee, honey etc., used in it? Or does it signify a spotted she-goat which is the victim in agnī ś omī ya sacrifice? This question is decided by applying the principle of sā mā nadhikaraṇ ya (‘having the same substratum’). Citrā is to be taken as a sacrifice of that name because then only the fruit of the sacrifice (viz., acquisition of cattle) and the prescribed means (viz., the sacrifice itself) will reside in (or belong to) the common substratum (i.e., the sacrificer). If the second meaning is accepted then there will be vaiyadhikaraṇ ya (different substratum) because only the fruit will belong to the offerer whereas the spotted she-goat belongs to the sacrifice Agnī ś omī ya. (See Jaiminī ya Nyā yamā lāa Vistara 1.4.3).

Before applying this principle here, certain clarifications are necessary. In the first quotation of the Gītā (9.13) it is parā bhakti that is referred to by the word bhajanti because it comes after knowing Him. In the second quotation (9.14) it is the aparā or gauṇī bhakti (inferior devotion) that is referred to by the word bhaktyā, because kī rtana (glorifying Him), namaskā ra (bowing down to Him) etc., belong to a lower plane. In the third quotation (9.29) where both words (bhajanti and bhaktyā) are used in summing up, a doubt arises whether the two words bear their respective meanings as accepted above or whether they mean the same thing. If the latter is true, that will need an explanation. This is exactly what the aphorism is for.

We can now apply the principle of sā mā nā dhikaraṇ ya on the analogy of Mī mā ś quoted above. Just as the desirer of cattle was advised to offer through the sacrifice called Citrā to produce the desired result, here also the desirer of God-realization is advised to worship through bhajana, called bhakti, to produce the desired fruit. Then only would the fruit of God-realisation and the means of bhakti, be directly connected to the devotee and the principle of sā mā nā dhikaraṇ ya is not violated. Since the actual meanings of the words bhajana and bhakti have differed, here one of them is to be taken in a secondary sense to fall in the line with the other.

Because both have been derived from the same root bhaj.

Nor (should it be said that) the highest devotion has been enjoined as a fruit, because it cannot be produced by an effort of the human will and as such cannot be enjoined (vide aph. 7). Nor again (can it be said that) the fact of its being the cause of supreme bliss, which was previously unknown, is being declared (now) because even in the seventh chapter itself this reminder is found in the words, ‘and My devotees too attain Me’ (Gītā 7.23) etc. However (the true view is this): When the question of destruction of the obstacles to the highest devotion arose, glorifying (kī rtana) etc., were brought in as the means. Then the word bhakti expressed in the instrumental case, was applied to them in a secondary sense and they were enjoined as themselves the means to the highest devotion. The closing passage ‘They are in Me and I in them’ (Gītā 9.29) was then connected with it to eulogise it. Otherwise the sentence would have to be split up as ‘by bhakti they attain bhajana’ and ‘through that (bhajana) they dwell in Me’.
Since glorifying (the Lord) etc., are means for producing devotion, the word `devotion' has been applied to them in a secondary sense which is more easily grasped than the literal one, as in the statement `Ghee is life' (Tai S. 2.3.2). Or like the word udbhid,\(^4\) (Ā ś . Ś r. 9.8.), the word bhakti also is used (with respect to glorifying etc.) in an etymological sense, deriving it as `He is worshipped by this' (bhajyate anena). Or like creation\(^5\), the application of the word might be due to the grouping according to the motive of worship as in `four kinds of men worship Me' (Gī ṭā 7.16). Or this secondary sense (gauṇ atva) may be due to the characterizing (guṇ a) of the devotees as `noble-minded,' as in the statement `All these are no doubt noble-minded' (Gī ṭā 7.18).

3 Because taking a strong food like ghee increases life, ghee is termed as life in a secondary sense.

4 The etymological meaning of this word is udbhidyate anena, `is dug up (or extracted) through this'. A shovel digs up earth; a particular sacrifice `digs up' the fruit of cattle etc., for the sacrificer. Hence both the shovel and the sacrifice are named udbhid.

5 The created beings are often classified as: (a) Aṇ ḍ a- those born out of an egg; (b) Jarā yuja-those born of the womb; (c) Svedaja-those born out of sweat or worm vapour; (d) Udbhijja- those that spring form the soil. Similarly the devotees are also classified into four groups. This four-fold classification seems to be the only common point between them.

This whole para gives several interpretations for taking devotion in a secondary (gauṇ a) sense.

57. Other (inferior forms of devotion) also (produce the same fruit viz., affection towards (the Lord) because they have been associated with `glorifying (the Lord)' for the sake of gaining affection (towards Him).

So has it been declared (in the Gī ṭā 11.36): `It is but proper, O Lord of the senses, that the world is delighted and filled with love at thy praises.' That glorifying the Lord (prakī ṭṛiti) is for the sake of producing love (anurā ga) towards Him has been directly affirmed here. Therefore all other inferior forms of devotion as referred to by the statement `always glorifying Me and striving with firm resolve' etc., (Gī ṭā 9.14) also produce the same result (viz., affection towards the Lord) because of their association with `glorifying (the Lord)’ (kī ṭrtana).

58. But (the inferior forms of devotion mentioned) in between, are subsidiary to (supreme devotion). So also (the devotion towards) the objects of meditation (mentioned in the ś ruti) because (they form part of) Brahma-kāṇ ḍ a (which treats of devotion).
The inferior forms of devotion mentioned in between the verse, `Having known Me as imperishable and the origin of beings they worship Me with a single mind' (Gītā 9.13) and the verse, `They who worship Me with devotion are in Me and I in them' (ibid. 9.29) are subsidiary to supreme devotion because of the very fact that they are included as if in a pair of tongs, in between the two supreme devotions.

They are thus (described): `Always praising Me, striving with austere vows, and bowing down to Me with devotion, always steadfast, they worship Me' (Gītā 9.14).

`Worshipping through the knowledge-sacrifice others adore Me, either as identical or as separate, or they adore Me, the manifold, in different forms' (ibid. 9.15).

`Those persons, who think of nothing else and worship Me through meditation-the accession to and the maintainance of the welfare of such ever-devout persons I Look after' (ibid. 9.22).

`The worshippers of the gods go to the gods, the worshippers of the manes go to the manes, the worshippers of the spirits go to the spirits, and My worshippers too come to Me.'

`He who with devotion offers Me a leaf, a flower, a fruit or water, that devout offering of the pure-minded one, I accept.'

`Whatever you do, or eat, or sacrifice, or give, whatever austerity you perform, that O son of Kuntī, offer unto Me.'

`Thus you will be rid of the bonds of action resulting in good or evil consequences' (ibid. 9.25-28).

Here `praising' (kīrtana) means the recitation of the names.
`Striving' (yatna) to attain devotion though of a worldly character, has been recounted here since the various subsidiary steps (of devotion) form the subject matter. Observance of fast on ekādaśī days etc., with devotion towards Me-this constitutes `austere vows' (dṛḍhavratatva). `Bowling down' (namaskāra) means such activity as bringing together the head and the hands in token of self-abasement. `Knowledge-sacrifice' (jñānayajña) is of two kinds: The superior and the inferior, as directed towards unity or plurality. `Thinking of nothing else' (but Him)-means contemplation and continuous remembrance (of Him). `Sacrifice' (yāga) means worship directed towards God, giving Him leaves etc., as also offering all actions enjoined or forbidden-to that Supreme Lord.

6 Suppose one makes an extra effort to earn more money with the help of which he would like to perform a special worship or go on a pilgrimage. In such cases, even though the `effort' is apparently worldly, it is to be considered as a
subsidiary to devotion since the end aimed at is devotion.

However, these are not the only subsidiary means. Even all those included under the word `meditation' (upā sanā ), in such statements as, `The mind should be meditated upon as Brahman' Ch. U. 3.18), `I am Viṣ Ṽu among the Ā dityas' (Gī tā 10.21) etc., are also aids to devotion. For what reason? Because the whole of the Brahmakāṇḍa (of which the above-mentioned statements are parts) treats of devotion and the means thereto.
C. f. what was said in the text and commentary on aphorism26.

59. Purity results from them as seen from the introduction of the subject.

From these inferior forms of devotion arises purity i.e., the destruction of sins which cause impurity of the internal organ. This itself is the means. Why? Because (they have been) mentioned after introducing the subject as, `This is the best purifier' (Gī tā 9.2.); and also because devotion is a characteristic of the internal organ and purity is an internal means.

60. Some (teachers think) that due to the association of the chief (devotion), the results achieved (by these inferior forms) will be more.

Some teachers hold that in such statements as `He who with devotion offers Me' (Gī tā 9.26), `Those bowing down to Me with devotion' (ibid. 9.14) etc., the mention of devotion once again along with `praising' etc,-whose subsidiary nature to devotion has already been determined by the context etc.,-is only to show that those who have already begun the practice of devotion will gain greater results by the practice of these inferior forms (of devotion).

61. Jaimini (thinks that) by (these inferior forms) named (as bhakti, supreme devotion is to be attained); because (such an interpretation) is possible.
Their inferiority (to supreme devotion) being already established, the teacher Jaimini thinks that by `praising' named as `devotion,' by `giving' named as `devotion,' the supreme devotion is to be secured; just as in the passage, `Let him who is using a spell, sacrifice with the Ś yena' (Ā ś . Ś r. 9.7) etc., (the word Ś yena denotes a special sacrifice of that name). It is only thus sā mā nā dhikaraṇ ya is possible. Hence bhakti is to be considered in the sense of a special name, existing for the sake of another (viz., supreme devotion) and not for the sake of producing another result by itself, because this introduces a needless complication.

In the previous aphorism the view of some other teachers was given. This aphorism being in apposition to that view and since Jaimini is being singled out by name, as the champion of this view, we may guess that Ś ā ṇ ḍ ilya also concurs within him. So according to this view, bhaktyā does not have the ordinary meaning of `through devotion' but indicates a special name. The statement of Ā ś valā yana and its interpretation are brought in, in support of Jaimini. In that statement, one who is desirous of using a spell to destroy his enemy is advised to sacrifice with the Ś yena. This word means both a hawk and a special sacrifice by that name. From the context, by applying the rule of sā mā nā dhikaraṇ ya, it is concluded there, that Ś yena means the special sacrifice of that name. Similarly here also, the word bhakti is to be taken as a special name applied to such inferior forms of devotion as `praising' (kī rtana) etc.

9 See note 1 under aphorism 56.

10 Viz., enhancing the results that would have normally been obtained without it. See the commentary of the previous sū tra.

62. Here, subsidiary means are to be performed according to time and circumstance, as in the case of (collecting materials for building) a house.

Now, three alternatives arise: (1) The various subsidiaries like praising the Lord, bowing down to Him etc., are to be performed, all simultaneously; or, (2) Only one of them need be performed; or, (3) They are to be performed one after another.

The first view cannot be accepted because the non-performance of even one will render the others useless. Neither can the second view be accepted because there will be (unlimited) choice thereby forcing us to the conclusion that all
of them have one and the same purpose. Nor can we subscribe to the third view because that is not what the text means. Moreover, after performing one, the non-performance of the others is likely, because of the unnecessary trouble involved. Hence these different observances simply lead to confusion by each intruding into the province of others! This is the prima facie view.

But our doctrine is that all these observances are means (for the production of supreme devotion), because they are all authoritative. On the other hand, due to the absence of authority, there is no rule that they must all be performed together. Where collective use has been ordained by the śruti, as for instance in the case of sandal paste, flowers, incense, lighted lamp, food-offering, etc., it is only there that collective performance is (necessary). Elsewhere however, they are to be performed according to time and circumstances, as in the case of building a house etc., where the building materials like the thatch, pillars etc., are brought sometimes all together and sometimes one by one. It does not follow from this that the thatch etc., cease to be the means. Therefore whatever sin each observance is specially capable of destroying, let it be performed for that purpose; and thus all having respectively shown their various efficacies the supreme devotion will eventually arise. So has it been declared: `At the end of many births he who has knowledge, attains Me (Gītā 7.19).

63. Even one among them can be sufficient to please God.

Among these inferior forms, whatever becomes powerful due to plenty of practice, even that one pleases the Lord and becomes capable of producing supreme devotion. The case is similar to that of an earthly lord who is not pleased even by several items of service loosely and carelessly performed, but is pleased even by a single service of shampooing the feet, done continually with hearty zeal. Supreme devotion is obtained through the grace of God who will be pleased by the resolute practice of anyone from among the various inferior forms like `praising' etc., as declared by the Gītā: `Devoting thyself to the yoga of the intellect, fix thy mind always on Me. Fixing your mind on Me you will overcome all difficulties through My grace' (18.57).

Similarly some of the practices may obtain their efficacy from a certain time, as declared in such statements as `What one attains by meditation in the Kṛta, by sacrifices in the Tretā and by external worship in the Dvāpara, the same is obtained in the age of Kali by merely reciting Keśava's names' (Br. P. 97.166).

Nor will these different means interfere with one another because each one of them like reciting etc., when it becomes powerful by practice, will produce its own result, viz., devotion.

Is purity the doorway (to devotion) in the case of all the (inferior forms) included in the list beginning with praising etc., or is it something else in the case of a few? This question is now answered:
See sutra 59. These inferior forms remove the sins of the mind and purify it thereby enabling the rise of supreme devotion. The question is whether all these forms pass through the same process or whether some of them produce supreme devotion in some other way also.

64. The absence of bondage (arising out of) surrendering (the works to God), is the means.

The absence of bondage characterised by the inability to produce their results, of all actions, good or bad, due to their being offered to God-this alone is the means (to supreme devotion). So has it been said: 'Thou shalt thus be delivered from the good and the evil consequence caused by works' (Gītā 9.28). The formula for this surrender of works is thus described in another Purāṇa: 'Whatever good or bad I do, either willingly or unwillingly, all that is offered to you. I do as impelled by Thee.'

It does not follow from this that one would be free to do as he pleases; because the absence of committing sins, arising out of the strength of such surrender, is also a part of such surrender. For instance the smṛti says: 'One could not be addicted to sin while depending upon the strength of the Veda'. Therefore this purification refers to something other than (the purification) of committing sins. Here, it is the daily and occasional duty prescribed to one's station in life (āśrama), that is meant by the term 'good deed' (śubhakarma). The proper performance of one's duties prescribed to one's station in life brings the reward of the world of Brahmā etc. Since on the attainment of such worlds, liberation is delayed, (even) they are considered as bondage. On the other hand when they are surrendered to Brahman, liberation is surely attained. Similarly works done through the desires for fruits, as also sins committed due to ignorance, if offered even afterwards, will not produce their consequences.

Now, a special question is to be thought of even with regard to these inferior forms of devotion. The śrutis and smṛtis describe certain forms (for meditation). For instance the Chāndogya says: 'That golden being who is seen within the orb of the sun, with a golden beard and golden hair' (1.6.6). The Nārāyaṇa-Pañcarātra says: 'He is ever to be meditated upon, who resides in the orb of the sun, Nārāyaṇa seated on a lotus seat; crest-bearing, wearing bracelets and makara ear-rings, bedecked with a string of pearls, with golden body and carrying conch and discus' (11.71). Here the doubt is: Whether there is any rule that one should meditate on such forms alone or can one meditate on complete manifestations as given in other śrutis? The prima facie view is that there is such a rule since the śruti has described a definite form for meditation. This view is now refuted:
65. However, the rule regarding meditation is there, because it is easier (to contemplate) a visible object.

The rule restricting meditation to a particular object is there (to present the mind with) a visible object, because, otherwise there is the possibility of the mind being distracted by several objects. Therefore its mention is to be considered only for the convenience it affords. If the object of meditation were invisible there is (the risk of infinite number) of choices. Therefore the rule is different with regard to the different passages of the śruti. That is why the milkmaids, Śiśupāla etc., even without recourse to this rule, could obtain such results for their meditation which would normally be very hard to obtain.

Hence diversion also would be more.

The idea is that they obtained these fruits by meditating not upon the form as described in the scriptures quoted above but upon the forms they liked (or disliked) most. If the rule were universal, this would not have been possible. Patañjali also says that one can obtain samādhi by meditating upon any form one likes:

66. There, the root yaj is used in the sense of worship; not so in the case of other (sacrifices).

In the statement of the Gītā (9.25), `Those who sacrifice to Me (madyā jinaḥ ) go to Me', does the root yaj (`to sacrifice') refer to the well-known sacrifices like the Jyotiṣṭoma etc., or does it denote worship? There, this root yaj is used only in the sense of worship. How is this known? By such statements as `Let him worship Viṣṇu etc., daily worship with desire is already enjoined here (in the Gītā ), but not with reference to Viṣṇu. However in the case of other sacrifices, there is no express statement that they be directed to Viṣṇu. Otherwise we would be forced to split the sentence into two, one enjoining that they be directed towards the Lord and the other enjoining that it be related to devotion.

Objection: Well then, since there are such injunctive statements as `He offers an oblation of milk and butter to the wide-stepping Viṣṇu,' let it be accepted that there is connection with devotion (also)!
Reply: True. However, oblations motivated by desires become purposeless once those results are obtained; (and hence the devotion associated with them will also have no further end to be achieved, like supreme devotion). But there is nothing to hinder the injection of connection with devotion in the case of the daily worship which has been made obligatory by the very fact of one's living; and since they are to be performed daily, they are always at hand. That is why, while censuring the acts of worship accompanied by injury to living beings, it has been declared thus in the Mokṣa-dharma: ‘The righteous Manu prescribed non-injury in all ceremonial works. Men injure animals, outside the sacrificial altar, because they are tainted by desires. They alone, who know Viṣṇu, worship Him rightly with offerings of pudding and flowers. Thus is His worship prescribed in the smṛti’ (Mbh. Ś. 264.5.10).

14 The arguments of the whole commentary boil down to this:
Though the root verb yaj normally means ‘to sacrifice’, in the particular statement of the Gītā it means worship. (See also ibid. 9.34). Development of supreme devotion is the object of this worship whereas it is not so in the case of other sacrifices like Jyotiṣṭoma etc., in which oblations are offered to certain minor gods with a view to attaining some lower desires. The particular quotation with which the objector confronts us, though it contains the name of Viṣṇu and hence seems to support the view that devotion can be associated with sacrificial acts also, does not really serve his purpose; because this devotion to Viṣṇu ends with the fulfillment of the particular desire. So also the act of oblation. But in the case of daily worship of the Supreme Lord, the devotion has to culminate only in supreme devotion because there is no particular desire to be attained by this act and also because this act is to be carried on as long as one lives.

15 These are the words of king Vicaknu who was moved by pity at the sacrifice of animals. Now three sections on worship (pūjā) will follow, since this topic has been raised:

67. The term pādodaka (‘water of his feet’) means the pādyā (‘water meant for washing His feet’), as otherwise it would not apply to all cases.

The smṛti says thus: ‘Those sacred waters of Gaṅgā, Prayāga, Gayā, Puṣkara and Naimiśa as also those of Kurujāṅgala and Yamunā, cleanse sinners only after a lapse of time; but the water of Lord’s feet cleanses immediately (Nr. P. 59.46). Here does pādodaka mean the water actually connected with the (Lord’s) feet, or does it mean the water offered at His feet (pādyā)? Between these two, it is the water offered at His feet alone that is meant by the (word) pādodaka. How is this known? Because, otherwise it would not apply to some other cases (which ought to be included). To explain: Direct connection with the Lord’s feet is not possible. Nor is it so through an incarnation, since His proximity to the worshipper is not (always) possible. Suppose we say in a secondary sense, it is connected with the feet of the consecrated image in worship, even then it would not hold good in the case of a non
consecrated image brought for worship or in the case of the śā lagrā maś ilā etc., which have no feet at all. Therefore in order to make that passage apply to all cases let it be taken to mean as pā ḍya itself. Otherwise one has to imagine all sorts of distant connections through the images etc.

68. What is offered to God (in worship) may (also) be taken by oneself, because there is no difference (between the devotee and the sā tvata).

It is ordained by such words as, ‘What belongs to Viṣṇu must be given away to the sā tvatas,’\(^{16}\) that the food, flowers etc., offered to God in worship are to be disposed off. Since the characteristic of being a sā tvata is common to the devotee of the Lord also, he himself also can partake of them, can make use of them by eating, wearing etc. This is the meaning. The final ceremony (of pratipatti)\(^{17}\) is fulfilled even by one’s own taking. However all trickery in the name of dharma must be avoided. Therefore just as the puroḍāś a cake\(^{18}\) which was given over to Agni etc., is afterwards disposed of in accordance with the words of injunction, ‘He cuts the offering to Agni (sviṣṭ akṛ t) from the upper half,’ the four priests, with the yajamāna as the fifth, eat the puroḍāś a cake’, similarly here also the same thing is done in accordance with the words of injunction. Otherwise it cannot be given even to the sā tvatas because it is a property belonging to somebody else.\(^{19}\)

\(^{16}\) The full text is like this:

‘What was offered to Brahmā, be given to the Brāhmaṇa. What belongs to Viṣṇu, must be given to the Sā tvatas. What belongs to Śambhu (Śiva) must be given to those who smear their bodies with the holy ash.’

Sā tvata means a worshipper or devotee of Viṣṇu or Kṛṣṇa.

\(^{17}\) In the treatises on rituals, the final disposal of what is left at the end of a rite, is technically called pratipatti. C. f. Jaiminīya Nyāyamāla Vistara 3.4.21.

\(^{18}\) Cake made of ground rice usually offered in Vedic sacrifices.

\(^{19}\) Whatever has once been offered to others, belongs to them. Then none else will have the right to appropriate it to oneself! Hence, what has once been offered to Viṣṇu belongs to Him and even the sā tvatas cannot partake of it!

**Objection:** Because of the the injunction it can be given to the sā tvatas, (but not to others).

**Reply:** No. There is nothing in the injunction to show that oneself must be excluded.
Objection: But then, since there is the injunction `must be given to the Brâhmaṇ as' and being a Brâhmaṇ a, one may as well give it to oneself!

Reply: Not so; because `gift' means divesting oneself of the ownership on that object and constituting another's ownership over it. It is not proper to apply this to the final ceremony of disposal because it is seen that the institutor of the sacrifice (yajamāna) also has a share in the puroḍāśa cake. Like purchasing etc., the final ceremony also establishes his ownership over it. This being the case, when there are no other sātvatas, this deficiency is to be made up by oneself taking them. Same principle is to be understood in the case of taking the water for washing the feet (pāḍya etc.,) already given (to God) by oneself. And also, the statement, `He is verily a thief who eats things given by the gods, not having first given them to them' (Gītā 3.12) (supports our view); because (1) the agent being the same and his supposed ownership over them being destroyed, the object also must be understood to be the same; (2) the negation with the indeclinable participle ktvā should necessarily be connected with the same object as the verb (`eats') by the principle of sāmānārdhikaraṇya; (3) in the statement `what is given by them' there is no proof to show that these are things of a similar kind (and not the very same things). Therefore we should hold that unless there is some other rule to hinder it, what is given to the gods also may be used by the offerer.

The point of controversy in the statement of the Gītā is whether what is given to the gods and what is eaten by the offerer are one and the same; or are they different but similar things? The former is the view of the commentator which he has proved by these three arguments. This will support the main contention of the sūtra also.

With regard to the offences in worship, (their nature) is to be settled in accordance with the occasion and character.

Beginning with the line, `Thirty two offences in divine worship have been enumerated' (Var. P. 125.4), thirty-two offences as also their expiations have been laid down. Now the question is whether the avoidance of all these offences is part and parcel of the worship or the avoidance of a few is part of the worship whereas the avoidance of others is an end in itself. With reference to these points we have another statement: `Whoever worships Me with a flower unfit for the rite, hear O earth, I will declare that man's fall (into hell)' (ibid. 124.64). Here, since flowers unfit for the rite have been forbidden, their avoidance cannot form part of the worship. However, in the midst of the worship, if such a flower is offered by mistake, there is an expiation with reference to that offence, due to that reason. But where, as indicated in the statement `when anyone offers me incense, without having first given me sandal paste and garlands' (ibid.25.3.6) There is an offence committed against the proper order of worship, since that particular order is part of the worship, the expiation performed to remove this defect, is to be considered as part of that worship. But
when it is said as in ‘But whoever approaches Me, not having chewed a twing (to clean this teeth)’ (ibid. 125.1), where there is no mention of any worship, there it is clear that the avoidance of this offence is an end in itself (as leading to happiness). This is how we have to determine the relative position of the different offences in worship.

Having thus established the connection of worship with devotion, he now proceeds to state the rule on the strength of the statement ‘(He who gives Me with devotion) a leaf, a flower, a fruit or even water’ (Gītā 9.26), that only those gifts directed towards God, are subsidiary to devotion:

70. The offering of leaf etc., (is a part of devotion), as otherwise it would become specialized (and limited).

(The statement of the Gītā regarding the gift of leaf etc.) actually enjoins that all gifts directed towards God are part of devotion, by adopting the principle already enunciated in such statements as, ‘Whatever is desired most in the world, whatever else is dear to one at home- all that must be given over to the discus-holding God of gods, to please Him’ etc. Otherwise (that gift stated in the Gītā) will become specialized (and hence limited to) the gift of the four things like leaf etc. Only. If it were a (special and) separate injunction when it would result in the defect of Vākyabheda. Therefore, just as (in the Vedic passage) ‘He wears his sacred-thread in the upāvīta way (i.e., over the left shoulder)’ (Tai. S. 2.5.11) where the usual mode of wearing the sacred therad (is once again specially enjoined as) part of the Darśa sacrifice, here also it is enjoined that the general gifts (to God) which follow from the statement regarding the gift of leaf etc., are parts of devotion.

21 According to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā if it is desired to state several different characteristic circumstances about a thing already enjoined, it should be done in several sentences and not in one sentence. The latter is a technical defect called Vākyabheda. Therefore if the objector maintains that all the four things (viz., leaf, flower, fruit and water) are enjoined, then there should have been four separate sentences and not one as here.

The upāvīta way of wearing the sacred thread is the normal practice enjoined by the smṛtis and smārtasūtras. That it is specially mentioned once again in connection with the Darśa sacrifice (performed during the new-moon) is to be taken as a positive injunction as a part of that sacrifice, eventhough it is not expressed in the potential mood (vidhilīṅ). Similarly here also, the general gifts to God already mentioned (c.f. the well-known statement quoted at the beginning of the commentary) are enjoined once again as parts of devotion through the words ‘leaf’ etc., and not merely those four things only.

22 According to the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā if it is desired to state several different characteristic circumstances about a thing already enjoined, it should be done in several sentences and not in one sentence. The latter is a technical defect called Vākyabheda. Therefore if the objector maintains that all the four things (viz., leaf, flower, fruit and water) are enjoined, then there should have been four separate sentences and not one as here.

71. (These various forms of devotion) are the best among good works; because they are born out of those good
works and are the causes of supreme devotion.

Among all the works, these devotions are verily the best. Why? Because they are the causes of supreme devotion and are themselves born out of other good works. So is it said: 'Many, being purified by knowledge and asceticism, have attained devotion to Me. In whatever way they worship Me, in accordance with that do I show favour to them' (Gītā 4.10, 11).

And here the word bhāva is used in the sense of devotion, as for instance in the verse: 'Do not fishes dwell in the waters of the Gaṅgā? Do not flocks of birds dwell in the temples (i.e. in the temple-towers)? Because they are devoid of devotion (bhāva), they receive no benefit from the important sacred river or the temple'.

And again: 'Four classes of men, all having done good works, worship Me with devotion, O Arjuna' (Gītā 7.16). Here, since their devotions are born out of their previous good deeds, they are superior to those good deeds.

By this it is to be concluded that this whole discussion fits in with the inquiry of devotion and not with the inquiry of works. 23

23 Though all the questions raised and discussed so far (śūtras 66-71) appear to belong to the realm of works, they are really part of devotion only.

There are no higher and lower classes among the devotees. Otherwise, how could they be spoken of, as if all the four were equal, as in the statement, 'Four classes of men, all having done good deeds, worship Me with devotion, O Arjuna: The distressed person, the aspirant after knowledge, the speaker of wealth and the man of knowledge, O best among the Bharatas' (Gītā 7.16)? This contention is now refuted:

72. The three classes of devotees are subordinate. Their association with the other is for the sake of eulogy.

The three classes of devotees are really subordinate. The śūrīt has associated them with the chief devotee (i.e. the man of knowledge) only to eulogise them. It is like praising the ministers by mentioning them along with the king. So then, 'the devotion of the distressed' means remembrance, glorifying etc., for the sake of destroying one's sins or to be delivered from difficulties etc. 'The devotion of him who desires knowledge' means the performance of sacrifices etc., in order to attain knowledge. (Or, this devotion called 'the desire of knowledge' may also mean the performance
of the duties prescribed to one's varṇa and āśrama like the repetition of the Veda, in order to attain knowledge as enunciated in) such passage as: (1) 'Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to comprehend by studying the Veda, by sacrifice, charity, austerity, fasting etc.' (Br. U. 4.4.22); (2) 'Having worshipped Him with his own prescribed duties, a man attains perfection' (Gītā 18.46); (3) Him, who never deviates from the duties of his varṇa, who looks with an equal mind on himself, or his friend, or his own group or that of his adversaries, who takes nothing from another and smites none down-him, of a fixed mind, know to be Viṣṇu's devotee' (V. P. 3.7.20).

The devotion due to the desire for wealth or happiness is of two kinds: The one described before and carried out for the sake of supreme devotion; and the other of the form of 'praising the Lord' etc., performed with the desire to attain kingdom, heaven etc. So is it said: 'When Viṣṇu is worshipped, a man obtains all terrestrial enjoyments that one can imagine, the supreme abode adored even by the dwellers in heaven, as also the final liberation which is the best of all' (V. P. 3.8.6).

Here, liberation is obtained through the supreme devotion; and as such, the desire to take advantage of supreme devotion, is entertained. This also fits in with this sentence in the Gītā, 'Whosoever worship Me with devotion, they are in Me and I in them' (9.29). And as for what is said in the Bhāgavatam (7.5.22-23), 'To hear and repeat the names of Viṣṇu, to remember Him, to serve His feet, to worship Him, to bow down to Him, to do service as His slave, to love Him as a friend and to surrender oneself to Him-if this nine-fold devotion is offered to Viṣṇu by a man, (I consider that as the best lesson)', they can all be included in these four themselves, according to the circumstances. There is nothing wrong therefore, in these artificial characteristics, even though the subject-matter may sometimes get mixed-up.

If 'praising the Lord' etc., were subordinate parts of supreme devotion how can they now be considered as principal, among 'the devotion of the distressed' etc.? With reference to this, it is now said:

73. Like aveṣṭi and sava, (they are) both inside and outside (of supreme devotion).

Remembrance of God, praising Him etc., are included in supreme devotion in as much as they are its subordinate parts. When they are without reference to any particular object, they can also be considered as being outside it and separate, because the śruti has mentioned independent fruits (in the latter case). For instance: The aveṣṭi rite even though a part of the Rājasūya, can also be a principal one, when performed without reference to it, in as much as it is connected with an independent fruit of its own, and hence can be separated from that sacrifice. Or it may be like the Brhaspati-stava which is sometimes performed as a principal rite even though it is a part of the Vājapeya
sacrifice. This distinction depends upon the existence or the non-existence of authority for it (in the ś rit). And also on the strength of the statement, `Whatever rite connected with a sacrifice-if it becomes deficient due to careless performance-that becomes corrected and completed by the very remembrance of Viṣṇu. So saith the ś ruti', all rites can also be performed occasionally as subordinate (to devotion to God). There is nothing contradictory in accepting that they are naturally parts of supreme devotion and yet principal in relation to the fruit of heaven etc.

24 This is described in Tai. S. 1.8.19. The discussion can be found in J. N. V. 11. 4. 3.

25 This ceremony is performed by one who wished to become a family priest, as Brhaspati was to the gods. It is described in Tai. Br. 2.7.1.

A special aspect of `the devotion of the distressed' is now discussed:

74. Remembering (God), praising (His glories), reciting His story etc., are (to be included) in `the devotion of the distressed' (ārtabhakti); because, they have the nature of expiation.

The inclusion of remembrance, glorifying, reciting His stories, bowing down to Him etc., in the `devotion of the distressed' is but proper; because, they have been described as responsible for the destruction of such and such sins to those suffering the pain of hell caused by those sins. Thus we read: `Arduous expiations for great sins and trifling ones for minor offences, have been propounded, O Maitreya, by Svāyambhuva and others. But whatever be the expiatory acts, whether penances, deeds of charity or the like,-to remember Kṛṣṇa is superior to all' (V. P. 2.6.36-37). Again: `That repetition of His name with devotion, O Maitreya, (that) is the best consumer of all sins, as fire is of metals' (V. P. 6.8.20). So also: `To visit all hermitages, to bathe in all sacred waters, confers not such fruits, O Sauti, as the story of Nārāyaṇa. Men become purified in personality, when they have heard His holy story from the beginning,-whose subject is Nārāyaṇa and which destroys all sins'. (Mbh. Ś. Mokṣa-dharma 343.2-3)

Therefore it is quite proper that these should be included in `the devotion of the distressed'.

75. If it be objected that the non-practice of the more difficult expiations would result, we reply that (remembrance etc.) must be ranked among the great expiations since they include a period ending only in death.

Objection: This may be true. (Still) it is but proper to consider these words as having reference only to the minor sins, since they are opposed to reason. Otherwise expiations involving considerable trouble and pain would lose their
authoritativeness due to their not being practised.  

Reply: Not so; since the (minor expiations like remembrance etc.) have been described as including a period ending only in death, they also involve considerable pain and trouble. So we read: ‘Therefore O sage, the man who remembers Viṣṇu day and night, being purified and having all his sins destroyed, never goes to hell’ (V. P. 2.6.45). By this it is concluded that (remembrance etc.) have to be carried on incessantly without any break. The idea is that the beginning and the end agree.  

27 No definite time is specified for the beginning, on the strength of which the end could have been proved to be different since it was opposed to that beginning. Therefore, since these are equal to the other (difficult) expiations in respect of trouble and pain, there is no fear of the others losing their authority due to their not being practised. As for the statement, ‘At morning and night, sunset and noon, remembering Viṣṇu’ (V. P. 2.6.41) etc., it is really a repetition (anuvāda) only. 

28 It is a well-known principle of Mimāmsa, that Upakrama (the beginning) and Upasāṁhāra (the end) must agree in sense. In this statement, No definite time has been specified either for the beginning or for the ending of the ‘remembrance’. Hence they agree. The idea is that even if only one of them, say, the beginning, had been definitely specified, we could have given an implied meaning to the end (different from what it appears to be) and thus limited the time to a specified period. Since this is not so, the only alternative is to understand that it be practised throughout the life, until death. 

29 The fact that times are specified in this verse does not contradict our view; because it is only an anuvāda, a simple repetition of what was already (V. P. 2.6.45) stated.

Nor is this expiation meant for the repentant sinner only. As for the statement, ‘Whosoever, having committed sin, feels repentance, his best expiation, the only one, is remembrance of Hari’ (V. P. 2.6.40); since this is a reiteration (anuvāda) of the fact that repentance is a part of every expiation, the word ‘one’ (ekam) must also be a reiteration of that comparative disregard of all other expiations which had followed from the previous discussions. Otherwise the sentence would have to be split up into two, with separate and special objects. Therefore the previous passages (V. P. 2.6.39 etc.) also are only repetitions and not eulogies (arthavāda) by the fact of their being severally involved in the same construction of the relative and its corresponding demonstrative (yat and tat). That is why in other places also this continuous remembrance has been described as in: ‘Yama’s attendants, their staves and binds, Yama himself as well as his tortures, are powerless against Him whose mind is ever dependent on Keśava. Let him at all times and in all places repeat the names of the wielder of the discus. No impurity can be found in him, for He is the purifier’ (V.P. 3.7.34-35).
The first part of the sentence (V. P. 2.6.40) clearly declares what has already been enjoined. (i.e. that repentance is necessary in every expiation), and is therefore an anuvāda. Whether the second part also is an anuvāda, or does it convey a different sense, say, eulogy (arthavāda)? If the second stand-point is accepted, then the sentence would have to be split up, one conveying anuvāda and the other, arthavāda. However, the correlative pronoun yasya and tasya cannot allow this. Therefore it is but proper that the whole sentence is an anuvāda only.

76. In the case of the devotee, even a little (effort like the remembrance etc.) destroys great (sins), because all other means (like expiations) have been given up.

Even a little effort like remembering and praising the Lord only once, can become the destroyer of even great sins; because in the case of the devotee, the abandonment characterised by the giving up of all other expiations, is clearly discernible. This is the meaning. So is it sung (by the Lord Himself): 'Abandoning all religious duties, take refuge in Me alone. I will deliver thee from all sins. Do not grieve' (Gītā 18.66).

Here, the sin accruing from the previous abandonment of desire-motivated (kāmya) actions is not what is meant; because no sin will result from giving up such actions rooted in desires. Where is then the sin from which the Lord is to deliver? If it be said that (by such giving up) some other kinds of sin are to be destroyed, (this is also not correct); because, in that case one has to accept that there is an invisible merit produced by such giving up. Neither does it mean the previous abandonment of the 'obligatory' (nitya) and 'occasional' (naimittika) duties. If there is an injunction to give them up (under certain special circumstances), there is then no sin from which one is to be delivered.

Objection: There is no such rule!

Reply: Not so, because by the very sentence (quoted from the Gītā ) it has been enjoined and hence no sin is produced.

31 This is contrary to convention. It is the production of an invisible merit by the performance of kāmyakarma, which will ultimately fulfill desires for which it was done, that is accepted and not the contrary.

Objection: But then we say that the words, 'abandoning all religious duties' (Gītā 18.66) describe by anuvāda the saṁnyāsin and hence refer to him.

Reply: (No), because the smṛti has laid down expiations for the saṁnyāsin and hence refer to him.
and (your interpretation) would give them an option between those expiations and devotion, thereby resulting as before, in the nonperformance of those difficult (expiations). Neither can this defect be obviated by the continuous (remembrance of the Lord etc.), because by such statements as, `Eventhough filled with great sin, if he meditates on Acyuta even for the twinkling of an eye, the ascetic becomes again the purifier even of those who purify others sitting in the same line', it is declared that even a little act can destroy great sins. Moreover, it does not occur to our minds that the institution of sarhnyā sa is meant here because this topic is to be found nowhere in the proximity. Therefore, just as in the world, when someone says to another `Give up everything and depend upon me, I will put an end to all your troubles,' the abandonment of all other means of getting over one's troubles is meant, here also, on the strength of that very sentence (of the Lord) the abandonment of all other means of destruction of one's inner sins, is implied. Eventhough the whole chapter is viewed in connection with this one verse which somehow enjoins sarhnyā sa, it is clear that sarhnyā sa is not its topic since context and proximity (both of which deny this assumption) are more powerful. Moreover in this chapter, by the words, `By sarhnyā sa, the seers understand the abandoning of all desire- motivated actions' (Gītā 18.2), it is the abandonment of desire-motivated actions alone that is stated and not the institution of sarhnyā sa. This being the case, `remembering Him once' etc., refers only to him who makes up his mind to give up all other expiations, but desires to overcome his distress only on the strength of the Lord's name etc.

32 This is to prevent the objector from taking advantage of the arguments put forward by the siddhāntin under similar circumstances! The objector cannot say that by the continuous practice of remembrance etc., till death, which would also involve great trouble, the choice is balanced: because these practices are so powerful that they destroy even great sins at one stroke.

And also, these various objections (against our position) cannot be brought simultaneously, because they refer to different types of aspirants. Nor will it result in the non-performance of the more difficult expiations due to the fear of the trouble they would involve, because by the statement, `Whatever religious act he leaves unperformed through fear of bodily trouble, saying `it is painful,' that abandonment only springs from the principle of rajas and he will not gain the fruit of abandonment' (Gītā 8.8), such an abandonment has been condemned. Such passages as, `The very terrible sin of men in the Kali-age which gives them the pain of hell, is at once abolished by His name being once repeated' (V. P. 6.8.21), refer to the devotee. Similarly, the following passages from the Gītā and the Nṛsiṁhapurāṇa clearly refer to the topic of devotion: `Even if a very wicked person worships Me to the exclusion of anybody else, he should be regarded as righteous, for he has rightly resolved. He soon becomes righteous-minded and attains eternal peace. O son of Kunā, be assured that My devotee never perishes' (Gītā 9.30, 31); `The inhabitants of hell, (in their agony), cried out, `Krṣṇa, O Krṣṇa! O Nā rasīṁha! Thus was Viṣṇu mentioned by those in hell, and all the internal pains of those great-souled ones were destroyed' (Nr. P. 8.28.29). Here, `recitation' (kīrtana) merely means the bare mention of the name, and there is no rule that it must be in the vocative case.
77. It does not partake of the characteristics of the others (i.e., the expiations), since, like the post of the threshing floor, it has come as a substitute.

From the statement, ´His best expiation, the only one, is remembrance of Hari´ (V. P. 2.6.40) etc., it should not be understood that the characteristics of other expiations are implied due to the mention of the name (prā yaś citta); because they (i.e., remembrance etc.) have come in the place of these (expiations). This is the meaning. Just as in the statement, ´The post of the threshing floor becomes the sacrificial post´ (Ā ś . Ś r. 9.7), the rule enjoins that the post of the threshing floor be used as the sacrificial post for tying up the animal victim, but it does not follow from this that this substituted post should have eight corners etc. (like the original), so here also, the characteristics of the expiations like the shaving off of the bodily hair, cutting of the nails etc., do not necessarily follow. It should not be said that recitation of the Lord's names etc., must be considered as expiations only, due to their causing the destruction of sins; because by the statement, ´Penance (tapas) is called prā yas and citta means certainty; the tradition says that is prā yaś citta which is combined with penance and certainty'33 it is clear that the word prā yaś citta primarily applies to some from of penance and is used elsewhere only secondarily.

33 The reading in the printed commentaries is

which seems to be a mistake. The reading given here is found in the Ś abdakalpadruma.

Since the restrictions regarding the subsidiary means depend upon the restrictions on the principal which they subserve, the question as to who is eligible to practise devotion (which is the principal) is now discussed:

78. All, down even to the despised births, are entitled (to practise devotion); because (they can learn of it, as they learn of) the common truths, indirectly.

Right up to the despised births like the cā ṇ ḍ ā la etc., all are entitled to practise devotion, because the desire to escape from the miseries of mundane existence is common to all. It may now be objected: ´How can anyone, who does not belong to the first three Varṇ as, practise devotion, since he has no right to the study of the Vedas?´ To this it is replied: ´indirectly.´ We certainly do not dispute that transcendental things can be directly known only from the ś ruts, because of such statements as ´Duty (dharma) is a thing recognized by the urging character (of the passage of the ś ruti which mentions it)´ (Pū . M. 1.1.2) and ´Because, the ś ā stra alone is the means of right knowledge.´ (Br. S. 1.1.3) But knowledge based upon the ś ruti can still be produced in women, the ś ū dras etc., through the itihā sa (Mahā bhā rata) and the purā ṇ as as, and in the cā ṇ ḍ ā las etc., through such mediate teaching which is in accordance with the smṛ tis and good customs. Just as they learn of the common truths (virtues) like non-injury etc. (from these sources, here also). Otherwise it would follow that they will not have a knowledge of these latter also.
Hence, even those with immature devotion (will perfect it) in His world.

Since all are entitled (to the practice of devotion), for that very reason, the practice of the various means to supreme devotion by those whose devotion has not yet become mature, in Śvetadvīpa, the world of the Lord, has been declared by the smṛti thus: `To the north of the ocean of milk lies the splendid Śvetadvīpa; there live men bright as the moon, intent on Nārāyaṇa, filled with the idea of absolute unity, these are devoted to the Puruṣottama' (Mbh. Ś., Mokṣadharma-Nārāyaṇīya 336.27, 28) Beginning with these verses, their practice of the means of supreme devotion has been described ending it thus: `Then those men quickly ran up together, folding their hands, full of joy and uttering shouts of praise; then I heard a great shout as they spoke, lo! an offering is presented by them to that deity' (Mbh. Ś., Mokṣadharma 336.40, 41). Therefore all have a right to practise it. That is why it has been said in the Brahma Sūtras, (1.3.26) `Bādarāyaṇa (allows a right to the study of the Vedas) even to beings above men, since it is possible (for them also to attain knowledge)'.

Now, introducing the question, `How is it that His world is not, even for those with perfected devotion?' It is answered thus:

But (it is only by this interpretation that the doctrines of) gradual attainment and immediate attainment can be accounted for.

The word `but' (tu) is used to dispel the doubt. In the Nārāyaṇīya section itself, after beginning with the words, `Those who are exceedingly sinless in the world and are devoid of merit and demerit' (Mbh. Ś. 344.13), and after describing their successive movement through the orb of the sun, into the forms of Aniruddha, Pradyumna and Saṅkarṣaṇa, it is declared: `But those who have their minds intently fixed in contemplation, who are self-restrained, and sense-subdued, filled with the idea of absolute unity, enter Vāsudeva' (Mbh. Ś. 344.19). Thus has the gradual attainment (of God) been described. It is said afterwards: `But they, who are like the fire which has consumed its fuel, who are devoid of all merit and demerit-the destination has been thus declared by thee, through successive stages; and in this fourth stage they attain the highest sphere. But verily this person who is absolutely devoted is dear to Nārāyaṇa because he attains to the immortal Hari without passing through the three intermediate stages' (Mbh. Ś. Mokṣadharma 348.2-4). This mention of the final stage of immediate attainment can be accounted for only if it refers to the perfected devotion. Otherwise there will be contradiction between these two statements. Therefore the attainment of `His world' refers only to the immature devotees.
(The same is proved) from the remainder of the sentence also in the śrāti, relating to the departure of the soul.

The passage in the Gītā relating to the departure of the soul begins thus: ‘Endowed with devotion and the power of yoga’ (8.10); and continues: ‘Repeating the monosyllable Oṁ which is Brahman, and thinking of Me, he who departs from the body, attains the highest goal’ (8.13). And there, the remainder of the sentence is: ‘Fire, the flame, the day, the bright half of the month and the six months of the sun’s northern course-departing by this path, the knowers of Brahman attain Brahman’ (8.24). Here the gradual attainment has been described. So also in another remainder (of the immediate context) it says: ‘All the worlds, O Arjuna, including the world of Brahmā, are subject to recurrence; but after attaining Me there is no rebirth, O son of Kuntī’ (8.16). Here, by the beginning of the statement with the word loka (the several worlds) and also by the strength of the word upa (in mā m upetya) (‘reaching Me’). It is but proper to conclude that the attainment of the worlds near to Him, refers only to those of immature devotion. As for him whose devotion is perfect, even the fruit of attainment of His world is not proper because His reward is imperishable, and also since there is no mention in the śruti of the practice of any means (to increase his devotion which is already perfect). And again, if gradual liberation is possible for one with immature devotion, from that itself, the injunction that he should remember the Lord at the time of death, would become useless. Nor can we say that by dwelling in His world, supreme devotion would be added on; because, by the statement, ‘This Supreme Puruṣa, O Pārtha, is to be attained only by one-pointed devotion’ (Gītā 8.22), it is clear that supreme devotion is an independent means of liberation. Therefore all that we can concede is that even in that world, one is entitled to get supreme devotion. As for the birth in the sacred land of Bhāratavarṣa, it is only useful for performing ceremonial rites (and hence not a precondition for practising devotion), as shown by the statement: ‘Nowhere else is ceremonial rite enjoined to the mortals’ (V. P. 2.3.5). It has already been declared (sū. 7) that devotion is not of the nature of ceremonial rite.

Objection: (By being born elsewhere) it is still possible that one would fail to obtain the subsidiaries for devotion!

Reply: No; because, just like the adjunct (fire) of the sacrifice of the Niṣāda king, here also the subsidiaries are automatically included, once the principal is attained. As for the śūdras etc., what is prohibited is the ceremonial rite arising out of the Vedic hymns and not remembrance, praising etc., as a means of devotion. Hence, when their right to practise devotion is thus being established, the conception that it must be associated with knowledge is improper.

34 From the aphorism 79 onwards, the point under discussion has been this: If all have a right to the practice of devotion, what will be the fate of those mediocre devotees with immature devotion, after death? This is answered by the assurance that they will attain ‘His’ world wherein they will continue their practice and ultimately perfect their devotion when they will be merged in Him. This standpoint has been proved by first mentioning the example of the devotees of the Lord at Śvetadvīpa, next by showing the logic behind the principle of gradual liberation for the immature devotees and direct immediate liberation for those of perfected devotion and finally summing it up with the ‘remainder of the sentence’ or vā kyaṣ eṣa.
The contention of the objector here is: ‘Why should not the perfect devotees too go to those worlds?’ This has been answered with two important points: (1) All worlds right up to Brahmaloka are perishable. Since the fruit that a perfect devotee deserves is nothing short of immortality, it is not proper to send him to such worlds! (2) The very purpose of these worlds is either to reap the results of the merit he has acquired, or, as in the case of the highest world, to practise further to perfect his devotion. Neither of these alternatives holds good in the case of the perfect devotee because of the very perfection of his devotion itself.

It is not immaturity of devotion that takes him to those worlds but the final remembrance of the Lord at the time of death which is a sure sign of his continuous endeavour.

Niṣādas are śūdras. There is a particular sacrifice which a king of the Niṣādas can perform. Whether the caru oblation of that sacrifice is to be made in the common fire or in the duly consecrated fire is the point of discussion in the Mīmāṃsā works. The discussion is necessitated by the fact of the śūdra not having the right to light up a duly consecrated fire. The conclusion drawn is that he should offer it only in the common fire because fire being the adjunct of the sacrifice is no doubt enjoined, but the ādhāna ceremony (ceremonial piling up of the fuel and lighting the fire) which is an adjunct of the fire is not specifically enjoined as in Darśapūrṇamāsa etc.

Once it is agreed that the Niṣāda-king also can offer the sacrifice, the necessary adjunct, fire, also follows. Similarly, once the right to practise devotion is granted to anyone, all the subsidiaries of devotion like remembrance etc., also follow automatically.

In that case, let it be granted that even those who have committed great sins are entitled to attain supreme devotion. Then it follows that they have a right to the repetition of the Vedas etc., also which itself is subsidiary to devotion. This is now countered thus:

But the great sinners (are entitled only) to the devotion of distress (ārtabhakti).

And again, those who have been addicted to sins which are responsible for their fall into lower states, are entitled, like their right to expiations, only to the devotion of distress, and not to anything else; because the destruction of those sins is more urgently needed by them than anything else. (This is seen from) such statements as ‘enjoying, he increases his sin’ etc. However, on the abolition of that sin, he would certainly gain the right (to practise devotion).

Like hell or animal births.
Since the topic is that of one-pointed (or supreme) devotion, he now proceeds to dispel the ghost-like doubt whether all religious duties are different from supreme devotion:

83. That (supreme devotion alone is) the one-pointed devotion (and nothing else); because such has been recognised as the meaning of the Gītā.

That supreme devotion alone is one-pointed devotion and nothing else. Why? Because this has been recognized as the meaning of the Gītā by the śruti (Mahābhārata). Thus in the Nārāyaṇya section itself the question is asked 'Those brahmāṇas who, duly intent and observing all the rules, read the Vedas along with the Upaniṣads, and those who follow the duties of the saṅnyāsa-sins, I know of a way better than theirs, the way of those with one-pointed devotion. By Whom-which god or ṛṣi was this way taught?' (Mbh. Ś. 348.5, 6). And the answer: 'When the troops of the Kuru and Pāṇḍava armies met in battle array, when Arjuna was full of despondency, this was sung by the Lord Himself, (ibid. 348.8). Therefore one-pointedness is supreme devotion.

What harm is there if it is conceded that the inferior forms of devotion also produce liberation directly? This is now tackled:

84. All (are useful in liberation) only through the production of the supreme (devotion). So does (the Lord) verily say.

Only by producing the supreme devotion do (all other means) become useful in liberation. So does the Lord say, giving reasons: 'Whosoever shall impart this profound secret to My devotees, he, having produced supreme devotion towards Me, shall undoubtedly attain Me' (Gītā 18.68). Here, since it is already established that even the fruit of this teaching is the becoming one with Brahman, why is it said, 'having produced supreme devotion towards Me'? Because that is the means to liberation, according to the śruti. That is why in the legend of the king Uparicara Vasu, when he says, 'My kingdom, wealth....' (Mbh. Ś. 335.23) it is understood that the characteristic of devotion, of the nature of love for the Supreme Lord, has been exhibited since the act by itself is useless. Therefore, when the śruti says that all (forms of religious duties) cause liberation, the idea to be inferred is that they are all useful in liberation through the production of supreme devotion. It (i.e. the religious duty) cannot produce both (supreme devotion and liberation) because, it being an action, cannot produce (an indestructible result like) liberation. Hence the sentence should be taken to refer to a visible effect (like the production of supreme devotion).
Thus ends the second section of the second chapter of the commentary on the hundred aphorisms of Śāṇḍilya, composed by the most learned teacher Svapneś vara.

THE SECOND CHAPTER ENDS HERE

THIRD CHAPTER

SECTION I

Since the excellence of devotion arises from the excellence of the object of devotion (viz., God) and also due to the identity of the devotee with Him, He, the object of devotion, is now described.

Suddenly Svapneś vara seems to have entered into the mood of a poet! His commentary on this chapter is mostly in verses.

85. This (visible world) is not different from the object of devotion (i.e. God), since everything is His manifestation.

The śāstras have come to the conclusion that the proof of an object of knowledge depends upon knowledge. (And) existence is (itself) knowledge. It is not a genus (jāti) since it does not exist in genus etc.

According to the Advaita Vedānta doctrine, all that exists is Brahman whose nature is pure consciousness and bliss. So Brahman is existence, is consciousness, is bliss. The Nyāya doctrine however maintains that ‘existence’ is a summum genus. That view is refuted here. The idea is that this Nyāya view would lead to infinite regress since one can imagine another genus in that genus, another one is that and so on.

Even if it did exist, the desired connection would not (be established), because of the cumbersome imagination (one has to invent, to prove it). Therefore the all-pervading Supreme Brahman Himself is knowledge.

The connection by which a genus is supposed to exist in its species—for e.g., the existence of ‘cowness’ in each of the individual cows—is called samavāya-sambandha, or inherence. If it is somehow accepted that a genus can exist in another genus, then the connection by which it exists will have to be newly invented; and this is bound to be more complicated and cumbersome than even this samavāya.

In all visible things there is identity with that (Brahman). Even the (apparent) diversity is found only in what exists really.

Objection: In that case, just as we perceive the jar as ‘the jar is,’ we should have perceived it as ‘the jar is knowledge!’

The contention of the objector is that if everything is Brahman and He is knowledge, we should have perceived even the ordinary things like the jar, as knowledge only. Since we are not, the siddhāntin is wrong.

Reply: But we never perceive the jar as only ‘it is,’ since it does not present itself (to our senses) as real existence. If
it is supposed (as the Naiyā yikas do) that God is the cause of creation due to His knowledge of the material cause, the desire to act upon it (for the sake of creation) and the consequent effort, then (our conception of Brahman as the only cause) is far more simple than the supposition of these three along with their object. He along with His object (viz., mā yā, His power of Cosmic Ignorance) is not a substratum of the qualities\(^2\) (of knowledge, desire and effort), because this is a cumbersome hypothesis.

1 We do not perceive the jar as 'existence appearing as the jar,' but only as 'the jar exists.' Hence the recognition of the principle of existence in the jar is vague and indirect. But from the transcendental stand-point it really exists only in Brahman, or better, as Brahman, who is knowledge itself.

2 But is Himself knowledge.

85. The conception that He is the knower etc., arises from the limiting adjunct (mā yā), as is seen from the parallel instance of time.

Just as our limited understanding divides the indivisible time into definite portions as minutes, days, months etc., so also it is our ignorance that attributes the qualities of knowing, wishing and acting to God.<sup>F14</sup>

86. His power mā yā (is the material cause of this world), as it is the common factor in all insentient objects.

The almighty power of that Brahman has been declared in the Gī́ṭā (7.14) as mā yā, thus: 'Verily this My mā yā -power, consisting of the three guṇas as, is hard to be overcome. Only those who take refuge in Me will cross over this mā yā.'

'Through Me as its superintendant, nature (prakṛti) brings forth this world of movable and immovable objects. Due to this reason,\(^1\) O son of Kuntī, the world revolves' (Gī́ṭā 9.10).

\(^1\) i.e., due to my superintendence.

It is mā yā, not because it is unreal, but because of the diversification of its effects. This is known from the śruti (Ch. U. 6.2.2; 3.14.2) which declares Brahman as real, in order to prove the reality of His effects.

Mā yā is not unreal as the Advaitins hold but a reality, a power, of Brahman. Svapneś vara takes the meaning of this word in its old sense, as the power to create varieties. See also the commentator's introduction at the very beginning of this work.

To surmise the falseness (of this world) would result in the falseness of its cause (also), which is not proper (as seen from the statements of the śruti).

**Objection:** By falseness we mean that it is dispelled by the knowledge of reality.

**Reply:** No, because (you hold) that this falseness (mā yā or avidyā or ignorance) is itself false, thereby confirming
the reality of this world even more firmly! On the other hand, if you say that its (inferred) falseness is true, its reality is (even more) true since it is being established by direct perception!

Since what is (absolutely) unreal cannot present itself (to our senses), whatever presents itself must be real only. As regards the appearance of a snake in the rope (which may be quoted as an exception to this), it is only a case of mistake (known technically as anyathā khyā tī).

1 According to the Naiyā yikas all error is anyathā khyā tī, knowing (khyā tī) one thing for another (anyathā ). The idea of a snake already seen elsewhere, is transferred to the rope due to semi-darkness. Hence this mistake. But the Vedā ntins hold that the snake is there, actually produced by ignorance, though it belongs to the class of `apparent' (prā tibhā sika) things and not to the class of `practical' (vyā vahā rika) things. Obviously our commentator does not subscribe to the Vedā ntic view.

It is an acknowledged rule in all other things (except undeveloped nature or prakṛ ti), that their reality or unreality depends on their being capable of, or not beingcontradicted (or falsified) by, a more authoritative judgment. This mā yā is the totality of the insentient creation, and as it is being capable of being known, it must be real. Otherwise a universal rule would be contradicted. Therefore both the pure consciousness (Brahman) and the insentient creation (prakṛ ti) are real.

87. (And also) because the effects are pervaded by (their respective material) causes.

The pervaded-principles (effects) arise out of the pervading-principles (causes). Since the pervading-principles are identical with the (respective) pervading-principles, the latter are therefore held to be the material causes of the former.

This is a well-known doctrine of the Sā ṇ kya adopted by the Vedā ntins also. It is called sat-kā rya-vā da which means that the effect pre-existed in the cause in a potential form. Hence the cause pervades the effect, and is identical with it (tā dā tmya).

Applying this principle to the subject under discussion, the world-effect is pervaded by and hence identical with, prakṛ ti or mā yā , the insentient general substance, which again is identical with Brahman as his power, who pervades it.

The (cause and effect) are not (connected) by inherence (samavā ya, as the Naiyā yikas hold) because (the imagination of such a) connection (based on the) difference (between the cause and effect instead of identity as we hold) is cumbersome.1 The conclusion of the ś rutis2 also is this only. And this assumption-like the siezing of the oxen by their horns3-is simple.

1 According to the Naiyā yikas samavā ya is the connection that is supposed to exist between a quality and the substance it qualifies, between motion and the object of motion etc. The essential pre-requisite of this view is that the two things thus connected are different. If the same connection exists, between the cause and its effect also, the process by which this is to be proved becomes very cumbersome due to the cause and its effect being materially the same and not different, as the samavā ya normally requires.
Śṛṅga-grā hikā-nyā ya (the maxim of seizing by the horns) is explained thus: If a cowherd boy is asked which cow gives the maximum milk, he just catches the horns of that particular cow and shows it. This is the simplest and the direct method. Similarly the explanation of the connection between the cause and the effect as tādā tmya is direct and simple, whereas the assumption of samavāya is cumbersome.

The causality of the Supreme Lord is due to His presence in all the effects. He is (also) the efficient cause\(^1\) because of His knowledge or intelligence pervading through all the objects of knowledge.\(^2\)

\(^1\) For a pot, clay is the material cause (upādānakāraṇa) and the potter as also his stick and wheel, are the efficient causes (nimitta-kārāṇa). Similarly the Supreme is the material cause of this world through His māyā or prakṛti which is identical with Him, and also the efficient cause due to His knowledge.

\(^2\) Because He makes them after conceiving them in His mind.

However, intelligence (buddhi, being enlightened by the witness (i.e. the soul), cannot know itself; because if intelligence can be taken as known by itself\(^1\), its very principle will be contradicted.\(^2\)

This is in answer to a possible objection like this: If buddhi is thus connected with all objects, then, why not consider that itself as the material cause of the world?

\(^1\) Just as the eye cannot see itself, intelligence also cannot know itself.

\(^2\) Because buddhi also is insentient by itself, and ‘knows’ other objects only through the consciousness of the soul reflected in it.

When Īśvara gets up from His sleep after mundane destruction His intellect is the first thing that arises. After having known the cause-effect relations (of various objects) He, the Lord, proceeds with the creation (of the world).

This intellect, though having no object by itself, being associated with consciousness as its adjunct, will reveal the various species of creation like the oil in a lamp.

Oil by itself cannot illumine objects since it is not a light. But, associated with a burning lamp, it can. Similarly intellect being insentient, cannot by itself reveal objects. When associated with consciousness, it can.

Next arises the principle of egoism from His volition, 'I shall make (the world)'. This is known from the śrutis and smṛtis such as, 'He thought, “Let me become many”' (Ch. U. 6.2.3).

Egoism also is a first principle since it has entered into the modifications of the intellect like wish etc. But still, intellect resides in it since (being more general) it pervades it.
I am the lord'-(this is the utterance of egoism). Since all things are thus created by volition and are determined by egoism, egoism also is a cause of the subtle elements, gross elements, the sense-organs etc.

And among these, the general elements viz., (the principles of) sound, touch, form, taste and smell known by those respective notations, are also the causes of the gross elements of sound etc.

**Objection:** In that case, it should be possible to detect these first principles everywhere!

**Reply:** (Yes). Just as the genus or general (jā tī) is perceived in the individual modifications, their perception also does exist (once their developments are properly recognized).

Thus the first principles or causes have respectively pervaded their effects. It is clear that the material cause of (all things like) a pot consists of these first principles starting right from Brahman.

The objection that the first principle (we have posited) is proved to be wrong because it is sufficient to assume karma (the pre-existing deserts) as the cause, is not valid; for, a material cause cannot be established to be so, unless it is identical with its effects. (The karma that the objector puts forward) cannot produce such an identity (since it is only an instrumental cause and not the material cause).

Moreover, these first principles which are causes (of the world) are also (indirectly) means to liberation. Since (beings are) not identical (with one another)² Their intellects etc., have been created separately.³

¹ Intellect etc. contribute to the production of knowledge which produces devotion, thus leading to liberation.

² This is from the phenomenal standpoint.

³ Depending upon the karma of each individual.

Intellect never wholly ceases to exist, from the first creation (of one cycle) to the final destruction (of that cycle). However the intellects of individuals get dissolved (temporarily) in deep sleep. This dissolution will be final in liberation.

The next aphorism declares that the evolution of creation in succession from the intellect, as held by the atheistic Sāṅkhyas, is untenable because it cannot be proved:

88. (Creation) cannot take place from the individual intellects, because it is impossible.

om whose intellect is the successive creation of the gods, the sages etc., declared in the śrutis, to have been produced? This creation cannot be done by (an individual intellect). Therefore (it must only be) the Supreme Lord (who can) have such an intellect.

89. Having created the high and the low, He also produces the Vedas, like a father.<F14>
Having created all beings, the high and the low, according to their merits and demerits, this (Lord) desirous of their welfare produces the Vedas.

Just as a father, having begotten sons, teaches them also by words, about the unknown means of obtaining the good and warding off the evil, so does this Supreme Lord too.

90. If it is objected that (He is) not a (well-wisher like a father) because of the teaching (of sacrifices which are) mixed up (with injurious acts), we deny it; because (the result of such injurious acts is comparatively) small.

**Objection:** But, this Lord is not a well-wisher like father; because, He has taught sacrifices which are mixed up with injurious acts productive of sin!

**Reply:** No, the enjoiner of these sacrificial acts is not an ill-wisher; because, compared to the happiness produced by the principal parts (of a sacrifice) the evil fruit of the accessories involving injury (to animals) is rather small.

**Objection by the Minsist:** But can we not answer that objection this way?-The general prohibition (regarding killing) does not hold good here, since the injurious act which is a subsidiary of the sacrifice has no independent fruit of its own but that of the principal. Otherwise there would result a choice between two (equally forceful) commands, ‘must be done’ and ‘must not be done’. Therefore the general prohibition-just as in the case of the ā havanīya fire will hold good only in those cases where there is no special injunction to the contrary.

1 `There should be no violence to any living being,’ `mā hiṁsyā t sarvā bhū tā ni.’

2 Since this ancillary exists for the whole it cannot produce any result of its own apart from that of the principal. Hence the above prohibition should be deemed to apply only to independent acts of killing.

3 This will result in confusion.

4 Offerings of butter, etc., called ā hutis are generally offered in the duly consecrated ā havanīya fire. But in the upanayana ceremony the boy, has to offer three ā hutis. He has no right to do so in the ā havanīya fire since he is not yet initiated formally. Hence the ā hutis are given in this particular case, in the ordinary fire. Thus the general rule is suspended by the special rule as far as the particular case is concerned. See J. N. V. 6.8.2.

**Reply:** With regard to this, we say that the injury (to animals) which is a subsidiary (to the main rite) can become the cause of an (evil) desert and also of sin since, after all, it is also injury. In this there should be no difference between us.

**Minsist:** But then (we say that the subsidiary rites involving injury) produce the desired fruit unconnected with great pain. As for his negative injunction (mā hiṁsyā t) it applies to cases where such (injurious) rites are not involved.

Therefore this injunction, ‘There should be no violence to any being’ (is helpful by) not producing pain etc.
**Reply:** But the pain produced by the injurious act which is an accessory of a sacrifice is real. However, it is not very powerful.

Since it is restrained by the happiness etc., which are the fruits of the principal rite, this pain will not prove to be an obstacle.\(^1\) Otherwise, since the, 'powerful-ness' is not defined exactly, there is the danger of extending the (detering influence of pain) too far.\(^2\)

\(^1\) A hungry man will not mind trouble of securing foodstuffs and cooking them since, compared to the happiness he obtains by eating, all this is insignificant. Similarly here also.

\(^2\) Since all actions involve some trouble or other, there is the danger of giving up all actions and becoming lethargic!

Therefore this idea of greatness or predominance as applied to pain is a class unto itself. As for instance: when one dies voluntarily as an expiation (for heinous sins) or drowns himself at (the sacred confluence of) Prayāga (to get religious merit), the pain of suicide is trifling compared to the (great) results obtained by such (a suicide).

That is why Pañcāśikha also says that this (pain) is to be borne with patience.

This alludes to a sūtra of Pañcāśikha, an ancient teacher of Śāṅkhya. He was the disciple of Ā suri who was a direct disciple of Kapila, the founder of the Śāṅkhya system.

The sūtra has been quoted in the Bhāṣya of Vyāsa, on the Yoga Sūtras 2.13

>`The mixture with a very small pain is easy to be obviated (by expiations), and to be borne with patience, and it is not enough to destroy one's merits. Why so? Because I have much other merit stored up, in which this little annoyance being thrown, will make little diminution in heaven.'\(^1\)

(Such pain is to be borne) because it is small. But not so when it is powerful enough to cause great suffering. There are general rules declared by the Veda, enjoining the performance of the Paryagni rite.\(^1\)

\(^1\) The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (2.5) describes it thus: ‘The priest takes a firebrand from the ā havanīya fire and carries it on the right side thrice round the animal which is to be sacrificed’. This rite is to avert evil. Such rites are provided in the Veda itself as expiatory rites for the necessary killing of animals in sacrifices.

`There are five slaughter-places (pañca-sūnāḥ) in the homes of house-holders'-so do the smṛtis declare, (and give expiations).\(^1\) Such special statements\(^2\) are not for all, (but strictly limited to the duly initiated Vedic house-holder
and priest). Much less can they apply to persons without the due qualifications.\textsuperscript{3} That is why it is said: 'The actor, the butcher go to hell.'\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{1} This refers to Manusmṛti 3.68. The five slaughter places are: the fireplace, the grindstone, the broom, the mortar and the water pot. The five daily sacrifices (pañcayajñas) are the expiations.

\textsuperscript{2} regarding the expiations for the injury involved in those necessary rites.

\textsuperscript{3} So, the general rule mā hīṃ syā t etc., will apply to them without exception.

\textsuperscript{4} See Viṣṇu Purāṇa 2.6.21.

Since a topic pertaining to the śruti (has thus been raised), the doctrine of apūrva is now discussed. Does it reside in the performer (of the Vedic rites) or in the enjoyer (of its fruits) or in the Supreme Lord?

Apūrva literally means 'that which did not exist before'. When a person desirous of heaven or such other worldly fruits performs the prescribed sacrifices, these sacrifices are said to produce an apūrva, potential unseen fruit, which will mature after the person's death and give him the desired object.

The question raised is: Where does this apūrva reside, when the performer is still living? Does it reside in him? Or does it reside in him who is going to enjoy the fruits of that rite? (This is possible since a rite can be performed by one for the sake of another.) Or does it reside in the Supreme Lord? The sūtra now answers this question.

91. Bādarāyaṇa (says) that the fruit comes from Him, because it is seen so (in the world also).

As it is seen (in the world) that the fruits of ordinary actions (of the men of the world) come from the pleasure or displeasure of the king (or a similar authority), (similarly here also the fruits of men's actions come) from this Brahman. So does the venerable Bādarāyaṇa say.

The reference is to the Brahma Sūtras 3.2.38: ‘From Him (the Lord) come the fruits of actions; for that is reasonable.’

The potential fruit does not reside in the performer, because the fruit of the ritual jāteṣṭi accrues to the son (though it is the father who performs it). If it is said that its enjoyment resides in the enjoyer, it is still worth-while thinking in whom it does reside.

The jāteṣṭi is performed by the father on the birth of his son. It is supposed to bestow on the son ceremonial purity, health etc.
In that case, the defect of mutual dependence (anyonyā ś rayadosa) will result because each conception depends upon the other. Therefore, as seen (in the world) here also, good or an evil fruit will result from the Supreme Lord's pleasure or displeasure, accruing to the person who deserves it.

In whom does this fruit of enjoyment reside? In the enjoyer. Who is the enjoyer? He in whom enjoyment resides. This will be the line of argument in which the defect of mutual dependence is obvious.

Nor even the conception of a different mode of distribution of the fruits (like the apūrva), to its subject necessary. Otherwise this idea of the apūrva will have to be assumed even in the case of the service to the king etc. (and the consequent reward or punishment). That is why it is stated in the śrutī that human actions give pleasure to the Supreme Lord:

‘But those who follow this ambrosial doctrine as I have declared it, full of faith and devoted to me, they, my devotees, are exceedingly dear to Me’ (Gīta 16.20).

Although displeasure and pleasure are attributed to Him, the Lord is not thereby brought within the scope of mundane existence; because, He is all that exists, He is without pain and sorrow, and He is ever free.

92. Dissolution takes place in the reverse order; so is it seen (in the world also).

It is held that dissolution (at the end of a periodical mundane existence) takes place in the reverse order, with the pervaded-principles (or effects) dissolving in their respective pervading principles (or material causes), since we observe in the world that the effects like the jar etc., are resolved back (on destruction) into their material cause like clay.

Thus ends the first section of the third chapter of the commentary on the hundred aphorisms of Śānḍilya composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.

SECTION II

The attainment of oneness with Brahman by the individual soul is called (his) liberation. By discussing about that liberation, here also, the discussion on that object of devotion (viz., the Supreme Lord or Brahman) (is continued). While investigating the question, ‘How is it possible for one thing to become another?’ the author of the aphorisms
declares the capacity of the individual souls to become one with the Lord:

93. Unity is its (nature). The diversity or unity is caused by the conjunction or the disjunction of the limiting adjunct, as is the case with the sun.

That his oneness (with Brahman) is natural to him is known from the (following) statements (of the śrutis):

`All This is verily Brahman' (Ch. U. 3.14.1).

`There is no diversity whatever, here' (K. U. 4.11).

`As the one sun illumines all this world, O Bhārata, the soul illumines all the bodies' (Gītā 13.33).

And know Me also, O Bhārata, to be the embodied soul in all the bodies' (ibid. 13.2).

That is why, the idea of diversity is produced in the soul, by the internal organ which is a limiting adjunct of the individual soul. So does the śruti also say: `It is seen in one way and also in many ways like the moon in water'. And again: `As the one sky is apparently seen diversified as white, blue etc. So the ātman which is in truth but one, is seen by those of deluded vision as distinct (in different individuals)' (V. P. 2.16.12).

Therefore when the limiting adjunct of the soul, viz., the internal organ, is dispelled by supreme devotion, then, that the essential oneness (manifests once again) is above contradiction. Just as the sun who is of the nature of light (continues to remain as one), after the removal of mirrors etc., which are the reflecting adjuncts, so here also.

94. If it is said that (the souls are) separate (from the Supreme), (we) deny it; because the self-manifesting (souls) cannot have any connection with the Supreme

Objection: (The individual souls) are separate (from the Lord), (and) absolutely different from one another. And, these souls are of the nature of light. Otherwise there could be no basis for the fact that someone is free while someone else is bound.

Reply: Not so. Even if this can somehow be proved to be possible in the school of the atheistic Sāṅkhyas, it is impossible in the case of the theistic Sāṅkhyas. How so? Because, they being of the nature of light (or knowledge), cannot have a seer-seen-type of relationship with the Supreme Lord, just as lamps being self-luminous, cannot be illumined by the sun. If such a position is accepted, there is every prospect of Brahman losing His omnipotence and
omniscience, and becoming knowable.

Objection: Let them, then, be illumined (by Him).

Reply: Then you have to take up the position that they are insentient! Nor can we accept that these souls are illumined (or manifested) by the mutual modifications of the internal organs; because this manifestation takes place by the removal of the darkness (of ignorance) and not by the evolution of the internal organ under sattva. This internal organ being thus incapable of manifesting the soul, it cannot take place. Even when the veil between two lamps is removed, one of them cannot indeed be illumined by the other. Between the two lights (the soul and the lamp)-One internal and the other external-there is a common characteristic though it may be a non-essential one, (viz., their capacity to manifest themselves as also others, thus not needing a second illuminator to illumine themselves). For instance, there is the statement, 'This soul is verily a light himself' (Br. U. 4.3.9), where the word 'light' has been used in a secondary sense. Therefore the conscious soul is established by the very fact of its illumining the world, for which it needs the help of no second entity. And also, the existence of the soul is incontestably established by the fact of its being the substratum both for the attributes of the internal organ erroneously reflected in it and for real knowledge. As for the attributing of knowledge, happiness etc., to the modifications of the internal organ in common parlance, it is only in a secondary sense.

'What is the proof of the separate existence of individual souls? It is clear that the principle of buddhi is separate (for separate individual souls). Since the souls are eternally free, how otherwise can there be the determination of bondage and liberation?'

There is a general rule that whatever is illumined or manifested by another, is insentient;

According to the commentator Svapneś vara, perception takes place like this: When a sense organ like the eye comes into contact with a jar, the darkness or ignorance concealing that jar is first removed. The internal organ next assumes the shape of the jar and presents it to the soul. The soul's light or consciousness is reflected in this modified internal organ, when the soul is said to 'perceive or know' the jar. This is slightly different from the usual Vedāntic standpoint wherein the internal organ itself, removes the veil of ignorance through its modifications.

It is the internal organ that undergoes modifications and not the soul. When the soul identifies itself with these modifications reflected in itself, it thinks 'I am happy,' 'I am suffering' and so on. Even for such an erroneous reflections there must be a substratum and that is the soul.

i.e., except by this conception of different internal organs which act as limiting adjuncts, just like several reflecting media, reflecting the same sun and making it appear to have become many.

Let then the souls, of the nature of existence, be considered as capable of undergoing modifications and that the knowledge, desire etc., be their qualities because of such perceptions as 'I know,' 'I desire,' 'I am happy' etc., this doctrine is now refuted:

95. But, the (individual souls are) not capable of being modified; because, it is the instrument which gets modified
The (individual) souls are not capable of such modifications as knowledge etc. Why? Because it is possible to explain the occurrence of knowledge etc., by noting that the perception of pleasure etc., belong to the instrument (i.e. the internal organ). Consequently the souls do not get modified. For instance, in the inference, 'perception of pleasure has to be through an instrument,' the soul being really unconnected with such an instrument, identifies himself with it through the reflection. And there is the other inference that pleasure etc., are not modifications of the soul, because they are perceived reflected in the soul, just like whiteness etc., (of the body, being reflected in the soul, is identified with it). Similar is the perception by the mind of egoism through identification with its cause (viz., egoism). When the mind is dissolved in deep sleep, there is no (such) perception of egoism. Just as the limiting adjuncts of time\( ^5 \) themselves constitute the time (here also, the limiting adjuncts of the mind like joy, knowledge etc., themselves constitute the mind).\( ^6 \) This is the general line of argument.

\( ^5 \) Like moments, minutes, hours, days, etc., past, present, future etc.

\( ^6 \) It will be appropriate here to quote the following passage from the Brāhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (1.5.3):

"Desire, deliberation doubt, faith, want or faith, steadiness, impatience, shame, intelligence and fear—all these are nothing but forms of mind."

Well then, how does the individual soul become Brahman? This question is now discussed:

96. Identification with Him (is achieved) through undivided devotion. (Liberation is attained) when the (individual's) internal organ is dissolved absolutely

It has been declared in the Gītā (8.22): 'That Supreme Being, O Pārtha, in whom are all beings and by whom all this is pervaded, is attainable by undivided devotion.' So also in the Nṛsiṁhapurāṇa: 'When that Ancient Person who can be attained through devotion only, is there, why not an effort be made for liberation?' Therefore, when the internal organ is dissolved through supreme devotion only, liberation characterised by the attainment of the bliss of Brahman, results. This is the meaning. Its characteristic is thus indicated to be the attainment of the bliss of Brahman, unaccompanied by the antecedent non-existence (prā gabhā va) of the dissolution of the internal organ\( ^7 \); this is liberation. Here, the internal organ is held to be the limiting adjunct of the individual soul, since it is accepted that the principle of buddhi has sprung up from the Lord
This long and complicated sentence simply means that the attainment of the bliss of Brahman is accompanied by the dissolution of the internal organ. Another reading of the original is prā gabhā va-sahavṛtī instead of prā gabhā va-asahavṛtī which is even more complicated to translate sensibly.

Objection: Since the attainment of the bliss of Brahman is ever present, it is not an end to be pursued by man.

Reply: Not so; because like a village etc., it can still be of utility to man, in a special way. Otherwise, even in the case of happiness there is the possibility of its not being an object of pursuit by man; because in such cognitions as `This is the thing happiness determined by the general idea (jāti) of happiness (sukhatva) inhering in it,' since the general idea is eternal, anything possessing it also becomes eternal, and hence does not become an object of pursuit by man. And, (unlike the power of cognition), desire and volition cannot separate the individual from the species. Therefore (we maintain that) desire and volition being coloured by that part of the object which is unfixed, pursue also that which is fixed (both being to them inseparably mixed).

Though the village is always there and hence is not to be produced by our will, still, we can produce a special relationship with it; as for instance, that of the owner of that village. Similarly though the bliss of Brahman is ever present, the individual soul can create a special relationship with it through supreme devotion.

Perception is of two kinds: savikalpaka or determinate and nirvikalpaka or indeterminate. The latter is a general comprehension whereas the former is particular comprehension. When we see a jar, we first comprehend the general species (i.e. jar-ness or ghatatva) and also the jar in which this inheres. The two ideas are distinct. This perception is nirvikalpaka. Next however, the two ideas are combined and there arises the perception `This is a jar', (and then the knowledge about its size, colour etc.) which is called savikalpaka. Usually we are not conscious of the first step. The commentator says that though the power of cognition has these two distinct steps, desire and volition do not have that. Consequently they are unable to separate the two (i.e. the species and the individual, the quality and the qualified etc.). Hence it is quite possible to argue for argument's sake, on the above lines leading to the conclusion that even happiness cannot be sought after by man since it is always there!

Objection: The knowledge that the object cannot be obtained by our volition (or effort) will act as a restraint!

Reply: What is there that is incongruous in this? Just as in the case of the ś yena sacrifice, where the intense desire (to destroy the enemy) will overshadow the knowledge that it is accompanied by a very undesirable result (and
goad him to perform that sacrifice), here also, a strong desire may overshadow the knowledge that the object cannot be got by his volition, and thus goad him to action. Moreover, the Āgama also says that bliss is the essential character of Brahman and that is established in liberation. From this also (it is known) that such a state is to be striven for.

The Śadviṃśa Brāhmaṇa (3.8) recommends this sacrifice to him who wants to kill his enemies by incantations.

But then, even if supreme devotion is attained, there will be no liberation; because, just as the unseen desert, which is responsible for this life, has to be dissolved only through working it out, so the other types of unseen deserts also (accumulated over the past several births) get dissolved only by working them out. This objection is now met:

97. (Liberation is) delayed only so long as life lasts. However, the other (unseen deserts) get destroyed since they have no place to abide in.

When devotion to the Supreme soul arises, 'He will be delayed only so long as he is not liberated (from the body); then he will obtain (Him)' (Ch. U. 6.14.2). Similarly (we read elsewhere): 'Whoever has steady devotion to Thee, the root-cause of all the worlds, what has he to do with meritorious acts, wealth or desire? Liberation is (already) placed in his grasp' (V. P. 1.2.20). This being the case the word ā yuḥ (‘life’) (in the aphorism) means that unseen desert which has produced the present life. Even though supreme devotion has arisen, there is ‘dealy’ i.e., obstruction to liberation, to that extent only and so long he will only have jīvanmukti.11 When this unseen desert gets dissolved (with the death of the body) and (with it), the internal organ also being absolutely abolished and there being no place for the ‘others,’ i.e. the unfructified merits and demerits to abide in, they also get destroyed, i.e., will not produce any experience. Consequently there is no question of final liberation not coming off, (especially) since the internal organ also, being itself changeable (and so, destroyable), helps to cause it. It should not be supposed that these other unseen deserts cannot produce their fruits; because, their capacity of being a cause (to produce those fruits) is indestructible though they do not actually produce them due to the absence of other helpful causes.12 The (unseen desert) which may manifest itself through the pleasure or the displeasure of the Lord, will also get destroyed in course of time or by the occurrence of the mundane dissolution (pralaya), just as the potential fruit (apūrva) of a principal will not be produced at all by the subsidiary potential fruits due to some defect in the performance of those subsidiaries.13 And there is no defect in all our arguments, because (according to us) the fruits of actions are offered to the Supreme Brahman so that they do not cause any bondage. As for the destruction of the fruit-bearing tendencies of our actions by knowledge, it is only indirect.14
According to some schools of Indian philosophy, the final liberation will come only after the death of the body, even though supreme knowledge or devotion has been attained while living. This liberation is technically termed videhamukti.

However, such a person has, while living, attained the highest possible state which is called jīvanmukti, as opposed to videhamukti.

A seed kept in a closed tin does not sprout even though it has the inherent capacity to do so, due to the absence of other causes like soil, water etc. Similarly here also.

It was previously declared that merit and demerit of the individuals reside in the intellect of the Supreme Lord and that He gives their fruits by being pleased or displeased. So, it may now be argued that since the Lord's intellect will never be dissolved, merit and demerit will continue to exist eternally and hence there will be no hope of any liberation!

Svapneśvara has tried to counter this objection on the analogy of a Vedic sacrifice consisting of several subsidiary rites.

For example, the Darśa-pūrṇa-māsa sacrifice consists of six parts. Each of these parts produces its own apūrva. But the general apūrva of the sacrifice as a whole is produced only by the united effects of all. Even if any one of the subsidiaries is not performed, or becomes defective due to any reason, the general apūrva will not be produced.

And there, the analogy ends! It is not very clear how this can be connected with regard to any work, he has the freedom to do, or not to do or even to do it in a different manner. Hence the unseen desert produced by each and every action of his should produce its own result independent of others, sooner or later, and can never be destroyed either by time or by mundane dissolution.

There seems to be some force and substance in the objector's contention. If time or mundane dissolution can destroy them, as our commentator argues, then there is no reason why it should not destroy the merits and demerits of all irrespective of their spiritual realisation!

It is indirect because it produces supreme devotion, which alone has the power to destroy the bondage of karma. This standpoint is obviously opposed to Śaṅkara's.

Perhaps, a better way of arguing it out would be to say that the Lord-on whose pleasure of displeasure depends the retribution for karma-will be so pleased with His devotee who has developed supreme devotion, that He will wipe off the balance of his karma, just as a king will remit the balance of his own sentence upon his subject, whose subsequent behaviour has pleased him immensely. This being a treatise on devotion, there should be no difficulty in accepting this explanation.
98. Their transmigratory existence arises (due to) want of devotion and not due to want of knowledge since (it has) not been proved to be the cause.

Is the transmigratory existence of the individual soul considered to be due to want of knowledge (i.e., ignorance) or is it the result of want of devotion? This aphorism proceeds to (answer this question).

These individual souls have three alternative courses: heaven, jī vanmukti, and final liberation, Out of these, jī vanmukti or liberation while still living, means the attainment of supreme devotion. Its non-attainment is however, transmigratory existence.

This transmigratory existence also, is there, only due to the want of the desire for devotion. It will disappear when devotion is produced. So has it been declared by the great rṣ is.

`As long as one has not taken refuge in Thee, the deliverer from all sin, so long will one have distress, desire, infatuation as also worldly pleasures' (V. P. 1.9.72).

(Some people) desire to state that this creation has been produced due to the ignorance of the truth and that it gets abolished on the attainment of the knowledge of the truth. Since there are no material causes which produce the snake in the rope etc., and since their (disappearance due to knowledge also) is impossible (the above-mentioned theory cannot be proved).

So far, the first part of aphorism had been explained. This verse now deals with the latter part. The Advaitic standpoint that ignorance is the cause of all bondage and that knowledge is the cause of deliverance is criticised here. The reasons given in support of this in the sūtra 86 may be remembered here. The gist of the whole argument is that the material universe being real, it cannot be produced by mere ignorance of the truth, just as a real snake cannot be produced by the mere ignorance of the nature of the rope. In this stock example of Advaitins, there never was any real snake and the whole thing was a case of mistake in perception. If ignorance was really the cause of this universe, then knowledge could certainly have abolished it. Since the former is not true, the latter also cannot be possible.
The succession of births made miserable by the sight of the son of Sun (i.e. Yama), and also by the scourgings of the servants of Yama-these are the mirage of the wave of the creature's sense of 'I' and 'mine', the effect of turning away from the lotus feet of Kṛṣṇa.

This looks like a quotation but the source has not been traced.

99. Like Rudra, these (individual souls) have three eyes (as it were), due to the division (of the means of knowledge) into verbal testimony, inference and sense-perception.

These individual souls have three 'eyes', instruments for determining the nature of things; in other words, three means of knowledge. Though there is no difference with regard to the knowledge obtained, the three-fold division is due to the instruments (of knowledge) being three-fold. They are as follows: Verbal testimony is of the form of a word and its meaning which are fit for knowing; (it is the same as) producing knowledge through the word. It has been listed first because (being revealed word), it is the chief means of knowing about the supernatural devotion and its means. Again, inferential knowledge is produced by the knowledge of the 'sign' (liṅga) which abides in the minor term (pakṣa) and is invariably accompanied by a known major term (sādhyā). Since we hold that an effect always pre-exists in its cause, there is no incongruity in saying 'the sign when recognised as abiding' etc. The senses produce direct perceptive knowledge when they get connected with their objects and they are six: mind and the organs of hearing, touching, seeing, tasting and smelling. These, by their connection with their objects dispel the darkness of the internal organ and produce a modification in it of sattva (the quality of light, knowledge and goodness) taking the form of the object and illumined by the conscious soul. That is why it has been declared thus: `Light arises in this body through all its avenues.' (Gītā 14.11)

All this jugglery of words can be cleared by an example: 'The hill is on fire, because, it has smoke. It is known that wherever there is smoke, there is fire.' Here, the knowledge of the fire on the hill, though the fire itself is not seen directly, is gained by inference. There are certain technical terms normally used with regard to such inferences. The thing to be proved (e.g. the fire) is called sādhyā or dharma or anumeya or the major term. The thing in which this major term exists, is known as pakṣa or the minor term (e.g. the hill). The sign (liṅga) or the reason (hetu which leads to such a conclusion is the middle term (e.g., smoke). This knowledge from inference will not be valid unless there is a universal connection (vyāpāti) between the middle term and the major term (e.g., smoke and fire).

The term jñāyamāna is in present continuous tense. It may be objected that at the time of inference the 'sign' might not be there, having already passed off. It may come in future also. Consequently no inference would be possible. This statement is in reply to such a possible objection. Since, according to the satkāryavāda to which the commentator subscribes, an effect is always pre-existing in its cause, the 'sign' will always be present-latent or manifest-and hence inference also is always possible.
As for sorrow etc., which are modifications of the internal organ of the individual soul, (which organ is of the nature of understanding or intellect), they do not remain unknown; but become manifest due to the light of the soul itself. Hence there is no necessity to assume the modification of sattva to account for their being known as this is cumbersome. It is this only that is meant by saying that (they are) illumined by the witness (i.e. the soul). Therefore there are only three (means of knowledge) divided as verbal testimony, inference and sense perception. Just as Rudra has three organs of sight, neither more nor less, so here also; and like them, they indicate the moon, the sun and the fire. However, ‘comparison’ (upamā na) being only useful for comprehending the direct meaning of a word, is included in these three only and is not an independent (means of knowledge); because, it is effected by the mind itself with the assistance of the inference known as sā mā nyatodṛ ṣ ṭ a, starting from the recognised fact that a well-known word is applied to the same object to which unknown word is applied, just as the determination by analogy of the metaphorical meanings of words in poetry. Since we have already discussed about the means of knowledge in our two works, Nyā yatattvanikāṣā and Vedā ntattvanikāṣā, it will not be extended here. Cowell gives an interesting explanation: ‘Śiva’s right eyes is the sun, his left is the moon and his third eye in the centre of his forehead is fire. I suppose that the sun properly stands for revelation as being the brightest, the moon for inference (from its connexion with pakṣ a as the ‘lunar fortnight’ and ‘the minor term’) and the fire for the five senses. In the text, however, the moon is put first in the compound (according to the rule abhyarhitaṇca) as being the monarch of the stars, planets, and Brāhmaṇ as. See V. P. 1.22’ (Cowell’s translation, p. 109).

Logicians divide anumā na or inference into three kinds: 1) pū rvavat 2) ś eṣ avat and 3) sā mā nyatodṛ ṣ ṭ a. When we see the clouds and expect rain, it is a case of pū rvavat inference where we perceive the antecedent and infer the consequent. This is because of our previous experience. When we see a river in flood and say that there was rain, it is a case of ś eṣ avat inference where we perceive the consequent and into the antecedent when we see a horned animal and infer that it has a tail, it is a case of sā mā nyatodṛ ṣ ṭ a inference. It is based on uniformity of experience. Upamā na or comparison is another means of knowledge accepted by many schools including Nyā ya and Advaita Vedā nta. It is the means by which we gain the knowledge of a thing from its similarity to another thing previously known. Haribhadra’s Ś aḍ darś ana- samuccaya (23) puts it nicely thus:

‘To prove an unknown thing by its similarity to a well- known thing, is called upamā na. For instance; the Gavaya (wildox) is like the cow’.

Unlike the logicians and the Advaitins, Ś ā ṇ ilya accepts only three valid means of knowledge. Svapneś vara has tried to prove here that upamā na considered by others as a separate and independent means of knowledge can be included under inference itself. His arguments run as follows: Comparison or upamā na is useful only in so far as it helps us to comprehend the direct meaning of a word and does not produce any new knowledge. For example, when we hear a new word gavaya and are told that it is an animal resembling a cow, and when we actually see a gavaya, we connect the word with the object inferring that this must be the animal called gavaya. This knowledge is actually got by the mind with the help of sā mā nyatodṛ ṣ ṭ a inference itself. How? By applying a well-known word (like ‘cow’) to the same object (an animal like cow) as the
unknown word (gavaya) also: ‘This animal must be a gavaya because it is just like a cow.’ This is just like determining
the metaphorical meanings of words and phrases used in poetry when the poet says, ‘The tiger has come’ with
respect to a human being, we infer that the man known for his ferocity like that of a tiger, has come.

The ‘intellect’ of the individual soul is called manas or mind. It has the power of contraction and expansion. It is by
this that the simultaneousness or non-simultaneousness of several perceptible knowledges can be accounted for.

Here, the nature of mind is being described. Though Śaṅkha holds that intellect (buddhi), mind (manas) and
egoism (ahaṅ kā ra) are all distinct, Svapneś vara, following the usual Vedantic standpoint, considers them as
same. The same internal organ (antaḥ karaṇ a) gets different names when it is modified into different forms:
Resolution and doubt go by the name of manas.
Determinative faculty is buddhi. Though waves are citta. Egosense is ahaṅ kā ra. Hence the buddhi or the intellect
associated with the individual soul is the same as manas or mind. According to Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools mind
is atomic and as such can comprehend only one thing at a time. Our commentator holds that it is not so, but is
capable of contraction and expansion. When it expands, it can perceive several things simultaneously like the colour,
smell and softness of a flower. When it is contracted it can perceive only one.

Like the sensations of pain etc., the sense of egoism also is directly perceived in the intellect because all the intellects
associated with the individual souls have arisen from the ego-principle ofĪśvara (or Brahman).

That means, no action of the perceptive faculty or any evolution of the intellect itself is necessary.

Pain, pleasure etc., are qualities which reside in the intellect. When reflected upon the soul, they are wrongly
attributed to the latter.

The subtle elements, the gross elements, the sense-organs etc., are fit to the known by the intellect of the Lord since
they have been produced out of it. For the same reason they can be grasped by the individual soul as also its senses.

Since the intellect of the individual soul also has sprung up from the Lord, it must be capable of grasping the
external world made up of these elements.

The five gross elements, the five subtle elements, the eleven organs of senses and action (including the mind),
egoism, intellect, nature (pradhāna), the soul and the Supreme Lord-these are the first principles in brief and they
are twenty-six.

100. Manifestation and disappearance are modifications (of the existing), because of the connection with the result of the action (expressed by the root-verb).

Creation and destruction will now be discussed as they are connected with the subject. Between these, creation is characterised by manifestation, the competency of an already existing thing to produce its effects. Similarly destruction is the incompetency to produce effects. In the same manner increase, decrease etc., are also modifications of an already existing thing only. Why so? Because in such statements as, `He makes a pot' `He destroys a pot' etc., a connection has been specified between the object and the result of action implied by the verbal root. And these two (i.e. manifestation and disappearance) can take place only with respect to a thing that exists and with respect to that which does not exist. So has it been declared: 'Existence cannot belong to that which is not, nor non-existence to that which is' (Gītā 2.16). Similarly in such phrases as `It exists,' `It is destroyed' etc., also, it is clear that the object is the basis for the action (implied by the verbal root). And this can happen only to a thing that exists.

That (`manifestation') is the connection with the very first moment and it also means the counter entity to destruction, since `the very first moment' cannot be defined, (accurately).

And there is no scope for the argument that our position will lead to infinite regress or cumbrousness since every manifestation needs another manifestation to manifest it;
because, the manifestation of the accessory things (of the pot like clay etc., and their union) is itself the manifestation of the pot. Otherwise, a similar charge can be levelled against the doctrine of `production' also, saying that one production needs another production.¹⁹ This being the case, the `antecedent non-existence' (prā gabhā va) of a pot (can be defined as) the series of previous manifestations and disappearances and `destruction' as its disappearance (of the pot). And this destruction will sometimes be absolute as in the case of Devadatta's body (after his death) or of the intellects of liberated souls. And the two (other non-existences), `the mutual non-existence' (anyonyā bhā va) and `the absolute non existence' (atyntā bhā va) are not really different from `possessing mutually exclusive properties' and `the site where

the thing should have been' respectively.²⁰ Otherwise one has to accept another absence in the first absence and so on ad infinitum. But in a mundane dissolution, we do not have any other modification, than the one called `mundane dissolution' (pralaya). Since the latent impressions produced by past actions continue to remain in a subtle form (to germinate into future merit and demerit and thus determine subsequent births) there is nothing wrong with this hypothesis. Thus ends this three-fold investigation into the doctrine of devotion.
19 The crux of the problem is whether a cause or causes `produce' (utpatti) an effect which was not there before, or, do they simply `manifest' (ā virbhā va) the effect which pre-existed in the causes in a latent and subtle form. The followers of the Nyā ya and Vaiś īka hold the former opinion whereas the Saṅ khyaś and Vedā ntins uphold the latter on the basis of satkā ryavā ḍa. Here it is being argued from the latter stand-point.

`Manifestation' simply means that all the relevant causes-the material, instrumental and the efficient-have come together. If it were something new, then the question would have arisen that this manifestation needs another manifestation to manifest it and so on. To avoid this, if we take recourse to the `production theory' for the second or third manifestation, then the opponent would say that it is easier to accept that theory at the very beginning instead of making it cumbersome like this. After thus arguing it out, the commentator hits back saying that this very same defect can be pointed out more in their own production theory.

After discussing `manifestation,' `disappearance' is taken up for discussion. Just as the logicians hold that a thing is produced (utpatti) from its causes it can also be destroyed (vinā ś a) by other causes. As against this theory of utpatti and vinā ś a, the aphorism and the commentary are expounding the theory of `manifestation' and `disappearance' (ā virbhā va and tirobhā va).

The logicians hold that abhā va (non esixtance) is of four kinds: (1) prā gabhā va (antecedent non-existence), e.g., the non-existence of a pot before its production; (2) pradhvaṁ ś ā bhā va non- existence caused by destruction), e.g., the non-existence of the pot after it is destroyed; (3) anyonyā bhā va (mutual non-existence) e.g., of a pot in a cloth and of the cloth in the pot; (4) atyantā bhā va (absolute non-existence), e.g., `There is no pot; here.' That means there is absolute non-existence of the pot here.

Our commentator is explaining these terms in his own way, in conformity with the theory of manifestation and disappearance: The prā gabhā va of the pot is nothing but the series of manifestations and disappearances before the present manifestation. What the others call as vinā ś a or nā ś a (destruction) is nothing but disappearance. Hence pradhvaṁ ś ā bhā va is the state after this disappearance; or it will be the prā gabhā va for a future manifestation. Being possessed of mutually opposite qualities is itself anyonyā bhā va. When we say that there is no pot in the cloth and vice versa, it simply means that the pot has `potness' (ghaṭ atva) which is absent in the cloth and vice versa. And, finally, atyantā bhā va simply signifies the place. When we say there is no pot here, it simply refers to this ground not containing the pot. Otherwise, if we take that non-existence of the pot itself as something positive it will lead to queer conclusions! For instance, when we say there is no pot here, it means there is non-existence of the pot here. Is there a pot in this non-existence? No. So there is a non-existence of the pot in that non-existence of the pot! This line of argument can thus be extended ad infinitum.

1. May the lustre of the Lord Ś rī  Kṛ ṣ ṇ a adorned with the kaustubha gem, wearing yellow garments, (himself) resembling the dark cloud, with lotus-like eyes, holding the flute and surrounded by the dust raised by the cows abide in your hearts!
2. There was in the bracelet of the country of Bengal (Gauḍa) a well-known place like a gem (in that bracelet) in which existed a leader of the wise, named Viśārada, who held the post of monarch over all the rulers of the earth; from him was born Jaleśvara, the chief of the learned, and general of kings; by Svapneśvara his son, was this investigation into the doctrine of devotion composed.

Thus ends the second section of the third chapter of the commentary on the hundred aphorisms of Śaṅḍilya composed by the most learned teacher Svapneśvara.

THE THIRD CHAPTER ENDS HERE
THUS ENDS THIS INVESTIGATION INTO THE DOCTRINE OF DEVOTION